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Preface
This book contains six essays, the first five of which are based on
presentations made at the twenty-ninth Annual Public Lecture Series
sponsored by the Department of Economics, Western Michigan Uni
versity during the academic year 1992-93. The final essay is based on
a public lecture delivered by a University Visiting Scholar in Econom
ics during the fall of 1993.
In co-directing the public lectures and in preparing this book, we are
first indebted to the authors of the essays without whom this volume
would not have been possible. We are grateful to our colleagues in the
Department of Economics at Western Michigan University for their
support during our effort in organizing and directing the Lecture Series
and the Visiting Scholar Program. We are thankful to the College of
Arts and Sciences and the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research for their co-sponsorship of the Lecture Series, and we thank
the University Visiting Scholar Program for sponsoring the public lec
ture on which the final essay of the volume is based.
We are also thankful to the members of the Economics Department
Lectures Committee for the 1992-93 academic year, Professor Emily
Hoffman of Western Michigan University, and Dr. Timothy Bartik of
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Finally, we express our thanks and appreciation to the W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research for their cooperation and the high
quality of editorial services rendered in the publication of this volume.

Sisay Asefa and Wei-Chiao Huang
Kalamazoo, Michigan, January 1994
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Introduction
Sisay Asefa and Wei-Chiao Huang
Western Michigan University

Human capital, as viewed by economists, involves a process of
investment that enhances human labor productivity by means of
advances in knowledge and its applications. It specifically involves
investment expenditures on education, training, health, nutrition, and
related factors that increase the productivity of the labor force. Nobel
Laureate T. W. Schultz (1956) was one of the first economists to iden
tify the deficiency of the standard neoclassical production function in
neglecting the critical role of human capital. More recent empirical
studies of economic growth by Hagen (1980), Denison (1985), and
Jorgenson (1988), have shown that human capital investment has made
a significant contribution to the economic growth of industrial nations
such as the United States. The essays in the present volume explore the
various national and international dimensions of human capital and
development ranging from the economic implications of demographic
trends in the United States (Richard A. Easterlin), the effect of popula
tion growth and human capital on development (D. Gale Johnson and
Julian L. Simon), the relationship among human capital, the family,
and economic development (Mark R. Rosenzweig), and the crucial
issue of workplace training in the United States (Peter B. Doeringer
and Ann P. Bartel).
In the first essay, Easterlin begins by challenging Benjamin Wattenberg's book, The Birth Dearth, which predicts a decline of the United
States economy due to an aging population and low fertility over the
next century. Easterlin presents the rationale offered by Wattenberg
and others for their pessimistic views about the economic effects of
future demographic trends of the United States. He makes the argu
ment that these popular views about the adverse effects of declining
population growth on future economic development do not stand up to
long-term historical facts. In supporting his thesis, he examines the his
torical record of selected Western industrial countries over the last cen
tury. These data include demographic variables such as the historical
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relationships between population growth and economic growth, the
size of the total dependency burden (youth and old age) in relation to
the rate of economic growth, the size and age of the labor force, and
the implication for overall educational/human capital level of the labor
supply. Based on these demographic data over the last century for
eleven Western industrial nations including the United States, Easterlin
concludes that the historical experience and evidence raise serious
doubt about the "secular stagnation thesis." He notes that projected
demographic trends are quite small by historical standards, and the
projected aging of the labor force is within the range of historical expe
rience. He further contends that any rise in old-age dependency will be
offset by declining youth dependency for the United States and West
ern industrial nations, and that the projected total dependency rates are,
on average, similar to the late nineteenth century for these countries,
thereby casting some doubt on the whole stagnation thesis. The level
ing of fertility below replacement level is not out of line with the data
on completed fertility in this century, according to Easterlin. These
data show long-term fluctuations of about half a century duration, and
that the emerging labor market conditions seem to favor a new
upswing; the data show a total fertility rate above the 1980 trough for
all the countries examined. Easterlin points out that even the possibil
ity of a new baby boom, dismissed by existing demographic projec
tions, cannot totally be ruled out.
In the next essay, Johnson takes up another aspect of human capi
tal focusing on the value of a human being with little or no formal
investment. His essay is relevant to low-income countries of the world
with relatively low human capital investments of their populations. In
examining the evidence on the effect of population growth on per capi
tal income growth of developing countries, Johnson challenges the
popular view of the negative relationship between population growth
and per capita income in developing countries, as advanced by the pro
ponents of "the Population Bomb Thesis." His essay summarizes some
of the major findings of a working group organized by the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, which is also
critical of the pessimistic view about the effects of population growth
on economic growth of developing countries. Johnson presents three
empirical propositions that cast serious doubt on the commonly held
view about the negative relationship between per capita income and
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population growth. First, significant increases in per capita income in
Western industrial nations occurred between the eighteenth and twenti
eth century when their populations were also rising rapidly and life
expectancy was increasing. Second, developing countries achieved
higher per capita income, a rise in life expectancy, and reduced infant
mortality since about 1950, when population growth began to rise rap
idly. Specifically, Johnson points out the fact that between 1950 and
1980 developing countries experienced a rapid population growth of
over 2 percent, paralleled with per capita income growth of 2.6 per
cent. Third, he presents evidence from regression results based on
cross-country data that show no significant relationship between popu
lation growth and economic growth. According to Johnson, other vari
ables such as economic policy, may be more important than population
and human capital variables included in these results. He supplements
this view by referring to recent empirical evidence by Levine and
Renelt (1992) which presents results on the effect of various policy
factors and population growth on the economic growth of 119 coun
tries. None of the regressions showed a significant relationship
between population and economic growth. Thus, Johnson makes the
point that much of the human suffering in developing countries over
the years has been caused by nonpopulation growth factors such as
civil wars, state policy failure, and economic mismanagement. Johnson
also summarizes some findings related to nine questions that came out
of the NRC report on population growth and economic development
that deal with the effect of population growth on the supply of exhaust
ible and renewable resources, environment, worker productivity, levels
of schooling and health, income inequality, rural-urban migration, and
social costs of fertility. He concludes that there is little evidence from
this report "to support the position that a family imposes negative
externalities on society when it chooses to have another child." He
qualifies his argument, however, by pointing out that a very high popu
lation growth in excess of 3 percent in the short run, "may reduce rates
of per capita income growth primarily due to the stress placed on insti
tutions such as education, health, and city public services," and so
NRC's evidence is more relevant to a moderate population growth rate
of 1.25 to 2.5 percent. Governments of developing countries should,
according to Johnson, pursue social and economic programs such as
primary education, maternal and child health care, and social security
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programs that have the external effect of reducing population growth.
He concludes his essay by presenting a rationale for what he calls
"positive population policy," whose aim is to assist "every family in a
country to have the number of children each family desires" without
coercion. For such a policy to materialize, governments must provide
relevant information, including contraceptive materials and services, to
every household on a voluntary basis.
Rosenzweig's essay explores the relationship among human capital,
the family, and economic development. He examines two related
aspects of this complex relationship. First, whether family relation
ships and stability are related to the rate of economic growth. Second,
how economic development affects the level and returns to investment
on human capital. Realizing that the study of these relationships is a
complex task in the context of a modern industrial economy such as
the United States, he bases his analysis on data from the simpler
(developing) economy of rural India. He uses time-series data that
describe farm household behavior under traditional technology and
cross-section data on farmers across India before and after the green
revolution technical change. He organizes his essay by first discussing
some key features of a traditional agrarian economy before technical
change, including the relationship between family stability and human
capital under this setting. After examining his data on the features of a
traditional economy, he includes some evidence on specific hypotheses
about the relationship between human capital and family structure with
emphasis on risk-mitigation and experience as important elements of
human capital. Rosenzweig then examines how technical change
affects human capital investments and family structure, and draws
some possible policy implications. According to Rosenzweig, experi
ence (learning by doing) is the most valuable form of human capital
under traditional static technology. Consequently, education which
enables farmers to acquire knowledge outside such environment, pro
vides little or no return. It follows that the elders have the largest
amount of human capital and respect, resulting in family stability and
intergenerational interdependence. The introduction of technical
change, however, reduces the value of past experience and erodes fam
ily ties, which leads to family breakups and instability even though the
rate of return from formal schooling may increase. Thus, according to
Rosenzweig, technical change can have a destabilizing effect on the
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family by reducing returns from experience, by decreasing the role of
risk-spreading arrangements among family members, and by weaken
ing coping mechanisms in an uncertain traditional economic environ
ment. Another important policy implication that he draws from these
findings is that a significant decline in fertility in growth areas relative
to other areas of India was achieved without any direct intervention by
the government, indicating that such efforts are unnecessary in an envi
ronment of continuous technical change and economic growth.
In the following two essays, Doeringer and Bartel both deal with the
issue of workplace training in the United States. Doeringer's essay is
concerned with whether the workplace training system of the United
States will survive international competition. He points out that the
crux of the nation's human capital deficiency problem may not be due
to its schools, and that educational reform may not be central to solv
ing the problem, especially in the short run. Instead, he notes, the prob
lem may be rooted in the weakening of the nation's workplace system
for raising labor productivity, which he defines broadly to include
effort, commitment, problem-solving capacity, and job skills.
Doeringer's view is that while educational improvement may be an
important part of a long-term solution, it is unlikely to rebuild the pro
ductive capacities of the present workers who are already out of school
and who will constitute two-thirds of the labor force during the next
decade.
Doeringer further examines some features and experiences with
such alternative systems of workplace training in the United States as
the Fordist system, the high-commitment system, and the low-wage,
Employment-at-Will System. The traditional Fordist system involves
raising productivity through "soft bargains" reached collectively
between labor and management. The high-commitment system empha
sizes individual rather than collective effort bargains to encourage the
individual worker to internalize the goals and objectives of the com
pany and to take action to achieve these goals. The employer in return
provides intensive career training and development, fair compensation,
and an implicit guarantee of permanent employment, with a result of
continuous improvement in productivity and career earnings. The rela
tively new employment-at-will system allows firms to keep wages as
low as market competition will allow, with an indefinite period of
employment that quickly adjusts to changing labor market conditions,

6

Introduction

with no commitment from employers and no expectations of job secu
rity by workers. He observes that such firms do not invest on human
capital development and do not depend on effort bargains, but rely on
market incentives to motivate training investments and effort.
Doeringer's essay is also concerned with the evolution of workplace
training systems and their effects on productivity. His view is that it is
an open question whether the traditional Fordist and high-performance
workplace systems will survive in some form in the future labor mar
ket or if the low-wage, employment-at-will model will prevail.
Bartel analyzes another dimension of the issue of workplace train
ing in the United States. Her essay is concerned with whether Ameri
can workers are getting sufficient on-the-job training or if workplace
training is underproduced. She explores this question by reviewing
data available on the amount of training received by U.S. workers rela
tive to other industrial countries, by examining data on the rate of
return to investments in on-the-job training, by evaluating alternative
suggestions to alleviate the underinvestment problem, and finally by
discussing her own research findings about the relationship between
technological change and training.
Bartel identifies two general sources of data, based on surveys of
individual workers and employers, to study workplace training. She
notes that both types of data report underinvestment. Even though the
National Longitudinal Surveys of Mature Men, Young Men, Young
Women, and Youth (NLSY) are the best employee-based sources of
data, according to Bartel, these data have some measurement prob
lems, as they do not measure informal training. Informal training
appears to be quite important for U.S. workers, since it is found to
occur at the same rate as formal training programs.
Bartel's essay also examines comparative training systems in three
industrial countries: Germany, France, and Japan. The German system,
which is based on an apprenticeship contract signed between a com
pany and the government, is too rigid and narrow. Thus, it cannot be
shown that German workers are better or more trained than American
workers if the various dimensions of training are considered. The
French system relies on a mandated training tax where employers of
ten or more workers must spend a certain proportion of their labor cost
on continuous education and training of employees or pay tax equal to
the required amount minus the actual training expenditures. It cannot
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be concluded that American workers receive less training than French
workers because, while the training incidence is higher in France, its
length is much shorter. Finally, the Japanese training system applies
only to large firms that employ only one-third of the workforce. The
majority of the workforce is employed in small firms where employ
ment is not guaranteed and very little training is done.
While the comparative data do not provide any conclusive evidence
to confirm relative underinvestment, Bartel uses the rate of return data
to reach "a conclusion that there is underinvestment in job training" in
the United States. She then explores some possible causes of underin
vestment, such as higher relative turnover rate, inability of the
employer to evaluate the quality of applicants' general skills, minimum
wage constraint, and inability of young workers to pay for their own
training.
Bartel addresses the merit of alternative policy options to increase
investment in training, including government-provided training, pay
roll-based national training tax imposed on employers, and subsidies
and incentives for employees from the government. She notes that
these options, especially the first two, are generally inadequate.
Finally, Bartel examines the issue of training in relation to techno
logical change and concludes, based on her own research, that
employee training will increase as a simple by-product of technologi
cal change during the next decade. In sum, her essay shows that while
the high rates of return to training may be consistent with a possible
underproduction of training in the United States, technological change
will increase the incentives for investment in training, thereby requir
ing no external government interference with the market for labor
training.
The final essay by Simon addresses the issue of the very-long-run
effect of human capital on economic progress. Simon's essay is in the
tradition of his provocative and often controversial views on the effect
of population on economic development. The basic question addressed
in his present essay deals with "the cause of so many of the world's
population now being long-lived and endowed with much wealth and a
high standard of living, with an even larger proportion likely to enjoy
these benefits in the coming decades," compared to several centuries
ago. In other words, he queries "why the rapid progress of the past two
centuries did not begin centuries or millennia earlier. ...Was there
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something extraordinary about the human numbers or the level of tech
nology in 1700 or so?" His answer is simply that today's technology is
the sum of increments of knowledge in the past, and the additional
knowledge was produced by people and therefore must have been
influenced by human numbers. He adds that other possible factors such
as culture, politics, and economic and social systems are also influ
enced by numbers. Thus, Simon's basic hypothesis is that the size of
human population as measured by population density and number of
people combined with the technology produced by them is the root
cause of the speed of economic progress. It is his view that had popula
tion been frozen at the level of some 10,000 years ago, economic
progress would not have reached the present state. His basic rationale
is the obvious notion that if there were more people there would be
more human capital to create knowledge that leads to economic
growth. Simon's essay provides some evidence in support of what he
terms "population-induced social change" by reviewing some sketchy
time-series and cross-sectional data on the relationship between popu
lation and rate of economic growth and between population and natural
resource availability, including some evidence on the relationship
between population and structural factors that affect the rate of eco
nomic growth. Simon's basic premise is that higher density and larger
population were, historically, necessary conditions for economic
progress. Whether they were sufficient depends on the nature of partic
ular societies, which have also been capable of retrogressing with pop
ulation growth. While he supports the basic Malthusian proposition as
relevant in the short-run subsistence economy under static technology,
Simon's model refers to the very-long-run effects of population growth
as the only exogenous variable, while other variables, such as institu
tions and technology, are all endogenously determined. This leads to
one of his major points, that "no other element was as essential as the
combination of knowledge and population numbers" in the very long
run. Thus, Simon's proposition is that human economic progress is a
function of population numbers, and all related social and economic
dimensions are a function of population size and density in the very
long run. He reinforces this view by reviewing some historical evi
dence about how more people bring about more ideas, more knowl
edge, expanded markets and cities, and higher productivity and income
over the long run. He notes that even the spread of diseases has been
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positively influenced historically by population, as for example a more
dense population reduced the "virulence of mass killers" such as
malaria by practicing intensive cropping.
Finally, we are impressed with the quality and insights of the essays
resulting from this lecture series. The individual authors present a com
plementary and well-integrated approach that challenges conventional
wisdom and views about the various dimensions of human capital and
economic development from the domestic and international perspec
tives. Our aim in this introduction was to highlight some of the critical
issues discussed. We invite the reader to explore the details and the
fuller context of the various aspects of the subject in the chapters that
follow.

10 Introduction
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The Birth Dearth, Aging,
and the Economy
Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?
Richard A. Easterlm
University of Southern California

In his recent volume, The Birth Dearth, Benjamin Wattenberg sees
the American economy, fettered by low fertility and an aging popula
tion, as grinding to a virtual halt over the next century. Wattenberg
writes for a popular audience in a self-styled "speculative and provoca
tive" fashion. But his work forms the tip of a substantial iceberg of
recent scholarly opinion offering similar and even wider-ranging argu
ments about the longer-term economic prospects of the United States
and other advanced industrial economies. In a nutshell, recent low
rates of childbearing, "the birth dearth," by causing low or negative
population growth and population aging, are seen as exerting a serious
drag on the economy. This happens because of slower growth of mar
kets, decreased productivity growth, and an increased burden of depen
dency.
These arguments are typically long on speculation but short on
facts, especially with regard to history. I propose here to offer a correc
tive. First, I recapitulate briefly the theoretical arguments and note
some counterarguments that have been advanced. Then I turn to the
historical facts and assess the arguments in the light of actual experi
ence, both that of the United States and of advanced western and north
ern European countries. If population growth plays such an important
role in determining economic growth, then one would expect to find
that population growth and economic growth go together. Is this, in
fact, the case? And how do prospective rates of population growth
compare with past experience are they, for example, far lower than
what has gone before? What of the outlook for the dependency bur
den? Does this involve magnitudes that appear unprecedented? How
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has economic growth varied with the dependency burden in the past?
How serious is the prospective aging of the labor supply, as distinct
from population? What are the implications of aging for the educa
tional attainment of the labor supply?
In discussing these questions, I take as given (as do Wattenberg and
others) the current projections of population stagnation here and
abroad. Typically these projections come in three variants high, mid
dle, and low with the middle projection being most favored. But even
the high-fertility projection assumes only a modest eventual increase in
rates of childbearing, to an average of around 2.1 births per woman.
This magnitude of 2.1 is called replacement-level fertility, because it is
the rate of childbearing per woman needed to maintain population size
constant over the long run.
These projections whether low, middle, or high of future low
fertility are critical to the forecasts of stagnating population and rising
old-age dependency. But how much confidence can we place in projec
tions that seek to peer a half century or more into the future? Does the
history of population forecasting, and particularly of projections of
rates of childbearing, argue for accepting these forecasts? If not, would
alternative forecasts substantially alter the outlook for population
aging? In the concluding section, I address these questions in short,
the prospective continuation of the "birth dearth" itself.

Effects of Population on the Economy: Theoretical Arguments

The theoretical arguments are of two general types one relating to
the impact of population change on the demand for goods, the other
relating to the impact on the supply or production capabilities of the
economy (for specific references, see Easterlin 1991).
The demand argument focuses on the effect of a declining rate of
population growth. The growth rate of population, it is said, governs
the growth rate of markets, and thus of the demand for consumer goods
and also capital goods such as housing, factories, and machinery.
Declining population growth discourages business, causing markets to
expand less rapidly or cease to grow altogether.
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The arguments about supply-side effects stress the impact of popu
lation aging. The population is seen as comprising three parts young,
middle-aged, and older with the older segment growing relative to
the other two. Now assume that for any given attribute affecting pro
duction capabilities, say, physical strength, the older group is relatively
low. Other things being constant, if the elderly's share of the popula
tion grows, then the average degree of physical strength in the popula
tion as a whole will decline. Aging of the population would thus reduce
production capacity by lowering the physical capacity of the popula
tion.
The specific attributes to which this argument is applied are numer
ous. The older population is supposed to be less well educated, and
thus less skilled. The older population is assumed to be less likely to
save and thereby to finance capital accumulation. The older population
is said to be more fixed in its ways, less innovative and creative, and
thus an obstacle to technological progress. The older population is
claimed to be less geographically and occupationally mobile, and
therefore less able to take advantage of new opportunities essential to
economic progress. In combination, these arguments assert that, in
general, aging of the population will retard the growth of production
capabilities by lowering the quality of the labor supply, reducing the
rate of capital accumulation, and lessening the rate of technical
progress.
In addition, the older population is said to be different in the type of
dependency burden it presents. Per capita public expenditures on
retirement and health are greater for the older population. Hence, as the
proportion of elderly grows, so too will the proportion of taxes to
income needed to finance public retirement and health spending. Thus
the "burden of old-age dependency" raises the specter of an insupport
able tax burden on the working-age population, lowering the motiva
tion of workers to work and save.
Although this is a formidable set of arguments, it has not gone with
out challenge. Regarding the demand argument, it is pointed out that
markets depend on total spending, not number of spenders. Even with
the number of spenders constant, spending per person and thus total
spending will continue to rise as per capita income grows. On the sup
ply side, it is pointed out that arguments about physical strength are of
dubious relevance to a labor force dominated by white-collar and ser-
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vice workers. Whether older workers are less educated depends on the
historical nature of educational progress. Moreover, age stands for
experience, and an older labor force is a more experienced labor force.
Nor is it clear that the older population saves less; older persons, it is
said, may be hesitant to spend down their assets because of uncertainty
about health costs and the timing of death, as well as the desire to leave
an inheritance.
As always, such "on the one hand," "on the other" arguments leave
one in a sea of uncertainty. Hence the need for historical facts, to which
we now turn.

The Evidence
As we examine the facts, we look at the United States and at ten
European nations in the forefront of the demographic changes that
have caused concern. The population projections used are the same as
those underlying the present gloomy forecasts of long-term economic
stagnation.
What Has Been the Historical Relation Between
Population Growth and Economic Growth?
If population growth were a major factor influencing economic
growth, then one might expect to find that higher population growth
and higher economic growth go together. Is this, in fact, the case?
Figure 1 presents growth rates since 1870 of population and real per
capita income for each of the eleven countries. Average growth rates
over four long periods are given. The periods are those identified by
Angus Maddison in his book, Phases of Capitalist Development
(1982), as development "phases" common to these countries, except
that the most recent period in his study, 1973-1979, has been updated
to cover 1973-1986.
Studying the figure, one notes that fluctuations in the two series go
together in most countries. Conceivably, one might seize on this to
argue that declines in population growth cause declines in per capita
income growth, but this is to argue that the tail wags the dog. Note that
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Figure 1. Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita (solid line) and
Population (dotted line), Specificed Country and Period
1870-1986 (percent per year)
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in all countries the swings in population growth rates are quite small
compared with those in per capita income growth.
Even more doubt about the importance of population growth in
determining economic growth arises when one compares long-term
trends in the two series. While population growth has trended down
ward in most of these countries over the last century, real per capita
income growth has trended upward. Typically the two post-1950
observations on real GDP per capita in figure 1, including even that for
the recent relatively depressed period, 1973-1986, lie above those for
the two earlier periods. In contrast, the post-1950 rates of population
growth are about the same as or lower than the pre-1950 rates. This
inverse association between trends in economic growth and population
growth is contrary to what one would have expected if declining popu
lation growth were exerting a serious drag on the economy.
How Sizable are Projected Declines in Population Growth
Compared With Past Experience?
The population growth rates projected for these countries in the next
century are, in fact, not a great deal different from their current rates.
The average annual growth rate of population in 1973-1986 was only
0.3 percent; the projected growth rate, at its lowest for the period
2030-2050 averages -0.3 percent (United Nations 1988b). The pro
spective decline in population growth rates is thus, on average, 0.6 per
centage points over an interval of six decades, or a tenth of a
percentage point per decade. As we have just seen, per capita income
growth has trended upward in these countries, while population growth
has trended downward. It is hard to believe that such a modest further
decline in the rate of population growth would in itself produce a dra
matic adverse departure from the historic pattern of secularly rising per
capita income growth.
How Sizable Are Projected Increases in the Overall
Dependency Burden Compared With Past Experience?
The dependency burden is sometimes discussed as though it com
prises elderly dependents alone, but it is obvious that the burden of
dependency on the working-age population involves infants and chil-
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dren as well as older dependents. Thus, to put dependency changes in
proper perspective, one needs to look at the size of the entire depen
dent population, young and old, relative to the working age population.
To this end, figure 2 presents, for the same eleven countries since 1880,
the ratio to the working age population aged 15-64 of the sum of the
two dependent age groups, persons under age 15 and over age 64. Sub
sequently, we will consider the two age groups separately. The vertical
broken line in each panel is at 1990, separating actual experience from
projected. The horizontal line in each panel, about which most of the
curves fluctuate, is at a value of 0.6, indicating that, on average in this
period, there were about 0.6 dependents per member of the workingage population.
How sizable is the prospective increase in dependency when viewed
in historical perspective? Figure 2 shows a projected peak in depen
dency for all of the countries in 2040, half a century hence. How does
the height of this peak compare with the highest level reached in the
past century? In three countries (France, Germany, and Switzerland)
the projected peak is clearly higher; in three others (Norway, the
United Kingdom, and the United States), clearly lower; and in the rest,
it is about the same. On average, the total dependency rate in these
advanced industrial countries will about match its historic high in the
period since 1880. The projected levels in 2040 are clearly higher than
those prevailing at the current time, and it is this contrast that gives rise
to much of the current concern. But extending the period of compari
son backward a full century, one finds that in only three of the coun
tries is projected dependency higher than in the past. Moreover, in no
case does the projected high fall outside of the past century's experi
ence of these countries taken as a whole the highest projected ratios
are somewhat less than 0.8, as was true of the highest ratios in the late
nineteenth century.
Thus, the outlook for the total dependency burden, when viewed
against the experience of the past century, is not unprecedented. This
conclusion holds under a variety of sensitivity tests. Varying the con
cept of dependency for example, instead of population ratios, using
nonworkers to workers does not alter the picture. Nor does focusing
on the "highly" dependent population, that is, old-old plus youngyoung. Neither do changes in the source used for the projections
OECD, UN, IMF, etc. Nor does allowance for wide variation in immi-
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Figure 2. Total Dependency Ratio, Actual and Projected, Specified
Country, 1880-2050 (ratio of persons aged 0-14 and 65+ to
those aged 15-64)
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gration. Among current projections, the only case in which total depen
dency would rise to levels unprecedented in the past century is that
which assumes a mortality revolution at the oldest ages. Although this
possibility cannot be wholly ruled out, it is not this projection that
underlies current gloomy accounts of the economic impact of popula
tion aging. Rather, such accounts are based on the more moderate mor
tality projections on which the projections used in figure 2 are based.

What Has Been the Historical Relation Between the
Dependency Burden and the Rate of Economic Growth?
Figure 3 bears on the relation between the dependency burden and
the rate of economic growth. It is designed to assess whether increases
in the dependency rate have been associated with decreases in the rate
of economic growth. The four time periods used in figure 1 are again
used here, 1870-1913 through 1973-1986.
As can be seen, although growth of total output (GDP) per capita
(the solid line) has varied markedly from one period of economic
growth to another, the total dependency rate (the dotted line) has not.
In most of the countries, the dependency rate is highest in the period
1870-1913, thereafter it is fairly stable (figure 3). In the post-World
War II period the contrast is dramatic. Growth rates of real per capita
income in the period 1950-1973 were almost double those from 1973
to 1986, averaging 3.5 versus 1.9 percent. In contrast, in almost all of
the countries, the dependency rate was nearly the same in the two peri
ods, and the eleven-country average was, in fact, virtually identical, .55
versus .54. One would be hard put to argue that dependency had much
to do with the dramatic post-1973 drop in economic growth rates, and
not surprisingly, it is never mentioned in scholarly attempts to explain
this decline.

What Does the Prospective Rise in Old-Age Dependency Imply
for the Tax Burden on the Working-Age Population?
Although overall dependency will not be so much different, the pro
spective age composition of dependency will be. As shown in figure 4,
youth dependency is trending downward and old-age dependency
upward. Seen in conjunction with the total dependency trend, this shift
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Figure 3. Rate of Growth of GDP Per Capita (solid line, right scale) and
Average Total Dependency Ratio (dotted line, left scale),
Specified Country and Period, 1870-1986
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Figure 4. Youth and Elderly Dependency Ratio, Specified Country,
1880-2020 (solid line = ratio 65+ to 15-64, broken line = ratio
0-14 to 15-64)
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puts in a rather different light the issue of the prospective burden on the
working population of rising old-age dependency. Clearly, a declining
burden of young dependents compensates for a growing burden of
older dependents. Analysts of government spending sometimes recog
nize this by noting the offset to rising government retirement and
health spending provided by declining education expenditures (Holzmann 1988; OECD 1988). But the relevant comparison must go
beyond this to consider the full economic costs per dependent, that is,
the private as well as public costs of supporting infants and children
compared with the elderly. If the working-age population needs to
spend less out of its income to support children, then more funds are
potentially available for supporting older dependents (United Nations
1988a).
It is one thing to count heads and compare the number of younger
versus older dependents. It is another to assess the full economic costs
of supporting an average younger versus older dependent. Clearly, the
standard of support for both children and older dependents is socially,
not physiologically, determined. Moreover, there is the need to con
sider nonmarket production and consumption of the two groups.
Indeed, it is because of the ambiguity regarding costs of dependents
that it is important to have a clear picture of the numbers of younger
versus older dependents, as in figure 4.
The amount of empirical work that has actually been done on rela
tive costs of the two groups is small, but what has been done suggests
that economic costs per dependent (private plus public) are, in fact, not
much different for older and younger dependents (Easterlin 1991). If
this is so, then the economic burden of dependency on the working-age
population is unlikely to be noticeably higher in the first half of the
twenty-first century than in the twentieth century, since the increased
cost of supporting a larger proportion of older dependents will be offset
by the decreased cost of supporting a smaller proportion of younger
dependents. This implies that the real issue to be faced is largely politi
cal, namely, how to capture via taxation the savings of households
from supporting fewer younger dependents, so that these funds can be
used to meet the rise in public expenditures needed to support older
dependents. The question of political feasibility is a serious one, but it
does not seem insurmountable, given that the workers to be taxed
would themselves eventually be beneficiaries of such taxation. In any
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event, the issue is clearly different from that suggested by the view that
the prospective economic burden on workers of support of dependents
will somehow be unprecedented. This does not seem to be the case.
But what about the implications for the prospective tax burden on
the working-age population? Clearly, if public expenditures grow rela
tive to GNP over the long run, so too will taxes. For one thing, as was
noted, increased public spending on retirement and health care would
be partly offset by decreased public spending for schooling. Hence, the
net increase in public spending and thus in taxes would be less than the
increase in retirement and health spending. Moreover, as shown in
table 1, projections to 2040 by OECD for most of the countries cov
ered here, using the present demographic scenario, indicate that a quite
modest average annual growth rate of real earnings (between 0.3 to 0.8
percent) would suffice to keep the tax burden per head of the workingage population in 2040 at the same level as in 1980. This growth rate of
earnings is well below that experienced in the past. This projection
assumes no change in benefit levels for the older population, but it also
fails to allow for the fact that the taxable capacity of the working-age
population would be enhanced by fewer younger dependents per
worker and by higher labor force participation of females. Nor is there
any allowance for a possible "peace dividend" due to the end of the
cold war. Thus, it seems unlikely that there would be adverse incentive
effects because of an undue tax burden associated with population
aging.

How Sizable is the Prospective Aging of the Labor Supply,
and What Does It Imply for the Overall Educational
Level of the Labor Supply?
What is the outlook for the age composition of the working-age
population itself? Will there be, as some have argued, a disproportion
ate number of older workers and a consequent possible decline in inno
vation, mobility, and thus productivity growth? To assess this question,
figure 5 presents data from 1880 through 2025 for the ratio of the pop
ulation aged 20-34 to that aged 35-64, that is, the younger workingage population relative to the older. The trend in this ratio is clearly
downward; there will be relatively fewer younger and more older
workers. In most countries, however, the projected level around 2025
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is not much below that around 1960. World Bank projections (Bulatao
et al. 1990), which have ratios for 2025 much like those shown here,
imply an increase to 2050 in the proportion of the young in all of the
countries, ranging from 2 to 10 percentage points, as lower birth rate
cohorts replace higher birth rate cohorts at ages 35-64. Thus, while a
relative scarcity of younger workers (or surplus of older workers) is in
prospect for the first quarter of the next century, it is not greatly out of
line with the degree of scarcity experienced three decades ago, and it is
projected to lessen between 2025 and 2050.
Table 1. Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Earnings Per Worker
Required to Maintain Tax Burden Per Worker Constant, 1980-2040, and
Actual Growth Rate of Earnings, Eight Countries, 1965-1987
(percent per year)

Country
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany (FRG)
Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States

(I)(2)
Required growth rate, Actual growth rate,
1965-1987
1980-2040
4.1 a
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.5

2.2
3.1
2.9
2.9a
2.1
2.4
1.3b

SOURCES Column 1. Calculated from OECD (1988, p 41). The OECD projection is based on
the demographic projections underlying figure 2 and an assumption of constant age-sex specific
labor force participation rates. Column 2. Compensation per employee in the business sector as
reported in OECD (1990), adjusted by the consumer pnce index (OECD, various dates). The
period used for the actual growth rates is the longest for which historical OECD data are avail
able, United States data are since 1948.
a.1970-1987
b 1948-1987

What about the impact of labor supply aging on the educational
attainment of the labor force? In considering this, one should note that
in a number of these countries, the educational level of the older work
ing-age population will improve substantially over the next thirty
years, as those who benefited from the pre-1970s upsurge of schooling
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Figure 5. Ratio of Persons Aged 20-34 to 35-64, Actual and Projected,
Specified Country, 1880-2025
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reach older ages. Table 2 shows the prospective changes in educational
attainment of older workers implied by recent census data. If schooling
of the young continues to stagnate as it did in the 1970s (OECD 1983,
1984), the average level of education of the labor force as a whole
would, nonetheless, be higher, as less-educated older cohorts are
replaced by better-educated ones. If schooling of the young resumes its
prior uptrend, then the average education of the labor force will rise
even more. In either event, the favorable trend in educational attain
ment at older ages will offset the supposed adverse effect of aging on
education of the labor supply.
Table 2. Actual and Projected Percentage of Those Aged 55-64
Completing Secondary Level Education or Higher, Specified Country
Country3
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany (FRG)
Norway
Sweden
United States

Actual, c. 1970-1980
21
42
13
21
37
25
57

Projected, 2000-2010
53
58
28
28
63
46
84

SOURCES United Nations (1974, 1980), U S Bureau of the Census (1984, 1987).
a The age group for Denmark and Norway is 45-64, for Sweden, 55 and over. For Sweden, the
percentage is for those with some secondary level education or higher.

There is a tendency to think of the older population in terms of the
low educational levels that prevailed in the past. It is time to recognize
that in many countries older workers will be much better educated than
heretofore, and not much different in educational level from younger
workers. In the future the generally higher educational level of older
workers (and possible younger workers as well) should be an impor
tant factor, along with the greater experience of older workers, com
pensating for a negative effect, if any, of aging on innovation and
mobility.
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The Outlook for the Birth Dearth
So far the analysis has accepted without question the view embod
ied in current population projections that fertility will remain quite low,
perhaps declining further or rising to near-replacement levels at most.
But how good are these projections? To answer this, one might reason
ably ask: did population forecasters foresee either the enormous postWorld War II baby boom or subsequent baby bust? The answer is no.
While the baby boom was taking off in the late 1940s, population fore
casters were still predicting a continuation of the low fertility rates of
the 1930s. Eventually, in the 1950s, with the baby boom at full throttle,
forecasters abandoned their low fertility projections for high fertility
forecasts only to be caught by surprise once again as fertility started to
plunge in the 1960s. In the last two decades, as fertility rates plum
meted to new lows in advanced industrial countries, forecasters have
switched back to low fertility assumptions, as in the forecasts we have
just been examining.
How much faith can we put in the current projections? Not much.
Rather than predicting the future, fertility projections basically track
the recent past. Instead of admitting this, however, forecasters typically
try to buttress their projections with supporting judgments. The latest
United States Census Bureau high fertility projection foresees an even
tual rate of childbearing only slightly above replacement, about 2.2
births per woman. In commenting on this, the Bureau assures us: "it is
clearly possible that fertility might eventually surpass [this level]...but
that does not seem likely given the social, economic, and demographic
trends of the last two decades" (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989, p.
21). Similarly, in a recent volume, authoritatively entitled Future
Demographic Trends in Europe and North America, the United
Nations' 1988 high projection of the total fertility rate (which also
reaches an eventual mean value of about 2.2 for industrialized coun
tries) is dismissed as "too high and not very probable." Instead, the
author opts for fertility rates considerably below replacement levels as
more probable, an average of about 1.6 to 1.9 births per woman
(Klingerl991,p. 159).
Such statements have a familiar ring. Over four decades ago, in
1948, the then leading American scholarly demographic publication
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opined regarding future fertility rates that "...the range of uncertainty
is between rates somewhat below replacement and rates slightly above
such replacement" (Population Index 1948). Needless to say, this state
ment was made after the post-World War II American baby boom was
underway, when fertility soared far above replacement levels.
A similar fate may be in store for the more recent statements quoted
above. As shown in table 3, in a number of advanced industrial econo
mies, the total fertility rate in 1990 was noticeably above its 1980s
trough, and in none was it below. The U.S. Census Bureau's high pro
jection of total births in 1990, published in 1989, was over 5 percent
below actual experience. Even allowing for the fact that work on the
projection was completed in 1987, how could the high projection fall
so far short in only three years? Indeed, although the latest recession
has put the usual damper on fertility, total births in 1991 were again
above the high projection of the Census Bureau, by almost 4 percent.
Compared with the medium projection, that used in the forecasts here,
births in 1990 and 1991 averaged almost 12 percent higher than pro
jected.
Table 3. Current Total Fertility Rate (TFR) Compared With That at
Most Recent "Baby Bust" Trough, Twelve Countries, 1980-Present
Baby bust trough Current (preliminary)
Country
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany (FRG)
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Year
1987
1985
1987
1983
1983
1985
1983
1983
1983
1985
1983-4
1986

TFR

Year

TFR

Percent
change in
TFR

1.43
1.50
1.66
1.38
1.79
1.28
1 .47
1.66
1.61
1.51
1.77
1.77

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1989
1990
1989
1990
1990

1.46
1.62
1.76
1.67
1.80
1.48
1.62
1.88
2.14
1.56
1.85
2.09

2.1
8.0
6.2
21.0
0.6
15.6
10.2
13.3
32.9
3.3
4.5
18.1

SOURCES- Calot (1988); Van de Kaa (1988), Monmer (1990); Monnier and Guibert-Lantoine
(1991, p. 955).
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Clearly, the fertility experience of the past few years here and
abroad hints at the possibility of a new fertility upswing. Historical
experience does provide a basis for projecting an upturn in fertility. If
we extend our historical perspective beyond the past two decades, we
find that over the past century there has been a long-term swing in fer
tility rates in almost all advanced industrial countries. This is illus
trated by estimates of completed fertility presented in table 4.
Typically, the initial trough occurs among women born near the begin
ning of the century and the subsequent peak among those born in the
early 1930s. Although completed fertility for most women born in the
two decades after World War II is not yet exactly known, the projected
figures for women born in 1950, who are now very close to the end of
their childbearing, are very similar to those of the cohorts born at the
beginning of the century. A new upswing would extend this pattern
nicely. Although the historical record does not prove that fertility will
increase as in the past, recent experience hints at this. Certainly, the
historical record suggests that an increase in fertility is a possibility
that forecasters ought at least to recognize.
This possibility finds further support when we consider the prospec
tive labor market for young adults in the coming decade. The numbers
of those who will be reaching the childbearing ages will be unusually
low, an echo of the recent baby bust. Also, immigration from lowincome countries in Europe is likely to be increasingly restricted. Other
things constant, this scarcity of younger workers will make for a favor
able labor market for adults in the family formation ages, a reversal of
the situation experienced by their predecessors, the baby boom
cohorts. The biggest conjectural factor is the growth rate of aggregate
demand. The prospective reduction in military outlays and consequent
easing of spending pressures on government budgets give some basis
for thinking there may be a return to the expansive monetary-fiscal pol
icies of the earlier post-World War II era. Moreover, smaller numbers
at the younger end of the labor market should make for more vigorous
expansion of aggregate demand by the monetary-fiscal authorities by
lowering the unemployment rate corresponding to full employment. If
aggregate demand is expanded more rapidly, then demand-side condi
tions will also take a turn more favorable to young adults. Although the
outlook is uncertain, it hardly warrants dismissing the possibility of a
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strong labor market for young people that would induce a fertility
upswing.
Table 4. Swings in Completed Fertility Since Around 1990
Projected
Peak
Initial trough
Children
Children
Children
per
Birth
per
Birth
per
Birth
cohort woman cohort woman cohort woman
(6)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
Country
1.90
1950
2.45
1934
n.a.
Austria
n.a.
1.80
1905
Belgium
1950
2.29
1931
2.01
1.94
1911
1950
3.39
1930
2.70
Canada
1.90
1904
Denmark
1950
2.39
1933
2.15
2.00
1950
England & Wales 1906
2.42
1934
1.81
2.10
1950
2.64
1896
France
1930
1.98
1.70
1901
Germany (FRG)
1950
2.32
1933
2.08
2.10
1950
2.58
1933
2.01
1906
Norway
2.00
1950
2.16
1934
1905
Sweden
1.81
1.80
1907
1950
2.20
1933
1.97
Switzerland
2.05
1950
3.24
1933
1908
United States
2.27
SOURCE Calot (1988) The Netherlands is omitted because it does not have a swing in fertility.
Compared with the other countries here, it starts at a much higher initial level (around 3 children
per woman) and trends downward
n.a.=not available

Ongoing rates of childbearing, historical fertility experience, and the
prospective labor demand-supply conditions for young adults thus sug
gest as a serious possibility a prospective upswing in fertility. If this
possibility were introduced into projections it would, of course, sub
stantially alter the outlook for population growth and dependency
rates. Over the next decade or two, population growth and dependency
would be higher than now projected as the population under 18 grew
more rapidly than expected. (No doubt, there would also be a renewed
upsurge of fears about excessive population growth.) But in the period
when dependency is currently expected to reach projected highs, after
2025, there would be a tendency for the dependency ratio to decline as
the newest baby boom cohorts reached adulthood and expanded the
numbers in working ages.
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While all of this is conjectural, it is hardly any more so than the pre
vailing consensus of a continued birth dearth. This consensus rests
solely on a projection six decades hence of experience merely of the
last two decades. It is hard to see why projections sixty years down the
road should not be based on historical experience of at least compara
ble length. The possibility of a substantial fertility upswing would
seem to deserve more weight in assessments of population prospects
than is given to it currently.

Summary

The central question at issue here is whether the demographic pat
terns projected for the future low or negative population growth and
population aging are likely to have important adverse effects on
future economic growth, that is, whether the projected patterns of pop
ulation growth imply secular stagnation on the economic side. To
answer this, we have focused particularly on the record of the last cen
tury.
As it turns out, historical experience raises serious doubt about this
secular stagnation thesis. In the past, growth rates of real per capita
income have trended upward despite a downward trend in population
growth. This is hardly what one would expect if population growth
were exerting a serious drag on the economy. Also, in the post-World
War II period, economic growth rates have differed sharply between
periods with little or no differences in dependency. Nor are projected
demographic changes markedly out of line with past experience.
Future declines projected for the rate of population growth are quite
small; hence it is hard to see why a substantial new negative effect on
economic growth should emerge. Projections of aging of the labor
force itself do not yield magnitudes out of line with previous experi
ence. Moreover, there will be a sharp increase in the educational attain
ment of older workers. Negative effects, if any, of labor force aging on
innovation and mobility are likely to be offset by a markedly higher
educational level of the older population, as well as the greater experi
ence of older workers.
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Similarly, the outlook for the total dependency burden on workers,
when viewed in historical perspective, is not unprecedented. Projected
total dependency rates are, on average, about the same as in the late
nineteenth century, since rising old-age dependency is projected to be
offset by declining youth dependency. An assessment of the projected
change in tax burden per worker suggests that this is not likely to be so
great as to have serious adverse incentive effects.
Indeed, the longer-term historical record raises doubt about fertility
leveling off below replacement levels, as currently projected. Com
pleted fertility in this century shows a long-term swing of about fifty
years duration, and labor market conditions are now emerging that
favor a new upswing. In all of the countries considered here ,the cur
rent total fertility rate is above its 1980s trough, and in a number of
them the increase is sizable. If a new baby boom were to occur, it
would change the dependency outlook in a more favorable direction in
the period after 2025, the period when current projections place the
dependency burden at its highest. It is hard to understand why the pos
sibility of a new baby boom is so blandly dismissed in demographic
projections.
In the literature on less developed countries, recent years have seen
a growing skepticism that population growth has important adverse
effects on long-term economic growth (see, e.g., Kelley 1986, 1991;
U.S. National Research Council 1986). It seems likely that a similar
fate is in store for the current literature foreseeing dire consequences
for economic growth in the demographic outlook of developed coun
tries.
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Can There Be Too Much
Human Capital?
Is There a World Population Problem?
D. Gale Johnson
University of Chicago

Most of the emphasis in the study of human capital is on investment
in people and the consequences of that investment social and private
returns, social and private costs, the effects of human capital upon pro
ductivity and national output growth, on-the-job training versus formal
education, and the substitution between quality and numbers of chil
dren. I plan to discuss a rather different aspect of human capital,
namely, the value of a person a human being with little or no for
mal investment other than that common in the majority of the develop
ing countries of the world.
My interest in the value of a person whose primary human capital
consists of a combination of physical capability, native intelligence,
and a limited education investment is in exploring whether population
growth has a measurable negative effect upon real per capita income in
developing countries. As I use the term, a negative effect exists if the
total marginal product of an additional individual is less than the aver
age product of the existing population. This definition of a negative
effect does not require that the marginal product be negative, only that
it be less than the average product or per capita income level. This is a
very stringent test, much stronger than what is generally considered.
I believe if the majority of people were asked what was the relation
ship between population growth and per capita real incomes in devel
oping countries they would answer that there was a negative
relationship that population growth reduces real per capita incomes
below what they would otherwise be. This was the common viewpoint
expressed in the popular press prior to and during the 1992 world con
ference on the environment in Rio de Janeiro. It is the intent of the
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Population Crisis Committee, certain agencies of the United Nations,
and the authors of The Population Bomb to create such an impression.
It is certainly the answer given by officials in the People's Republic of
China responsible for the country's population programs.
There have been relatively few voices putting forward a contrary
view; Julian Simon has been the most prominent. A few years ago
(1986) a Working Group was organized by the National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences, and after many meet
ings and several studies commissioned, it issued a report (NRC 1986),
Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions,
which has been ignored except for reviews in a few scholarly journals.
I hope I will be forgiven if a significant part of this paper is devoted to
presenting the major findings of that report which, I believe have stood
the test of time very well. But I may be biased I was the co-chairman
of the Working Group.

Why is Population Growth Bad?
It is useful to start with the arguments that support the view that
population growth has adverse effects upon economic growth in devel
oping countries. The case is quite simple and straightforward. The
earth is considered to be finite in terms of physical space and
resources. The exploitation or use of its resources is subject to dimin
ishing returns additional inputs (including labor) applied to the land,
water, minerals, and forests will yield a diminished return. Therefore,
other things equal, more people will mean a reduction in the marginal
productivity of labor and, eventually, lower per capita incomes. These
relationships seem so obvious that they are seldom spelled out so
explicitly. The basic argument hasn't changed from that given by
Malthus nearly two centuries ago.
The fact that only a small minority of the world's population eats
less well today than did the majority of Europeans at the time Malthus
wrote seems not to have dimmed the attractiveness of his model of
human behavior (Fogel 1992). It is estimated that in the period 17811790, daily per capita calorie consumption in France was 1,753. As of
1965, how many countries in the world had a smaller caloric supply?
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The answer is: exactly two Mozambique and Somalia (World Bank
1992). It was not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century that
France's calorie consumption equaled that of India today. At the end of
the eighteenth century England's daily per capita production of calo
ries was 10 percent below the Indian daily consumption in 1989. It is
sad to note that in 1989 there were three countries, all torn by war and
revolution, that had less than 1,753 calories per day Mozambique,
Ethiopia, and Chad and as of 1992 they have probably been joined
by Somalia and Sudan. Yet the view that increased food supplies would
soon be followed by increased mouths to feed should not be too sur
prising, since this view was expressed more than two millennia ago in
Ecclesiastes 5.11: "When goods are increased, they are increased that
eat them."
The World Bank's World Development Report 1984 dealt with the
issue of population change and development. The discussion, which is
both competent and balanced, gave rather little weight to the impor
tance of diminishing returns to or scarcity of resources except for the
possible adverse effects of population growth on the environment. Nor
was the claim made that rapid population growth stopped development
or caused a fall in real per capita income. Instead, the consequences
were that rapid population growth, such as that occurring in most
developing countries, slowed economic development (p. 105). It
attributes the negative effects of rapid population growth to two fac
tors. The first was internal to the family; a large family reduces the
investment in each child in terms of time and other resources. Since
poor families have the most children, this makes it more difficult to
reduce poverty. The second factor was that "rapid population growth
weakens macroeconomic performance by making it more difficult to
finance the investments in education and infrastructure that ensure sus
tained economic growth" (p. 105). This work represented an important
shift in the scholarly discussion of population growth, but seems not to
have penetrated the popular discussion.
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What Are the Facts?
What are the facts concerning the relationship between population
growth and development as measured by the growth in real per capita
incomes? This may seem like a simple question and, at one level, it is.
But as will become clear, it is far from a simple question. Or it may be
a simple question with a complex answer or answers.
I shall present some empirical information concerning the relation
ships between population growth and economic development. Let me
note in advance that the empirical relationships presented do not prove
causality; they do not prove that population growth has either a posi
tive or negative effect upon development and growth. For this reason
the Working Group (NRC 1986) did not present any regressions relat
ing population growth to various variables, such as per capita income
growth. Spurious correlations abound. Why do I present such data
then? I do so because those who believe that population growth is the
source of most human ills either implicitly or explicitly claim that a
negative relationship holds between population growth and economic
and social development. A recent pamphlet of the Population Crisis
Committee, The International Human Suffering Index, presents, in
color no less, a comparison between an index which it calls the Human
Suffering Index and the annual rate of population increase. Two state
ments are made: "Most countries with high human suffering scores
have very high rates of population growth," and "Virtually all the
countries with low human suffering scores have low rates of popula
tion growth." But there appears to be a very weak statistical relation
ship between the two variables except between the 57 countries
classified as having Minimal and Moderate Human Suffering versus
the 83 others. Within the 83 other countries, whose fates include those
classified as subject to Extreme Human Suffering, there was almost no
relationship between population growth and the index; the square of
the correlation coefficient is 0.06. This means that 94 percent of the
variation in the suffering index was due to something other than differ
ences in population growth rates. If one's only source of information
on the status of the life of people in developing countries were the dis
cussion of the Human Suffering Index, one would hardly guess that life
expectancy at birth has increased from no more than 35 years in 1950
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to 62 years in 1990 in the low-income countries (less than $600 GNP
per capita in 1990).

Why It Is So Hard To Know
Why is it so hard to determine how population growth affects eco
nomic development? As noted, the interrelationships between popula
tion and economic growth are very complex. First, if economic
development is measured by changes in per capita real income, at cer
tain income levels increases in per capita income will result in an
increase in population growth through influences that reduce mortality,
especially infant mortality. For the developing economies, there is a
strong negative relationship between income levels and infant mortal
ity. Thus, if income and population growth are compared for the same
time period, it is likely that there will be a positive relationship
between the two. Introducing lags as I have may not entirely eliminate
the problems associated with the direction of causality. Second, the
effects of population growth can differ in the short and long run, with
the short run being perhaps as long as half a century. Other things
equal, in the short run an increase in population growth would be
expected to lower the rate of growth in real per capita incomes. An
increase in population growth rates will be accompanied by an increase
in the number of children and in the dependency ratio. The labor force
declines as a percentage of the population. In the long run the effects of
investment in human capital can be realized. Positive effects through
invention and innovation and increasing returns to scale can result
from population growth when there is time for adjustment and
response to changing conditions. Slow or nil long-run increases in pop
ulation also increase dependency as the population ages. Thus, in the
long run (after one or two generations), slow population growth can
have similar effects upon per capita productivity as rapid population
growth may have in the short run.
A possible reason for the belief that an increase in population in the
developing countries will either lower the actual average income or the
rate of growth of income is the implicit assumption that individuals in
these countries consume everything they produce. This assumption is
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incorrect. The people of the developing countries do not consume
everything they produce. According to World Bank data (1992, pp.
234-235), the domestic savings rates of the low-income countries are
equal to or greater than the rates for either middle- or high-income
countries. Thus if resources are productively invested, over a lifetime
an additional person would make possible an increase in the productive
potential of a country. This conclusion assumes that savings rates are
independent of population growth rates, and that point is addressed
below. It may be noted that the savings estimate excludes savings that
result in human capital investment. If the succeeding generation has
more education and more adequate health care than the current genera
tion has, this increases the probability that a significant positive rate of
population growth either will have a positive or nil effect on per capita
real incomes in the long run. Consequently, in considering the effect of
population growth on income growth we must consider the total effect
and not solely the marginal product of labor. This is why I earlier used
the term "total marginal product" of an additional person which
includes not only the marginal product of labor but the increase in
investment and any effects through increasing returns to scale.

Some Empirical Relationships
There are a number of empirical relationships or propositions that
merit our attention. The first two are of a very general nature, and the
third involves regressions between population growth rates and real
per capita incomes with the inclusion of other relevant variables. These
empirical propositions raise some questions concerning the validity of
the commonly held view that higher rates of population growth have
adverse effects upon economic well-being. I do not claim that these
empirical relationships imply causality, but only that each is worth
pondering and exploring.
The first of the empirical relationships is that the significant
increases in the real incomes in the industrial countries of Europe and
North America occurred in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twen
tieth centuries during a period of historically rapid population growth
that followed a long period of slow population growth. From 1650 to
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1750 population growth rates were very low in both the industrial and
developing regions at 0.33 and 0.34 percent annually (see table 1). At
these rates population doubling would require two centuries. From
1750 to 1900 population growth rates were higher in the industrial than
in the developing regions and this difference continued through the
first two decades of this century.
Table 1. Population Growth Rates and Distribution of World Population
Between Industrialized and Developing Regions, 1650-1986
Average annual rate
% of world % of growth
Industrialized Developing
in pop. in
pop. in
regions Difference developing developing
regions
regions
regions
(B-A)
(A)
Interval
(B)
91.6
-1.32
1.98
1980-1986
76.9
066
74.4
-1.45
2.23
0.78
89.6
1970-1980
71 7
-1.37
241
1.04
86.2
1960-1970
-081
798
69.9
207
1.26
1950-1960
-1.09
1.44
90.0
67.5
035
1940-1950
77.3
66.4
-0.43
1.28
0.85
1930-1940
1.11
68.6
66.1
-0.20
0.91
1920-1930
0.40
53.8
67.9
0.52
0.92
1900-1920
54.5
73.3
0.52
0.53
1.05
1850-1900
534
78.1
0.52
0.31
0.83
1800-1850
0.15
0.47
062
1750-1800
73.6
79.3
-0.01
0.34
1650-1750
79.4
79.3
033
SOURCES Bogue (1969, p. 49), United Nations (1988)

As late as 1840 life expectancy at birth in six European countries
and Massachusetts was 41 years (table 2). It reached 50.5 years by
1900 and then increased rapidly reaching 71 years by 1955. While we
have little knowledge of life expectancy at birth in the developing
regions prior to 1950, it is unlikely that there was any significant
improvement in the prior century. However, since 1950 the increase in
life expectancy can only be described as spectacular, increasing from
35 years in 1950 to 62 years in 1990 (World Bank 1984 and 1992). Life
expectancy at birth in the United States was approximately 42 years in
1880; it did not reach 60 years until 1930. Thus, the lowest income
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countries in the world achieved a greater increase in life expectancy in
25 years than was achieved in the United States in twice that long. This
improvement in the developing regions was achieved during a period
of rapid population growth.
Table 2. Expectation of Life at Birth for Six European Countries and
Massachusetts in the United States: 1840 to 1955

Year
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1955

Expectation of life at
birth
41.0
41.5
42.2
43.5
45.2
47.1
50.5
54.3
58.3
61.7
64.6
71.0

Average annual
increase in
life expectancy
-0.05
0.07
0.13
0.17
0.20
0.34
0.38
0.40
0.34
0.29
0.43

SOURCE United Nations (1962, table IV 1).

Similar rapid progress has been made in the developing world in
reducing infant mortality and child death rates since 1950 (table 3).
The infant mortality rate declined from 165 in 1950 to 72 in 1985,
while the child death rate fell from 27 to 11; both are rates per 1,000.
The infant mortality rate in the United States in 1900 was 160, and it
declined to approximately 80 over the next quarter century (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1971, p. 55).
The second of the empirical propositions is that the developing
countries had rapid economic growth in the three decades from 1950 to
1980 with population growth rates exceeding those ever realized in the
industrial countries. Population growth rates were 2 percent or more
while the per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.6 percent during
the three decades (National Research Council 1986, p. 5). Prior to
1950 population growth rates had been much lower, generally 1 per-

Table 3. Life Expectancy at Birth, Infant Mortality Rate, and Child Death Rate
Life expectancy at birth
1985C
1960
Country or income groups3
Low-income economies
69
42
China
56
43
India
52
43
Other
42
60
Average
Africa
Low-income
44
37
Semi-arid
49
39
Other
48
38
Average
Middle-income
41
50
Oil importers
50
39
Oil exporters
49
Sub-Saharan
62
51
Middle-income economies
46
58
Lower-middle income
66
56
Upper-middle income
76
70
Industrial market economies

Infant mortality rateb
(under age 1)
1985C
1960

Child death rateb GNP per capita
(in $U.S.)
(ages 1-4)
1985C
1985C
1960

165
165
163
165

35
89
112
72

26
26
31
27

7
11
19
11

310
270
200
270

203
158
164

151
112
117

57
37
40

34
22
24

218
254
249

159
191
170
126
144
101
29

111
113
115
68
82
52
9

37
51
42
23
29
15
2

21
21
23
10
13
6
-

670
889
491
1,290
820
1,850
11,810

SOURCE: World Bank (1987).
a Income designations are based on per capita income (in 1985 U.S. dollars), low income, $390 or less, lower-middle income, $400-$ 1,600; upper-mid
dle income, $1,600-$7,420
b Rates are per 1,000
c Data for Africa are for 1982.
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cent or less, and there had been slow or nil increases in real per capita
incomes.
Economic growth was relatively slow during the 1950s in the lowincome countries. If we look at a somewhat later period, 1965 to 1985,
the rate of income growth was quite spectacular. The per capita gross
national product for the low-income countries grew 2.9 percent annu
ally for 1965-85 and exceeded the 2.4 percent of the industrial econo
mies (World Bank 1987). Since low-income countries were defined as
those with less than $400 per capita GNP in 1985, some rapidly grow
ing countries that were poor in 1965 were excluded from the calcula
tion because they grew out of the low-income category by 1985; had
these countries been included, the growth of income would have been
even higher.
The third of the empirical propositions is that the evidence does not
support the view that for developing countries the rate of population
growth has a negative effect upon per capita income growth for the
period since 1950. Some results are given in table 4 for three decades.
In the simple model it was assumed that per capita income growth in a
decade was a function of population growth and per capita income
growth in the prior decade. Enrollment ratios for primary schools and
per capita gross domestic products were included. School enrollment is
included to provide a rough indication of society's investment in
human capital. Per capita GDP is included to determine if there is a
convergence effect among the developing countries. Per capita GDP
growth in the prior decade was included because of the possible cau
sality between income growth and population growth and the possibil
ity of continuity in per capita income growth from one decade to the
next. The coefficient for population growth was positive but not signif
icantly different from zero for each of the three decades for lowincome countries. For middle-income countries the coefficient was
negative and significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level
for the 1960s, but was not significant for either of the other two
decades. Thus, of the six coefficients for the developing countries, only
one indicated that there was a (weak) negative relationship between
past population growth and current growth of GDP per capita. The
variables included had surprisingly little relationship to the real per
capita growth rates. The correlation coefficients were very small and
none of the coefficients were statistically significant at the conven-
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tional 5 percent level. Obviously other variables, including policy vari
ables, are much more important in influencing income growth rates
than population growth or the human capital measures that I have
included.
Table 4. Cross-Country Regressions of Per Capita GDP Growth Rates
Low income
Lagged population growth
Enrollment primary school
Lagged GDP growth
Lagged GDP level
Dummy: Africa
R2
n
Middle income
Lagged population growth
Enrollment primary school
Lagged GDP growth
Lagged GDP level
Dummy: Africa
Latin America
R2
n

1960-1970
0.053
-0.015
0.226
-0.001
-0.931
-0.004
12
-0.524**
0.017
0.236
-0.005
-0.711
-0.859
0.163
32

1970-1980
0.115
0.025
-0.221
-0.003*
-0.742
0.163
32
0.319
0.029
0.163
0.000
-0.241
-0.608
-0.043
61

1980-1988
0.319
-0.015
-0.286
0.000
-3.371*
0.059
33
-0.551
0.024
0.320*
0.000**
-0.792
-2.115**
0.055
58

NOTES GDP data are from Summers and Heston (1991); and World Bank (various years)
Lagged population and lagged GDP growth rates are for the pnor decade, lagged GDP level is
beginning year of the decade Africa and Latin America dummies are 1 for country in region, 0
otherwise Constant terms not presented
*Statistically significant at 5 percent level
**Statistically significant at 10 percent level

Table 5 is from Levine and Renelt (1992), who included population
growth as one of the variables in their analysis of the influence of pol
icy factors on economic growth in 119 countries. In none of the regres
sions was there a statistically significant effect of population growth on
the rate of economic growth. Several of the policy or policy-related
variables had a statistically significant coefficient, especially invest
ment and government share. A study by Singh (1992) for twenty-nine
developing economies obtained negative but insignificant coefficients

Table 5. Cross-Country Growth Regressions (Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Real Per Capita GDP)

Independent variable
Constant
Initial GDP per capita (RGDP60)
Investment share (INV)
Population growth (GPO)
Secondard-school enrollment (SEC)
Primary-school enrollment (PRI)
Government share (GOV)

1960-1989
WB/IMF
(1)
-0.83
(0.85)
-0.35*
(0.14)
17.49*
(2.68)
-0.38
(0.22)
3.17*
(1.29)

Regression period data set
1960-1985
1960-1989
1960-1985
SH
WB/IMF
WB/IMF
(2)
(3)
(4)
2.01
0.86
0.47
(0.83)
(1.18)
(0.89)
-0.69*
-0.30*
-0.40*
(0.12)
9.31*
(2.08)
0.08
(0.18)
1.21
(1.17)
1.79*
(0.58)
-6.37*

(0.11)
16.77*
(2.62)
-0.53
(0.18)

(2.03)
Growth of government share (GSG)
Socialist economy (SOC)

1960-1985
SH
(5)
2.05
(1.12)
-0.57*

(0.13)
13.44*
(3.13)
-0.15
(0.19)
0.63
(1.26)
0.91
(0.73)
-0.59
(3.73)

(0.12)
10.15*
(2.43)
-0.02
(0.19)
0.99
(1.23)
1.07
(0.70)
-6.80*

-0.21
(0.45)

-0.17
(0.43)

(2.30)

-0.08
(0.06)
-0.25
(0.38)

Revolution/coups (REVC)

-1.76*

Africa dummy (AFRICA)

(0.52)
-1.24*

-0.86
(0.62)
-1.36*

(0.59)
-1.78*

Latin America dummy (LAAM)

(0.37)
-1.18*

(0.48)
-1.34*

(0.44)
-1.27*

(0.33)
0.019*
(0.009)

(0.38)
0.013
(0.008)

(0.36)
0.008
(0.007)

-0.009*

-0.006*

(0.003)
-0.22
(0.11)
0.090
(0.052)
83
0.61

(0.003)
0.01
(0.13)
0.023
(0.047)
84
0.67

-0.003
(0.003)
0.15
(0.13)
-0.03
(0.041)
86
0.73

Growth of domestic credit (GDC)
Standard deviation of domestic credit
(STDD)
Civil liberties (CIVL)
Export-share growth (XSG)
Number of observations
R2

101
0.46

103
0.68

-1.75*

SOURCE: Levme and Renelt (1992)
NOTES Regressions (1), (3), and (4) use primarily World Bank and IMF data, while regressions (2) and (5) use Summers and Heston data Coverage
includes all countnes with data given by the sources except major oil exporters
*Statistically significant at the P=0.05 level
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for the population growth variable. In each of these studies the periods
for income and population growth were contemporaneous.

Population Growth Only One Factor
Before summarizing the results of the NRC study on population
growth and economic development, I want to make a point that is all
too often ignored in the popular discussions of the subject. Population
growth is only one factor in determining the economic well-being of
the citizens of a country. And, looking around the world today at the
observed differences in real per capita incomes, it seems to be a rather
minor factor in explaining such differences. Governmental policies are
of far greater importance. Much of the human suffering witnessed in
recent years has not been caused by excessive population growth or too
large populations; most of the real causes are to be found in civil war
and strife and governmental mismanagement and failures. Bangladesh
is a probable exception to this conclusion, but I am not sure that there
are any others.
China is a clear example of the dominance of factors other than pop
ulation growth in explaining real income growth over the past four
decades. While there has been a reduction in population growth rates
over the past three decades, the small decline in the population growth
rate after the early 1970s can't account for any significant part of the
sharp changes in the growth of income per capita. Using the Summers
and Heston (1991) estimates, per capita GDP grew at an annual rate of
2.3 percent from 1960-1973, by 3.7 percent from 1973-1980 and, dur
ing major policy reforms, 7.8 percent from 1980 to 1988. Population
growth rates in Taiwan closely parallel those of the mainland, but from
1960 to 1980 the real income growth rate was double that of the main
land. This difference can only be explained by policy factors. From
1980-1988 the per capita income growth rate on the mainland
exceeded that of Taiwan.
Most African countries, unfortunately, provide further evidence of
how the national policy framework dominates changes in economic
welfare. From 1973-1980, thirty out of forty-six African countries had
negative real per capita income growth rates (Summers and Heston
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1991). The same number had negative per capita growth rates during
1980-1988. During these two periods the African countries generally
followed import substitution policies with heavy taxation of agricul
ture, especially of export commodities. The beginning of the shift to
market-oriented policies did not begin generally until the mid-1980s
and is just now beginning to influence the pattern of growth.

Propositions: Population and Growth
In the report, Population Growth and Economic Development'. Pol
icy Questions (NRC 1986), nine questions were posed and the avail
able evidence was used to answer them. I shall now paraphrase the
nine questions and provide a brief summary of the report's conclu
sions.
1. Would slower population growth increase the per capita supply of
exhaustible resources?
In reflecting upon this question, it should be remembered that over
the past century the real prices of exhaustible natural resources have
declined, not increased (Simon 1981). The decline in the prices of such
resources relative to wages or earnings has been striking; for oil and
coal the time cost today is about a fifth of what it was a century ago.
The same pattern of decline in relative scarcity has prevailed for nonfuel resources such as copper.
An important point is that no exhaustible resource is essential or
irreplaceable. As the easily available supplies of such a resource are
extracted, the real cost of extraction and the price increase, which
encourages economy in the use of that resource and stimulate the
search for substitutes. One reason that real copper prices have declined
is that aluminum, which is derived from a plentiful resource (bauxite),
has been substituted for it in many uses, especially wire.
A little reflection will convince you that the number of people who
will enjoy the use of an exhaustible resource will be the same whether
population growth is slow or fast. Exhaustion will occur sooner with
rapid population growth than with slow population growth, but the
number of people who will have used the resource will be the same. If
you contend that with more time provided by slower population
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growth it would be possible to learn how to economize on the use of
the resource, you have already lost most of your argument that rapid
population growth results in undue resource exhaustion. The applica
tion of more resources to find ways to economize on use of the
exhaustible resource is an effective substitute for more time. With a
larger population there are more human resources to devote to the
problem at an earlier time.
2. Would slower population growth increase the per capita availabil
ity of renewable resources and thus increase per capita income?
Up to the present, the decline in the per capita availability of renew
able resources, such as land, has not resulted in a reduction in per cap
ita income. Instead, the long-run trend in the prices of farm products
that depend upon land, especially the food crops, has been a declining
one over the past century (Simon 1981).
We need to bear in mind that the use of renewable resources is influ
enced by existing institutional arrangements. Some institutional
arrangements, such as common property or property rights, that are
limited and uncertain may have disastrous effects upon the conserva
tion of renewable resources. Consider the near extinction of certain
kinds of whales or the depletion of certain fishing areas. These
occurred where common property existed and, until recently, no effec
tive mechanism existed for avoiding the "tragedy of the commons."
The tragedy of the commons occurs because it is in the interest of the
individual to use or harvest the commons as long as what is harvested
has a value greater than the costs, even though this activity reduces the
total output. Consequently, if serious problems do occur due to the
diminution of the productivity of renewable resources, it will probably
be because appropriate institutional arrangements do not exist.
3. Will slower population growth alleviate pollution and environ
mental degradation?
Environmental resources, such as air and water, are almost always
common property; unless appropriate institutional arrangements exist,
these resources will be overused whether population is growing rap
idly, slowly, or not at all. There is an optimum level of pollution,
namely, the level at which the marginal cost of reducing the pollution
equals the value of the marginal harm done by the pollutant. But where
air or water are common property, no enterprise or person has to bear
more than a small part of the cost of pollution created. Public policy
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has the responsibility of internalizing the cost of pollution by adopting
measures, such as regulations, fees, or incentives for pollution abate
ment, that force or induce producers to limit the amount of pollution to
the socially optimum level. Please note that enterprise is used here in a
very broad sense and includes enterprises owned publicly, such as the
Tennessee Valley Authority or the local school district, as well as those
owned privately; no form of ownership has a monopoly on pollution.
Major sources of pollution in the world today, however, are not
associated with rapidly growing populations but with either popula
tions with high incomes or in countries that had socialist economic sys
tems. Feshback and Friendly (1992) chronicle the story of how having
the means of production "owned by all the people" led to environmen
tal disaster in the Soviet Union. People with high incomes consume
more than people with low incomes, and their demands upon produc
tion resources and the potential for environmental disruption are
greater. It follows that if population growth has little or no effect on
income growth, more people increase the potential for environmental
disruption; but the actual amount of environmental disruption is a
function of many variables other than either per capita incomes or pop
ulation.
Based on research done since 1986, it is now possible to say more
about the effects of developing country economic growth on the state
of the environment. A major factor in economic growth is the openness
of the economy to the world economy the degree of trade liberaliza
tion. Because of the comments about the North American Free Trade
Agreement by groups that the press calls environmentalists, I start by
noting the probable effects of world trade liberalization upon the envi
ronment. This is a topic ably addressed in a recent paper by Kym
Anderson (1992).
The probable direct effect of world trade liberalization would be to
reduce pollution overall. Two effects are worthy of note. Agriculture is
an important source of ground water pollution, especially in the indus
trial countries. This is due to the relatively heavy use of chemicals in
crop production and the concentration of livestock production in large
units. Trade liberalization for farm products would shift crop produc
tion from countries with high farm output prices and heavy chemical
use to countries that have and would continue to have lower levels of
fertilizer and pesticide use. If there were worldwide trade liberalization
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in agricultural products, grain production would shift from Western
Europe to Argentina, Australia, Thailand, and the United States. With
the lower crop prices in Western Europe, chemical use would be signif
icantly reduced. While use of chemicals would increase some in the
countries expanding-crop production, the use level would be relatively
low due to the price relationships between crops and fertilizer. The
expansion in U.S. crop production would result from the return of idled
land to cultivation; chemical use would fall.
The second direct effect of trade liberalization relates to the use of
energy. Most developing countries hold energy prices below world
market prices, resulting in excessive use of energy per unit of output.
In China and India coal prices have been kept at hardly more than half
the world market prices. Not only is an excessive amount of coal and
other energy used, but energy is used inefficiently because it has not
paid to invest in new and less polluting combustion technology. Ineffi
ciency in combustion leads to a high level of pollution per btu con
sumed.
If the developing countries liberalize trade, including trade in
energy, energy prices will rise to world market levels and there will be
an incentive to conserve in the use of energy and thus reduce pollution.
One of the sources of environmental disruption in the low-income
developing countries is the harvesting of forests for firewood and the
consequent erosion and silting of rivers. As labor becomes more valu
able, wood becomes less competitive as fuel. Its main cost under the
conditions in the low-income developing countries is time, since the
institutional arrangements permit harvesting without paying for the
trees. Deforestation occurs not only because labor is so cheap, but
because the rights to utilize the forest are not well defined.
The available evidence indicates that pollution abatement is a nor
mal good. This means that the income elasticity of demand for pollu
tion abatement is positive and that as real per capita incomes increase,
people demand more pollution abatement. It is not only that more
effort and resources are devoted to pollution abatement, but the accept
able standards for pollution become more stringent. Consequently, it
can be expected that as per capita incomes increase in the developing
countries, less and less pollution will be acceptable and permitted.
Restraints on pollution are a function of per capita incomes, population
density, and urbanization.
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Those who opposed NAFTA because of presumed environmental
effects apparently failed to consider such rational responses. Theirs is a
highly condescending and even insulting view of the people of devel
oping countries. The progress that developing countries have made in
environmental improvement where it really counts, namely, in saving
lives, has been enormous over the past four decades. Earlier I referred
to the sharp reduction in infant mortality. A large share of this decline
resulted from environmental improvements better handling of sew
age and the provision of safer and cleaner water. These changes
occurred because the people of the developing countries had more
income and allocated increased resources to improving their environ
ment. And the evidence is clear: they have been highly successful at
improving the environment where it really counts in saving lives and
reducing illness.
4. Will slower population growth lead to more capital per worker
and higher per capita worker output and income?
Does slower population growth increase the rate of saving? The
NRC (1986) Working Group, after reviewing various ways in which
population growth could influence the savings rate, concluded: "We
have found little evidence that the aggregate savings rate depends on
growth rates or the age structure of the population" (p. 87). Subse
quently, A.C. Kelley (1988) presented the results of his research on the
effect of population growth on savings and investments in developing
countries. He considered three possible reasons for negative effects
upon economic growth: age dependency, capital shallowing, and
investment diversion. The age dependency effect is due to the large
proportion of children who do not work; the children may also be
responsible for investment diversion to consumption. Capital shallow
ing is nothing more than a reduction in the amount of capital per
worker if savings decline on a per capita basis. Kelley concluded that
the empirical research had not substantiated any of these effects (p.
459). He also noted that where the economic analysis was rather more
sophisticated and included second order effects such as economizing
on resources and supply effects, the "puzzle of reconciling the apparent
divergencies between theory and fact disappears" (p. 460).
5. Do lower population densities cause lower per capita incomes by
reduced stimulus to innovation and reduced economies of scale?
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One of Adam Smith's greatest contributions to economics was his
analysis of the interrelationships between specialization, the extent of
the market, and the existence of economies of scale. The NRC Work
ing Group concluded that for manufacturing, the economies of scale
can be achieved at an unspecified moderate-sized city. The liberaliza
tion of international trade in agricultural products and the international
flow of capital and technology probably does mean that low rates of
population growth are without significant effect upon innovation in
manufacturing productivity. And the same answer seems to apply if the
question is put differently: Does rapid population growth reduce the
growth of labor productivity in manufacturing? The answer also seems
to be in the negative.
The Working Group concluded that low density of population could
and probably did have adverse effects upon productivity in agriculture.
This effect resulted from the costs of the infrastructure, such as roads,
communication, marketing services, agricultural research and exten
sion. While Boserup (1981) showed how increased population density
influenced the intensity of cultivation and encouraged technological
change, it cannot be ruled out that after a certain density of agricultural
population is reached, the productivity effects of increased density are
either nil or negative. This still seems to be an open question.
6. Will slower population growth increase per capita levels of
schooling and health?
This question needs to be considered in two parts. The first is the
effect of an increase in the average number of children in a family
upon family expenditures on education and schooling. The evidence
supports the conclusion that having more children reduces the amount
spent on each child.
The second part is the response of the public sectors to an increase
in the number of children. T.P. Schultz (1987) found that the percent
age of school-age children enrolled in school was not associated with
the size of the school-age population relative to the total population.
He found, however, that expenditures per child were a negative func
tion of the relative size of the school-age population. These results are
quite striking; they indicate that during recent years of rapidly growing
populations in developing countries, these countries were able to
increase the places in school rapidly enough to keep pace. In fact, in
almost all developing countries the percentage of school-age children
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in school has increased. Increasing the number of places, unfortu
nately, was apparently associated with little increase in total expendi
tures on education as the percentage of the population in school
increased.
The Working Group could not isolate any effects of population
growth on health expenditures due to the poor quality of the available
data.
7. Will slower population growth decrease the degree of income ine
quality?
In the short run the effects of slower population growth on income
inequality depend on the distribution of the fertility decline among
income groups. If the fertility decline occurs first in the higher income
groups, the short-run effects will be to increase the inequality of the
income distribution. If the fertility decline is greater in urban than in
rural areas, there will be a short-run increase in income inequality,
since urban incomes are significantly higher than rural incomes in
developing countries
In the long run the effect of a decline in fertility on the distribution
of income is likely to work through increasing the amount of capital
per worker as the number of entrants to the labor force declines. This
conclusion depends on the earlier conclusion that savings rates are
independent of population growth or age composition. In effect, if
labor becomes more scarce, it may command a higher share of the
national product and in this way somewhat reduce the inequality in the
distribution of income.
8. Will slower population growth facilitate the transfer of workers
into the modern sector and alleviate problems of urban growth?
It cannot be doubted that rapid urbanization has occurred in the
developing countries since 1950, nor can one doubt that the rapid
growth was a response to population growth rates. Approximately 60
percent of the increase in urban population has been due to natural
population growth; the remainder has been due to migration from rural
areas (NRC 1986, p. 67).
But once these facts are noted, it is important to recognize that part
of the rapid growth of cities such as Mexico City and Cairo has been
due to policies that subsidized living in cities, especially by providing
large food subsidies that in most cases were not available to farmers. In
addition, the income differences between urban and rural populations
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in developing countries have been very large, generally with urban per
capita incomes ranging from 2.5 to 5 times rural incomes. Often the
low rural incomes have reflected an urban bias, as well as the taxation
of agriculture through low prices for farm products and high prices for
farm inputs.
Consequently, governmental policies have had a role in rapid urban
ization in the developing countries. If agriculture and rural areas were
permitted to share more fully in economic growth, there would be less
concern about too rapid urbanization. But economic growth does result
in a shift of population from rural to urban areas, and this shift can be
avoided only at large cost. Except to protect the relatively high
incomes of those now in the cities, it is not obvious why there should
be objection to the growth of urban populations.
9. Can a couple's fertility behavior impose costs on society at large?
The apparent answer is in the affirmative. Where there are public
goods such as parks and roads, another child increases congestion.
Given that most schools are publicly financed, an additional child
imposes costs upon taxpayers generally. Furthermore, additional chil
dren will in due course increase the number of workers and thus reduce
wages, resulting in a potential increase in income inequality. This is
essentially the answer in the NRC Working Group report.
It was an answer that I found unconvincing because it ignored the
general thrust of the report, namely, that population growth had little or
no effect on per capita income growth. True, some negative effects
were noted, such as on the quality of education or at least on per capital
education expenditures. But there were also some positive effects, such
as economies of scale. On balance it seems to me that there is little evi
dence to support the position that a family imposes net negative exter
nalities upon society when it chooses to have another child. The family
does impose certain costs upon others, but the most important of
these the cost of schooling is a cost that most societies have chosen
to bear publicly for the general benefits that a society derives from hav
ing a well-educated population.
At least the Working Group came down against governmental coer
cion to control fertility decisions, although it was unwilling to use the
word coercion and instead said that it preferred using changes in incen
tives rather than quantity rationing. Quantity rationing limiting the
number of children a couple may have can only be imposed by the
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application of coercion. Finally, the following was stated: "It is impor
tant to note, however, that current data and theory are inadequate to
quantify the size of the external effects; certainly there is no evidence
to suggest that drastic financial or legal restrictions on child bearing are
warranted" (p. 84).

What is the Value of a Person?
The last of the questions concerning whether an added birth imposes
costs upon society generally, is not quite the question that I posed at
the beginning of this paper. The question I posed was whether adding
to the population lowered the level of per capita income. Put another
way, the question was whether in a developing country the total mar
ginal product of a person of average human capital was below the aver
age product of that economy. I interpret the evidence, including the
research and conclusions of the Working Group, to support the conclu
sion that the population growth rates that we have observed in recent
decades have had little or no significant effect upon the level or the rate
of growth of per capita income in either the long or the short run.
I wish to note two caveats to the conclusion that I have just stated.
First, there are reasons to argue that moderate rates of population
growth are more supportive of economic development than either low,
including negative, or high rates. I define moderate rates of population
growth in the approximate range of 1.25 to 2.5 percent. Population
growth rates of 3 percent or more may reduce rates of per capita
income growth primarily because of the stress placed upon institutions,
such as education, health, and city governments, by the high rates of
adjustment required. High rates of population growth may require rates
of response that are beyond the capabilities of such institutions. Sec
ond, even if population growth rates have no significant effects upon
economic development, governments should pursue many ordinary
economic and social programs, such as universal elementary educa
tion, maternal and child health care, and institutions that assist individ
uals in providing personal financial security, that have the effect of
reducing the rates of population growth, although that is not the pri
mary objective of such programs.
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A Positive Population Policy
I strongly support a positive population policy that seeks the objec
tive of assisting every family in a country to have the number of chil
dren that each family desires. By definition, such programs must be
voluntary; coercion and compulsion are simply not consistent with
each family achieving its objectives. Thus I strongly favor govern
ments making both relevant information and contraceptive materials
available to every family that desires such information and materials.
As I argued above, a case has not been made that there is a significantly
negative externality to the number of children a family has. But,
because I believe that the welfare of families is enhanced if they are
given the resources that they need to limit the number of children to the
number each family desires, I believe that governments should accept
the responsibility of assuring that such resources are available and their
availability is highly publicized.
I would argue that governments should go well beyond what many
would argue is a passive population policy such as I have described,
though in most real world situations policy makers would not agree
that such a policy can be carried out without addressing some real con
flicts. While ruling out coercion, governments can and do influence the
number of children a family desires as well as the number a family has.
This can be done by influencing conditions that are recognized to have
an effect upon the number of children desired. Education, especially of
women, has major impacts on both the desired and the actual number
of children. Creating conditions that reduce infant mortality leads to a
reduction in the number of children born, though with a lag.
In many rural communities old-age security is achieved primarily
through having several children, especially male children. In rural
China, for example, the rural reforms have not produced any alterna
tive sources of old-age security to having one or more sons. While the
ownership of land is one means for providing security in one's older
years, private ownership of farm land does not exist in China. Not only
can rural families not own the land they farm, they cannot assume that
the land use rights assigned to them can be readily marketed. There are
other alternatives for making provision for the uncertainties of old age
and death, such as life insurance and access to reliable savings institu
tions that are allowed to have positive real interest rates. The most
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immediate and direct approach for the provision of old-age security in
China would be the extension of the social security system to the entire
population, rather than restricting it to the employees of the govern
ment and state and some collective enterprises.
The cost of providing a pension to all rural residents 65 years and
older at 80 percent of the average annual income of all rural residents
would not be beyond the financial resources of the Chinese govern
ment. In 1989 there were 56 million persons living outside of cities
who were 65 years of age or older. If the average pension were 50 yuan
per month, the annual cost would be 34 billion yuan. This is less than
the budgetary cost of the grain price subsidy in 1991! This subsidy
went to urban residents who, on average, had far higher incomes than
rural people. It appears that the grain price subsidy is being phased out.
It would be hard to think of any alternative use for those funds that
would create greater happiness and contribute more to the future via
bility and tranquility of the Chinese society than the creation of a uni
versal social security system.
Such a system, especially if combined with providing the institu
tional and legal framework for individuals to make some provision for
their financial security, would achieve two major objectives. It would
significantly alter the incentives to have large numbers of children, and
it would reduce the neglect and mistreatment of female babies. Put
more directly, much of the pressure in rural China for violating the
restraints of the coercive population policy would be eliminated if rural
families had viable alternatives to a son or sons to provide security for
their old age.
Coercive population programs do great harm, not only to families
but to a nation. Fortunately, policies and programs that will lead to
reductions in population growth rates need not be coercive. The appro
priate criteria for evaluating programs that directly influence the num
ber of births is the degree to which families are assisted in having the
number of children they desire. Lacking evidence that family decisions
with respect to the number of children have adverse external effects
upon others, there is no basis for coercive behavior by governments.
Even if there were some adverse external effects, however, I would
still hold that decisions with respect to the number of children should
be made by the family. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who
accepts the Western concept of human rights would approve of the use
of coercive restraints placed on such a fundamental right.
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Human Capital Accumulation,
the Family,
and Economic Development
Mark R. Rosenzweig
University of Pennsylvania

Family issues particularly the notion that there has been a decline
in "family values" as signaled, for example, by a lack of respect for
elders and family instability have become an important theme of
political debates in the United States in recent times. Another impor
tant theme has been the relationship between economic development
and human capital investment. This essay is concerned with the rela
tionships between human capital, the family, and economic develop
ment. In particular, it examines two related questions: First, do family
arrangements and family stability, as characterized by the structure of
households and their dissolution and marital patterns, reflect the rapid
ity of economic development, such that enhanced growth and develop
ment can cause a "breakdown" of the family? Second, how does
economic development affect the returns to and investments in differ
ent types of human capital? I will attempt to show that these two ques
tions are linked, that the technological transformation of an economy,
by altering the value of different kinds of human capital and increasing
incomes, also affects the nature and stability of family relationships.
To understand the complex relationships among growth, human
capital, and the family would be quite difficult in the context of an
economy such as that of the United States. Distinguishing the effects of
development on the returns to human capital investments from the
effects of human capital investments on development, for example, is a
formidable task. Moreover, the measurement of economic growth and
the technical change that underlies it is fraught with difficulties when
the economy is as technologically differentiated as in the United
States. As a consequence, I look for some answers to the questions
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about the family-human capital-growth nexus in a simpler economy,
that of rural India.
There are three key reasons for studying the Indian rural economy to
understand better the relationships between family, human capital, and
development. First, that economy is relatively homogenous with
respect to production compared to the United States. The most impor
tant economic activity by far is agricultural production, and as a conse
quence it is easier to characterize the economic constraints facing
individuals and households.
Second, an important and recent source of economic development in
India is clear the "green revolution." There is no question that a
major source of rural development and growth was technical change
that was essentially exogenous to the Indian economy. In particular, the
widespread availability of substantially more productive varieties of
wheat and rice, which began in the early and mid-1960s, was not due
to increases in human capital investments or to changes in family
arrangements in rural areas. Moreover, because the technological
change was crop-specific, not all of the Indian economy could benefit
directly from the new grain varieties. The geographically selective
nature of the green revolution and its relatively clear timing means that
we have a natural experiment in which we can compare, before and
after the technical change began, areas now experiencing growth pro
pelled by agricultural technical change with those areas without such
growth.
The third and essential reason for examining the Indian economy is
that there are excellent data describing that economy. We can thus
exploit the green revolution experiment. In particular, there are two
sets of data that (1) characterize the behavior of Indian farmers over
time in an environment relatively untouched by the green revolution,
and (2) describe farmers across all of India, both within and outside of
green revolution areas. Thus there is information that describes family
arrangements, schooling, and agricultural production prior to and after
the onset of technical change in the same areas, as well as in areas
without significant agricultural productivity growth.
I use results from prior studies undertaken by me and others over the
last decade based on these data describing Indian farm families to
examine hypotheses about families and the role of human capital as
affected by economic growth. First, I will briefly discuss the key fea-
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tures of undeveloped agricultural economies typical of a low-income
country such as India prior to the green revolution, how these charac
teristics influence family arrangements and stability and the value of
human capital, and how technological change affects these factors. I
will then describe the data sets and what they say about the characteris
tics of families and households and related behaviors that require
explanation. This section is followed by an examination of the evi
dence pertaining to specific hypotheses about the relationship between
human capital returns and family structures and arrangements under a
no-growth, low-income regime, with particular attention to risk mitiga
tion and experience as human capital. I then turn to an examination of
the evidence on how agricultural technical change affects human capi
tal investments and family structure, and conclude with some specula
tions about the policy implications of the results.

Hypotheses About Family Arrangements and Human Capital
Returns in Agricultural Settings
The Agricultural Environment Prior to Technical Change
The four most important features of the environment experienced by
agricultural households in a setting without technical advances are: (1)
intertemporal variability in rainfall, a critical productive input; (2) spa
tial covariability in rainfall families living close-by experience simi
lar weather at the same time; (3) stationarity in weather, making it
possible to assess weather risk and the consequences of weather, once
realized, for production and income; and (4) the absence of insurance
for adverse rainfall conditions or shortfalls in incomes. As a conse
quence of fluctuating rainfall, and other weather conditions, house
holds experience fluctuating incomes and have a need for mechanisms,
alternative to formal insurance, to smooth their consumption.
There are two principal means of consumption-smoothing. Farmers
can attempt to reduce the impact of weather variation on incomes by
altering their productive practices or inputs prior to the realization of
rainfall, by installing irrigation facilities, for example. 1 These ex ante
adjustments to the riskiness of rainfall can be supplemented by
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attempts to transfer income from good-weather periods to bad-weather
periods by ex post adjustment to realized weather outcomes. Saving,
by storing output, or borrowing from the more fortunate are examples.
Note, however, that neighbors are of limited help in bad-weather times,
as they are likely to experience shortfalls at the same time as the "dis
tressed" household because of the covariant nature of rainfall.
In this economy, experience is the most valuable form of human
capital. Given the stationarity of weather, farmers learn over time the
best ways of coping ex ante and ex post with the varieties of rainfall
based on their experience. Moreover, if land plots are differentiated,
the returns to such experience are specific to plots of land or the local
economy. As a consequence, schooling, which enables farmers to
acquire knowledge outside their immediate environment, provides lit
tle return. Because of stationarity, traditional practices based on years
of experience (learning by doing) are optimal, with book knowledge
about other environments of little value.
Where experience is valuable, the elderly have the highest levels of
human capital; it would be expected in such stationary environments
that elders would be "respected." In particular, where the returns to
plot-specific experience are high, there are incentives for children and
parents to farm together on the family land. By working on the family
land, the children acquire specific knowledge about that land, and that
land then becomes more valuable to them than any other land in the
economy and is worth more to them than to any anonymous agent. The
children will thus want to remain on the family land that they will
inherit. The gains from keeping the land within the family, arising from
plot-specific experience, are shared intergenerationally, with the adult
children perhaps working at lower rates of pay than hired laborers or
working harder in exchange for future returns they will earn on the
family land from their experience on it. Thus, the existence of experi
ential returns leads to intergenerational co-production and to little land
divestment. Family stability with highly valued elders should be char
acteristic of the stationary but risky traditional economy. 2
Note that this plot-specific experience hypothesis turns the "old-age
security" hypothesis on its head the vertical extension of farm house
holds is not due to the need by the elders for support from their more
productive children, but rather reflects the enhanced value of the
elders' human capital, relative to their children, which is tied to the
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family land. The value of accumulated experience as a factor in bind
ing together two generations of family members also implies that there
is no reason for adult siblings to co-produce after their father dies.
Each sibling essentially brings no additional embodied knowledge to
the farming enterprise.
Specific experience, given the natural immobility of land, is a cen
tripetal force tying family members together and contributing to ex
ante consumption-smoothing. However, the scope for mitigating the
effects of adverse weather is limited. What can be done if such actions
fail to sustain incomes? Some means by which income shortfalls are
made up ex post is required. However, by concentrating in one loca
tion, the family gives up the gains from spatial diversification, which
makes ex post consumption-smoothing more difficult. The covariant
nature of weather risk and the need to smooth consumption would cre
ate an incentive for the family to diversify income sources spatially.
Thus there is also a centrifugal force tending to spread family members
over space, given risk prospects.
While risk considerations increase the returns to the spatial spread
of income sources, the costs of coordinating and monitoring a geo
graphically diverse income-pooling scheme also rise with the separa
tion of partners in the scheme. Indeed, it is the positive association
between risk-spreading from locational diversity and information and
monitoring costs entailed in limiting the scope for cheating that is in
part responsible for the absence of crop or income insurance. Can the
family sustain an efficient income-pooling scheme across space while
minimizing moral hazard and maintaining the gains from experience
that are tied to specific plots of land?
Consider first the possibility that the family simply splits, with some
members migrating to settle apart from the origin household. The pro
ductivity of the new, split-off household would be lower than that of
the origin household, as the specific experience returns would be lower
on the newly acquired land. Indeed, ex post income-pooling consider
ations would lead to the minimization of the similarity of both land and
weather across the two households and thus minimization of the rele
vance of experience on the family land. An alternative scheme, how
ever, would have one family member transferred into an existing,
established household with experience on its own land and income
covaring minimally with that of the origin household. In this case, the
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origin household has an incentive to support the destination household
to the extent that the household cares about its former member. More
over, to the extent that the family member cares about the origin fam
ily, the family member will see to it that the destination household does
not cheat the departed family member is like a resident agent of the
origin household. Thus, altruism, an important characteristic of fami
lies, contributes to the efficiency of spatial income pooling by creating
a verification and monitoring capacity.
This latter scheme describes the typical pattern of marriages in rural
India, as will be described below. Daughters typically leave the village
in which they are born to live with their new husband in his household
of birth. Why are daughters and not sons mobile? Given the division of
labor in which women contribute less time to agricultural production,
there is smaller loss from the reduction in experiential capital upon the
migration of a woman compared to a man. Thus, an arrangement in
which men are immobile and inherit the family land, and in which
there are maritally mobile women establishing ties with spatially
spread families, facilitates risk-sharing in the face of covariant risks
while maximizing the returns from experience capital (Rosenzweig
and Stark 1989).
Effects of Technical Change
One of the most important potential effects of the introduction of
technical change is on the returns to human capital. First, under a new
technology, past experience becomes less relevant to production deci
sions. The new regime of best production practices that characterize
the new technology obsolesces experience. As a result, it may be
expected that one of the ties holding families together, the value of
experience specific to the family's land, would erode, with a conse
quent increase in family breakups and an increase in land sales. In
addition, as the value of elders' experience is reduced, such groups
may become more vulnerable.
A one-shot change in technology immediately reduces the value of
past experience, but if there are no further changes in technology,
experiential returns eventually will increase, as farmers become more
familiar with the new technology under different varieties of weather
and on their own plots of land. Under a regime of constant changes in
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technology, however, long-term experience never has substantial value
and, as hypothesized by T. W. Schultz (1975), the returns to formal
schooling rise. This is because under constant change, farmers better
able to cope with that change and adapt to new practices earn higher
returns. And it is this skill that formal schooling may help to foster.
Farmers experiencing a flow of new technologies may need to decode
the new information better, for which literacy may be quite useful.
In an environment of persistent technical change there is an increase
in the rate of return to formal schooling and literacy and a decline in
the value of experience. These changes may lead to new family rela
tionships, not only because of the reduced value of specific experience
but also because the increase in incomes reduces the need for alterna
tive mechanisms for coping with the vagaries of weather. Farmers are
better able to self-insure, and perhaps are less averse to risk, when
average incomes are higher. However, informal insurance arrange
ments involving transfers across households would appear to be inher
ently fragile. One reason is that beliefs about each farmer's future
willingness to participate in the income-pooling arrangement are criti
cal for arrangements undertaken by households that transfer resources
to those experiencing negative earnings shocks from those with posi
tive shocks (Foster 1988; Coate and Ravallion 1993). Each participant
must believe that other participants will not renege from commitments
in the future. These considerations suggest that economic development
may have an important effect on the ability and willingness of house
holds to engage in these arrangements.
There are three ways in which economic development, in particular
increases in farm earnings brought about by agricultural technological
change, may reduce the role of insurance-like transfers and thus the
insurance premium attached to marriage. First, technological change
may increase mobility; established households will be less likely to
remain on the same land due to the erosion of plot-specific experiential
returns. As shown by Coate and Ravallion, the prospects of increased
mobility of any household participating in the income-pooling scheme
increase the divergence between first-best and optimal-constrained
transfer arrangements, as the likelihood increases that the future bene
fits from such a scheme will not be forthcoming to all participants.
A second reason that technical change may reduce the insurance
value of marital ties is that increases in earnings, given declining risk
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aversion and/or improved abilities to accumulate assets, reduce the
demand for such insurance. Note that with forward-looking house
holds, it is only necessary that one of the partners believe that future
earnings growth will reduce the likelihood of participation for the
arrangements to be broken off in the current period. Thus, even farmers
who experience earnings growth but who wish to continue such
arrangements may not be able to if their partners are less motivated to
do so.
Finally, all of the parameters in the risk-sharing decision rules
reflect the bargaining parties' mutual assessment of risk and their
knowledge of the technology of production. Changes in technology
necessitate new arrangements, at least initially, by changing risks and
making risk assessment more difficult. This may decrease the ability to
risk pool and thus make farmers more reliant on alternative mecha
nisms to smooth consumption.
In the new environment of technical change and growth, then, the
incentives for larger, and vertically extended families with little
schooling are reduced. The reduction in returns to experience attenu
ates the costs of mobility by loosening the ties of generations of kin to
the family land, and the decline in the value of family arrangements
involving spatial diversification lowers the demand for larger families.
Moreover, if the returns to schooling also rise, then in order to mitigate
the costs of such schooling, families will reduce the number of chil
dren they will have, as elaborated in Becker and Lewis (1973).

The Data and Empirical Features of the Rural Indian Economy
In order to ascertain if the relationships between family arrange
ments, human capital, and growth elaborated above are useful depic
tions of reality, it is important to have data that describe household
structures in settings with and without technical change. There are two
data sets describing rural India that are quite useful for this purpose.
One of these, the International Crop Research Institute for the SemiArid Tropics (ICRISAT) Village Studies survey data, provides infor
mation on income, expenditures, production resources, assets, and
family membership for thirty farmers in ten villages in the semi-arid
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tropics of India, many of whom were surveyed for as many as ten
years. This survey was begun in 1975 in six villages in three agroclimatic regions. In three of those villages, the farmers (and ten house
holds not owning land in each village) were surveyed for ten years, in
three others for seven years. In addition, a retrospective questionnaire
administered in 1984 elicited retrospective information on marriages,
farming experience, and land ownership, which is particularly relevant
to the study of the family.
There are two other important features of this data set for an inquiry
into the determinants of family-human capital interactions. First,
although the data were collected after the green revolution was well
under way in India, the semi-arid tropical areas were not directly
affected, as the low levels and erratic nature of the rainfall in such
areas preclude the use of the new seed varieties of wheat or rice. Thus,
the data describe a setting in which there is little technical progress. A
second important feature of the data is that there is time-series infor
mation on daily rainfall, making it possible to measure an important
source of risk and thus study how risk differentially shapes family rela
tionships and the returns to human capital under a technologically stag
nant regime.
The longitudinal nature of the ICRISAT data makes it useful for
depicting the consumption-smoothing problem confronting farmers.
Figure 1 displays the aggregate fluctuations in farm profits from crop
production in the original villages for the period 1975-83. As can be
seen, the fluctuations are large, and with the exception of two of the
villages depicted by the solid lines where there were some improve
ments in seed varieties (sorghum and cotton) in 1981, trendless. A
computation of the intertemporal coefficient of variation (the intertemporal standard deviation divided by the mean) for each of the farmers
in these villages indicates that for the average farmer the standard devi
ation in profits is 25 percent higher than mean profits. To benchmark
this figure, I calculated the same statistic based on seven years of
annual earnings using U.S. data on white males 25-29 years of age in
1971. For this group, the average coefficient of variation was only 39;
earnings variability was thus more than three times higher among
farmers in the ICRISAT region than among white males in the United
States.

72

Human Capital Accumulation, the Family, and Economic Development

Another important feature indicated by figure 1 is the covariability
in incomes. As noted, the villages are grouped into sets of two in three
regions. This is depicted in the figure by the use of common line pat
terns for the groups, and as can be seen the intertemporal movements
in aggregate profits are quite closely correlated, particularly in the two
solid-line villages, whose distance apart is only 20 kilometers. The
data thus suggest that earnings fluctuations and the covariability in
earnings are important characteristics of the agricultural environment. 3
Figure 1. Profits from Crop Production

Profits

The ICRISAT data cannot be used to assess directly the conse
quences of technical change. As noted, and as indicated by the ICRI
SAT data, an important feature of the Indian experience with respect to
the introduction of the newer higher-yielding grain varieties in the
early 1960s is the spatial variability in the degree to which the green
revolution took hold, chiefly because of location-specific heterogeneity
in soil and weather conditions. In recognition of the selective potential
for the success of the new technologies, the government of India in
1961 implemented a program, the Intensive Agricultural District Pro-
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gram (IADP), in one district in each state in India (two in the state of
Kerala) in which it was expected that the improved grain varieties were
likely to be particularly productive. The program's objective was to
facilitate the adoption of the new inputs and the implementation of new
agricultural practices associated with the new inputs an early exam
ple of a governmental program attempting to "pick winners"!
To assess the income distribution consequences of the new grain
varieties, the National Council of Applied Economic Research
(NCAER) undertook a national survey of rural households in 250 vil
lages in 1968, the Additional Rural Income Survey (ARIS), based on a
stratified random sample in which one of the sampling strata was
defined by the presence of the IADP program in the district. One-third
of the sample thus included households from each of the IADP districts
(National Council of Applied Economic Research 1975). Households
were interviewed three times annually from the crop year 1968-69
through the crop year 1970-71 resulting in three years of information
on a sample of 4,118 households, approximately two-thirds of which
were fanning households. The sampling scheme of the ARIS survey
enables both a more generalizable view of Indian households and
behavior and an assessment of the effects of technical change. With the
information provided on production, household demography, and
income sources taken in the early stages of the green revolution for a
national probability sample of rural households, we can assess how
typical the six to ten villages in the ICRISAT sample are as well as the
consequences, at least initially, of the introduction of continuing agri
cultural technical progress.
Both data sets reveal a consistent picture of household structure and
stability. The NCAER-ARIS data indicate that 62 percent of farm fam
ilies are characterized by vertical extension (two adult generations of
co-resident kin), with only 7.5 percent characterized by horizontal
extension (adult siblings co-residing without their parents). The ICRI
SAT data are similar; they show 70 percent of the farm households ver
tically extended and only 3 percent horizontally extended. The
ICRISAT retrospective data also indicate that households are stable
and immobile, with less than 7 percent of household heads born out
side of the village in which they were currently living. This stability is
also reflected in the rarity of land sales indicated in the NCAER data,
with less than 2 percent of farm households having sold any land in the
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last year of the survey (when this information was elicited). In contrast
to the immobility of households and household heads, the women are
mobile, as indicated by the ICRISAT retrospective data: 94 percent of
the adult married women in the sample were born outside of the vil
lage in which they were currently residing. These figures on the immo
bility of men and the mobility of married women in rural areas in the
ICRISAT data are echoed in the 1981 Population Census of India,
which indicates that 80 percent of all lifetime migrants, persons not
residing in the village where they were born, are women.

Returns to Experience in a Stationary Environment
The patterns of household structure and mobility (and immobility)
are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that returns to experience
are sufficiently important in stationary but risky agricultural settings to
bind the household to the family land, particularly those members who
specialize in production. But is the basic assumption correct, that expe
rience has a high return related to coping with the consequences of
adverse weather in a stationary economy? To have some confidence in
the experience-household structure association, which has important
implications for the consequences to families of economic growth, it
would be desirable to estimate the returns to experience.
Both the NCAER-ARIS and ICRISAT data sets permit estimation of
the returns to farming experience. The NCAER data identify for each
of the three years of the survey whether or not there was adverse
weather in the village in which the household resides. It is thus possi
ble to estimate the effects of bad weather on farm profits and the way
these effects are mitigated, if at all, by farmer experience. Based on
regression estimates, figure 2 shows how profits earned under adverse
weather conditions are related to the age structure and other character
istics of households, given their average profitability in the years in
which weather conditions were normal.4 Each bar represents the per
centage fall in profits from normal or good weather profits resulting
from bad weather for households with different characteristics. The
first bar on the left represents the percentage shortfall from normal
profits (39.7 percent) for households in which the eldest person is less
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than forty years old and in which there is no extension aid. The next
bar represents the profit shortfall in an otherwise identical household in
which the eldest person is as old as fifty-nine the effect of adding a
person in the forty to fifty-nine age range to a household in which the
eldest is less than forty. The effect is to decrease the shortfall by 10
percentage points. When the eldest is sixty or over, the shortfall
declines by an additional 15 percentage points to 15.3 percent (third
bar). Thus the presence of an elder over fifty-nine years of age halves
the adverse effect of bad weather compared to a household in which
the eldest person is less than sixty.
Figure 2. Percentage Fall in Profits Due to Bad Weather by Family Type
100 _

Eldest<40 and
no help
Eldest<40
Eldest<40 and
and extension
electricity

As a benchmark with which to compare the age structure effects, the
next bars in the figure represent the profit shortfalls in households like
the first, with no elders over forty, but with extension aid and electrifi
cation, respectively. These figures indicate that the provision of exten
sion services has a comparable effect on the mitigation of adverse
weather to adding an elder between the ages of forty and fifty-nine to
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the "young" household (the percentage shortfall declines from 39.7 to
31.5 as compared to 30.4), but is only half as effective as adding an
elder who is sixty or more years of age. The effect of electrification,
which permits irrigation and thus better water control, is similar to the
extension service (a fall of 31.0 percent compared to 31.5), and evi
dently less valuable for limiting the consequences of bad weather than
having an individual in the family with forty or more years of farming
experience.
The results in figure 2 suggest the importance of farming experience
in a stationary environment characterized by erratic rainfall. However,
they are not fully satisfactory because (1) age and experience on the
family's land are not necessarily the same, although the dearth of land
sales suggests that they are highly correlated; and (2) the association
between age structure and profits is not necessarily indicative of the
effects of age structure, but may instead mean that higher profits in bad
weather affect household age structure. Specifically, vertical extension
may be a "normal" good households with higher profits in bad
weather may simply prefer to have elders co-reside compared to less
fortunate households. Or, for households in which bad weather some
how does not strongly affect profits, the elderly are more likely to sur
vive.
The ICRISAT data permit, in contrast to the NCAER data, a more
exact reconstruction of each farmer's experience on the family's land,
based on the retrospective questionnaire providing a complete plotspecific history for all owned plots of land for all heads of households.
Moreover, the extended number of years over which the fanners are
observed permits better controls for unobserved factors that may affect
profits and thus the family age structure. Based on the restrospective
questionnaire on plot ownership and cultivation administered to all
sample households, the total experience of each household head on all
owned plots of land, differentiated by whether the land was irrigated or
not, was computed for each of the ten years of the sample survey. For
each household in each year, cumulative experience on owned plots for
each type of land (dry or irrigated) was computed as the weighted aver
age, by plot size, of the total years that each plot (whether owned or
not) had been cultivated by the household head. One can then examine
how the change in the real value of net profits from cultivation is

Human Capital Accumulation, the Family, and Economic Development 77

related to the changes in (1) total experience on each type of land, (2)
total holdings of each land type, (3) rainfall in the year (rain per day in
three of the most critical months during the rainy season, July, August,
and September), and (4) rainfall interacted with both land owned and
experience. By looking at the association between the change in profits
and the changes in the determinants of profits, the influence on profits
of permanent but unmeasured characteristics of the farm households,
such as ability or healthiness, which may also affect the number of
accumulated years of cultivation, are eliminated.
Figure 3 reports in graphical form the relationships between farm
profits and rainfall for the farmers surveyed by ICRISAT classified into
three experience groups: those with ten, twenty, and thirty years of
farmer experience on their own plots of land. 5 The figures show that,
among farmers with the same schooling, with the same irrigated and
dry landholdings, and who are the same age, increases in specific expe
rience contribute significantly to increased agricultural profits.6 At the
sample mean rainfall (5 mm per day), it can be seen that farmers with
thirty years of specific experience (3,963 rupees) have significantly
higher profits than those with twenty years of experience (2,596
rupees) and ten years (1,459 rupees). Moreover, and consistent with
the results from the NCAER-ARIS sample, the sensitivity of profits to
rainfall is also less for the more experienced farmers the relationship
between profits and rainfall is less steep for the more experienced
farmers compared to those farmers with less experience. Indeed, at the
lowest level of rainfall, 2 mm, the ratio of profits for the most experi
enced farmers to those with the least experience is 4.5 to 1, while at the
highest levels of rainfall the ratio is only 1.8 to 1 as a consequence of
the differential sensitivities of profitability to rainfall across the experi
ence groups.
The results reported in figure 3 thus indicate that there are signifi
cant gains from the experience accumulated by farmers from the con
tinuous cultivation of land in the environment of the ICRISAT villages
where technical change is not a significant factor. The magnitudes of
the effects are such as to make it profitable for families to try to hold on
to their landholdings, and for cultivating members of the household to
stay on the family land. Moreover, the data also indicate, although
these results are not shown, that the schooling level of the farmers
played no role in either altering the effects of rainfall on profits or in
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determining the level of profits. Where there are few or no innovations
to learn about, the skills provided by formal schooling are evidently
not profitable.
Figure 3. Relationship of Farm Profits to Rainfall, by Farmer Experience
o 10 Years of Farmer Experience
a 30 Years of Farmer Experience

20 Years of Farmer Experience
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While figures 2 and 3 suggest that specific experience in farming
can alleviate some of the adverse consequences for earnings due to
shortfalls in rainfall, they also indicate that farm profits are sensitive to
rainfall variability even among the most experienced farmers. Farm
households thus still need mechanisms to smooth their consumption in
the face of ex post earnings fluctuations. As discussed earlier, having
family members who reside some distance from the household can
potentially contribute to consumption-smoothing by pooling earnings
from spatially diversified income sources. If there is such pooling, then
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transfers of income should be observed to originate from outside the
villages of the households and not from nearby neighbors and in partic
ular from the destination households of married daughters and the ori
gin households of the wives of the men in the household. The ICRISAT
data provide information on the approximate location of transaction
partners for many of the transactions undertaken by the surveyed
households, which can be used to ascertain if transfers are locally
based.
Table 1 compares the origin, by location, for three types of income
for the three ICRISAT villages with the longest time-series of informa
tion on transactions (ten years). These numbers indicate that the likeli
hood of a transaction originating outside of the village is three times
higher for a transfer than for crop sale and a transfer is four times more
likely to originate outside the village than is the sale of labor services.
Moreover, among transactions with partners residing outside the vil
lage, income transfers originate the farthest from the village three
times farther than the external purchasers of crops and almost four
times farther than the employers of labor.
Table 1. Location of Origin of Income, by Type, in Three ICRISAT
Villages

Income type
Transfers
Daily labor
Sale of crops

Total number Value share from
of transactions outside of village
58.7
3,000
24.8
10,940
19.0
13,083

Mean distance
to source
(kilometers)
24.9
6.5
8.3

SOURCE- Rosenzweig (1988b)

Although there is no information in the ICRISAT data on the iden
tity of transaction partners, the issue can be addressed indirectly. One
way to do this is to ask whether households who are more successful in
smoothing consumption are those with a greater number of marital
"connections," as indicated by the number of married women in the
household. If such marriage-based income-pooling schemes are impor
tant, then one should observe that adding married women to the house
hold reduces consumption variability. Information on annual
consumption is available for each household and can be used to com-
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pute, over a ten-year period, the variability in consumption for each
household. Similarly, based on annual profit information, a measure of
household-specific profit variability can also be constructed.
If households can perfectly smooth their consumption, then there
should be no relationship between the variability in earnings or profits
that they experience and the variability in their consumption. On the
other hand, if households cannot smooth at all, consumption variability
will be identical to earnings variability. Figure 4 charts the extent to
which actual consumption variability deviates from perfect consump
tion-smoothing (no variability) for households classified by the num
ber of married women in them and by their inherited wealth. 7 The
figure shows that households least successful in smoothing consump
tion ex post have the highest deviations and the tallest bars.
Figure 4. Percent Deviation from Perfect Consumption-Smoothing
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The first bar on the left depicts the shortfall from perfect ex post
consumption-smoothing for a household with no married women and
no inherited wealth; for this household, approximately 68 percent of
profit variability is carried over into consumption variability so that the
household's consumption variance deviates from perfect consumption-
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smoothing by 32 percent. The next two bars represent the extent of
consumption-smoothing for otherwise identical households, in terms
of landholdings, total number of adult males and females, and levels of
schooling, but with one and two (resident) married women who came
from a household located in the village, respectively. These house
holds, as can be seen, experience less consumption variability than the
first household with no married women, by about 7 percentage points
for the household with two married women.
The next two bars show what would happen in a household with two
married women if the average distance of the origin household from
the village of the respondent household was to increase to 30 and 60
kilometers, respectively. As can be seen, increasing the distance
between households does also reduce consumption variability,
although the effects are smaller than the creation of household ties via
marriage as represented by the presence of married women.
Finally, the last bar shows the extent to which the addition of capital
to a household with no married women also reduces the impact of
earnings variability on consumption variability. In this case, it is the
effect of providing the sample mean inheritance of 79,000 (1984)
rupees, or about $4,000, to the household with neither wealth nor mar
ried women. The height of this bar indicates that this amount of wealth,
coincidentally, has almost the exact same impact of the degree of ex
post consumption-smoothing as does having two married women in
the household with origin families located 60 kilometers away. In
terms of improving a household's ability to smooth consumption in the
face of earnings variability, these married women are equivalent in
value to having an inheritance of 79,00 rupees! This last "experiment"
also demonstrates that increased wealth, which is one consequence of
economic growth, is a substitute for the informal risk-pooling scheme
associated with marriage.

Consequences of Agricultural Technical Change
for Schooling Investments and Household Stability
I turn now to the evidence on how technical change affects the
returns to schooling and family stability exploiting the geographically
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selective nature of the green revolution in India and, in particular, the
identification by the Indian government of specific districts in which
such technology would yield the greatest productivity gains, the IADP
districts. How successful was the Indian government in identifying
where growth would be most rapid? In this case, the areas selected do
appear to have grown more rapidly than did other areas as a whole.
Figure 5 plots the ratios of indices of aggregate output to 1960 levels in
IADP and non-IADP areas from 1960 up to the survey date. 8 As can be
seen prior to 1967, output movements in both IADP and non-IADP
districts were similarly affected by weather variation and did not
exhibit growth. After 1966, however, output grew at a higher rate in the
IADP areas and the similarity in movements is attenuated, reflecting in
part the different agricultural technologies being used. Moreover,
adoption rates of the new high-yielding grain varieties in IADP areas
were significantly higher than elsewhere as of 1970-71 and real agri
cultural wage rates in the decade between 1961 and 1971 rose by 24
percent in IADP areas compared to 6.4 percent in non-IADP areas
(Rosenzweig 1990). Thus, the IADP areas were, at least up to the time
of the survey, experiencing higher rates of growth in earnings after the
onset of the green revolution.
Figure 5. Ratio of Aggregate Output to 1960 Output in IADP and
Non-IADP Districts
o Non-IADP Districts

A IADP Districts

16-

93-

69

70

71

Human Capital Accumulation, the Family, and Economic Development

83

It is, of course, not possible to know on the basis of the 1968-71
NCAER-ARIS data, collected approximately eight years after the
introduction of higher-yielding seeds, whether the returns to schooling
rose more in districts where farmers directly benefited from the new
technologies, because we only have cross-sectional evidence. The evi
dence does suggest that rates of return to primary schooling in 197071 were higher in the IADP areas, but they may also have been higher
in 1950 or 1960 as well (Rosenzweig 1990).
On the basis of school enrollment data for children and schooling
attainment information for adults in the 1970-71 survey, however, a
retrospective history of schooling investments can be reconstructed. It
is thus possible to ascertain if schooling investments rose more in the
IADP districts since the onset of the green revolution compared to
non-IADP districts. By comparing the pre- and post-green revolution
schooling investment rates in the IADP and non-IADP districts, aggre
gate trends in schooling over the 1961-71 period are effectively "con
trolled for." This intertemporal comparison from the cross-sectional
survey data can be accomplished based on the fact that members of
households aged twenty-five and above in 1971 who attended primary
school would have completed their primary schooling prior to the
introduction of the new high-yielding grain varieties, while those per
sons aged ten to fourteen in 1971 who attended primary school would
have completed their primary school education after the green revolu
tion began.
Figure 6 shows the changes in the percentage of male illiteracy in
farm households in the non-IADP areas and in the IADP districts
before and after the beginning of the green revolution. The figure
shows that male illiteracy was lower in the IADP districts before the
new technologies were introduced. This pre-1961 difference in literacy
could not therefore have been caused by the growth induced by the
subsequent availability of the new grain varieties. However, the figure
also reveals that the proportion of men who were illiterate fell more
after the new technologies were first introduced in the IADP areas
compared to the non-IADP areas, which experienced considerably less
growth: the proportion of men who were illiterate in farm households
decreased by 14.5 percentage points, a 56 percent drop, in IADP dis
tricts, and by 12.1 percentage points, a 30 percent drop, in non-IADP
districts. The cohort data thus indicate that increases in the pace of
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development, fueled by exogenous technical change, lead to increases
in human capital investment, consistent with the hypothesis that tech
nology growth raises the returns to schooling.
Figure 6. Male Illiteracy in Non-IADP and IADP Districts: 1961 and
1971

Non-IADP Districts
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It is also possible to compare the pre- and post-green revolution
cumulative fertility experiences of comparably aged women in the
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IADP and non-IADP districts using a similar cohort analysis based on
the retrospective fertility rosters of the married women in 1970-71 to
see if families were getting smaller as a consequence of technical
change. The children born to women aged twenty-five to thirty-four in
1971 in IADP districts should almost wholly reflect the green revolu
tion experience, while the cumulative fertility of women aged twentyfive to thirty-four residing in IADP districts in 1961 and that of women
aged twenty-five to thirty-four residing in non-IADP districts in either
1961 or 1971 should not have been directly influenced by the new
technologies. Figure 7 plots the cumulative fertility (children ever
born) of women aged twenty-five to thirty-four in the IADP and nonIADP districts for the years 1961 and 1971. The figure suggests that
there were substantial effects on fertility associated with the introduc
tion of technical change. While cumulative fertility was higher by
almost one-third of a child in the IADP districts compared to the nonIADP areas in 1961, the cumulative fertility rates fell by much more
over the subsequent decade in the IADP districts from 3.44 children
to 3.04 children in the IADP districts compared to a fall from 3.11 to
3.03 children in the rest of India. By the end of the 1960s, fertility in
the IADP and non-IADP areas was virtually the same.
Figure 7. 1961-71 Change in Fertility: Women 25-34 in IADP
and Non-IADP Areas
o IADP Districts

Non-IADP Districts
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Do the declines in fertility reflect the reduced return to larger fami
lies from risk-spreading and the reduced stability of households? The
evidence based on the 1968-71 NCAER-ARIS data suggests that
households in the IADP districts were significantly less likely to
receive a financial transfer than households in non-IADP districts
experiencing the same shortfalls in income and with the same house
hold structure. However, again, the lower efficacy of income-pooling
in the IADP districts observed in 1968-71 may have existed before the
onset of the green revolution; before and after evidence is needed.
Two new findings on the change in the stability of landholdings and
in family structure are associated with the introduction of new grain
varieties. First, as noted, new varieties of two principal crops, sorghum
and cotton, were introduced in two of the ICRISAT villages in 1981.
Prior to that year, over the 1975-1980 period, 4.8 percent of house
holds sold land in a typical year. After 1981, based on information in
the years 1982-84, 6.3 percent of households sold their holdings. This
increase in land divestment is consistent with the erosion of the returns
from specific experience associated with new technologies.
Figure 8. Proportion of Households Splitting in Non-IADP and IADP
Districts, 1971-1982
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A second and more important piece of evidence is from a prelimi
nary look at newly available data from a 1982 follow-up survey under
taken by NCAER, which reinterviewed a subset of the original 197071 NCAER-ARIS households. By matching the two surveys for
households in which the head was still alive in 1982, it is possible to
discern which households split over the 1971-82 period, where a
"split" household is defined as one in which an adult male has left per
manently. The results of this preliminary matching, performed jointly
with Prem Vashishtha of NCAER, are shown in figure 8. It indicates
that in the non-IADP districts, the proportion of households that split
was 29 percent less than the proportion who split in the IADP districts
subsequent to the initial survey in 1970-71 16.8 percent of house
holds split by 1982 in the non-IADP districts compared to 21.6 in the
IADP districts. These differences in the probability of break-up were
not due to either differences in initial wealth across the two areas, as
indicated by landholdings in 1970-71, or to differences in the school
ing attainment of heads in 1970-71, as the results are unaffected by
controlling for these household characteristics.

Conclusion

In this essay I have briefly discussed some of the connections
between economic development, the family, and the returns to human
capital. The evidence from the Indian experience, in which economic
growth in the rural sector was propelled by exogenous technical
change starting in the mid-1960s, appears to suggest that a fuller
understanding of changing family arrangements and family values
cannot be achieved without attention to the economic problem of
security facing households and to the effects of economic growth on
the relative rates of return to formal schooling and experience. An
examination of Indian data soon after the beginning of the revolution
ary transformation of agriculture, from a relatively stable, traditionbased regime to one which is dynamic, suggests that technical change
can have important destabilizing effects on basic institutions such as
the the family by reducing the returns to experience and by making
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risk-spreading arrangements among family members more difficult in
an environment of increased uncertainty.
There are some general implications for policy from these findings.
First, it is notable that the significant decline in fertility in the growth
areas relative to the rest of India occurred without direct governmental
intervention. Public family planning efforts were not targeted to those
areas. When lower fertility is a public goal, such efforts are not always
necessary if economic growth is significant. On the other hand, the
demand for services that a family planning program would provide
was evidently higher in the high-growth areas. Moreover, the less sub
stantial relative increase in schooling may in part reflect a lack of
response in terms of school facilities. Given the Indian government's
prescience in selecting areas of potential growth, it would appear that
an anticipatory reallocation of public resources aimed at facilitating
schooling, fertility reduction, and, perhaps, increasing income security
would have been desirable. Indeed, it is hoped that the further study of
the consequences of economic growth for family relationships and for
human capital investments will provide a more effective basis for for
mulating policies that will mitigate some of the problems associated
with adapting to the new, and less stable, circumstances a high-growth
regime entails.
NOTES
1. See Rosenzweig and Bmswanger (1993) and Rosenzweig and Wolpm (1993) for studies of
how weather risk alters the allocation of productive durables in Indian farming and the conse
quences of different production portfolios
2. The mtergenerational gams from specific experience are more formally modeled in Rosenz
weig and Wolpm (1985).
3. The relationships between the distance between the ICRISAT villages and the mtervillage
correlations in rainfall and farm profits are positive and statistically significant (Rosenzweig
1988b).
4 Only households experiencing at least one good-weather year were selected for this analy
sis In the crop year 1968-69, 59 percent of households were in a village that experienced adverse
weather; the percentages for the subsequent two crop years were 27 and 14 percent, respectively
For details, see Rosenzweig and Wolpm (1985).
5. For details on the estimates underlying the figure, see Rosenzweig (1988a).
6. The figures are computed for farmers at age fifty, with otherwise average schooling and
landholdings in the sample
7 The estimation procedures used to obtain the results in the figure are described in Rosenz
weig and Stark (1989)
8 The construction of the output series for the districts included in the NCAER-ARIS survey
is described in Bmswanger, Khandker, and Rosenzweig (1993)
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Can the U.S. System
of Workplace Training
Survive Global Competition?
Peter B. Doeringer
Boston University

One of the most well-documented facts of modern labor economics
is that education and training, or what economists call human capital
investments, have high payoff in terms of income and productivity
(Denison 1985). In a country like the United States with a large public
education system and high levels of college attendance, estimates are
that investments in schooling yield a rate of return in excess of 10 per
cent and that over half of all national wealth is in the form of the edu
cation and skills of the labor force (U.S. Congress 1973).
Increases in human capital have traditionally translated into rising
productivity and growth in earnings (Denison 1985; Jorgenson 1988).
During the postwar period, the American economy could regularly
count on productivity increases of around 3 percent a year. After the
OPEC oil shock of 1973, however, this rate plummeted to nine-tenths
of a percent.
Many explanations have been offered to explain this decline fall
ing R&D expenditures, low rates of savings and investment, increased
governmental regulation, and even the bureaucratic and myopic behav
ior of managers (Griliches 1988; Jorgenson 1988; Olson 1988). How
ever, a series of blue-ribbon competitiveness commissions advanced
the thesis that the accumulating weaknesses of American schools were
also a significant drag on productivity growth.
The Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Effi
ciency (1989) reported that "vast numbers of American students cannot
meet the educational requirements of today's workplace, much less
those of the next century...." A study by the American Society of
Training Directors (1989) concluded that the problem of "deficiencies
in basic workplace skills is a growing one... [which is] driving the
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nation toward a human capital deficit...that threatens the competitive
ness of economic institutions...." A Business Week (1988) cover story
on human capital reported that "the U.S. has lost much ground to com
petitors, and investing in people looks like the way to retake it." The
general conclusion of this wave of reports was that educational reform
and new partnerships between education and business were needed to
restore productivity growth and to make American industry competi
tive.

The U.S. System of Workplace Training and Productivity
While not wishing to diminish the importance of education reform, I
would argue that the crux of the nation's human capital deficiencies
does not lie exclusively in its schools, and that improvements in educa
tion are not as central to solving the nation's productivity and human
capital problems as many have argued. Even if schooling could be a
critical part of the long-term solution to the nation's competitiveness
problems, it could do little to rebuild the productive capacity of today's
workers who are already out of school and who will account for twothirds of the next decade's labor force. Instead, the problem is rooted in
the weakening of America's workplace system for building labor pro
ductivity where I define productivity to include effort, commitment,
and problem-solving capacity, as well as job skills.
Schools in this country have never contributed much to this broad
conception of productivity and are unlikely ever to play a major role,
given the organization of work in American industry. The K-12 school
system, and even vocational and technical schools and higher educa
tion, are largely intended to provide a once-in-a-lifetime foundation of
basic skills for young workers who are entering the labor market. No
matter how high the quality, common denominator training in founda
tion skills for entry-level jobs cannot prepare workers to operate spe
cific technologies, to accommodate quickly to changing products and
materials, to meet rising standards of quality, or to solve day-to-day
production problems. Nor can it prepare workers for the inevitable
changes in skills that will occur during their working lives.
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Lifetime skills of this sort can only be learned through experience
gained on-the-job by working on the shop floor or in other work set
tings. A sense of the importance of such workplace training can be
obtained by comparing the earnings of recent school graduates who
have little or no work experience with those of workers whose produc
tivity has been increased through experiential learning. The earnings of
full-time, male high school graduates, for example, will about double
after thirty years of work experience and a similar amount of work
experience will more than double the earnings of college graduates.
If I have persuaded you that the "workplace training system" is wor
thy of attention as a source of improved earnings and productivity, then
it is important to understand how this system works and what has been
happening to it in recent years. I will use the example of production
workers in manufacturing as an illustration, but many of the same prin
ciples apply more generally to other occupations and other sectors.

Recent Trends in the Workplace Training System
The United States actually has two systems of workplace training.
One is what my radical colleagues call the "Taylorist" or "Fordist" sys
tem that originated in mass production manufacturing in the early part
of the twentieth century; the second is a newer "high-commitment"
system that was initially introduced in nonunion, high-technology
manufacturing after World War II.

The Fordist System
Under the Fordist system, workers are hired into entry-level jobs
that require little or no skill. Those who pass a probationary period of
employment are gradually promoted up the rungs of a job ladder to
positions of increasing skill, responsibility, and pay. Promotion gener
ally follows seniority, and each promotion requires additional on-thejob training to bring employees up to full productive capacity.
Many of the skills acquired in this way are unique to a particular
company's technology and work organization, and workers therefore
acquire human capital that is valuable only in a specific employment
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situation. The cost to the firm of providing such skills gives employers
an incentive to retain trained workers.
At the same time, the lack of transferable skills and the importance
of seniority in job ladder promotions mean that if workers quit their
jobs to work for another employer, they are likely to lose income
because they will have to start again at the bottom of the job ladder.
Since changing jobs is costly to both employers and workers, one of
the benefits of working under the Fordist system is that senior workers
who have acquired the greatest training and experience tend to accu
mulate the most job security and are the least likely to quit.
The Fordist system, however, is about more than building workforce
productivity through on-the-job training and experience. It also
involves raising productivity through "effort bargains," often reached
collectively between labor and management. Collective bargaining
agreements can be seen as "grand" effort bargains that commit workers
to a certain work pace in exchange for agreed-upon rates of pay and
other conditions of employment. These "grand bargains" are further
elaborated through numerous informal "shop floor effort bargains" in
which workers supply the extra effort and assistance needed to resolve
unanticipated production problems in exchange for time off or other
considerations that can be granted by foremen (Kaboolian 1990).
Such collective effort bargains provide a means of ensuring that pro
ductivity increases do not unduly threaten job security and that gains in
output are shared between labor and management. At the same time,
they secure worker consent to providing the regular increases in effi
ciency that are needed to sustain economic gains and job security over
the longer term.
The High-Commitment System
The high-commitment system shares many of the underlying
sources of productivity found in the Fordist model. Workers are hired
into entry-level jobs and are then promoted to positions of increasing
skill, responsibility, and pay.
Where these two systems part company, however, is in the nature of
their effort bargains. The high-commitment systems emphasizes indi
vidual, rather than collective, effort bargains. In contrast to the Fordist
model which relies on collective bargaining processes to set and
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enforce the rate of productivity growth, the high-commitment model
relies on a complex set of psychological and sociological management
techniques to encourage individual workers to internalize the goals and
objectives of the company and to act so as to achieve these goals.
Under these individual effort bargains, workers are asked to adopt
performance goals and are trained to self-monitor and self-discipline
their performance. As soon as a given performance goal is achieved,
workers are encouraged to adopt a new effort bargain that incorporates
higher production targets.
The quid pro quo for these high-commitment effort bargains is the
pledge by the company to provide intensive career training and devel
opment within the company, fair levels of compensation, and often an
implicit guarantee of lifetime employment. The result is continuous
improvement in both productivity and career earnings.

Comparing the Models
Both the Fordist and high-commitment systems have in common the
ability to enhance labor productivity through workplace training and
through the setting of workplace norms that control effort. However,
these systems gain productivity at the cost of both high wages and a
certain amount of inflexibility that comes from routine adherence to
job ladder assignments and from the provision of long-term employ
ment security.
Fordist firms, for example, tend to pay high wages as part of their
collective effort bargains, while high-commitment firms typically
match or exceed Fordist wage rates as a way of underscoring the fair
ness of the terms of their effort bargains with individual workers.
These high performance pay premiums are not trivial. In high-perfor
mance industries such as chemicals and petroleum, nonelectrical
machinery (including computers), and primary metals, they range from
16 percent to 29 percent above economy wide averages for comparable
skills (Katz and Summers 1989).
In economics terms, these productivity-enhancing practices corre
spond to a concept know as "efficiency wage theory." Efficiency wage
theory is a metaphor about how employment relationships can suffer
from what economists call "principal-agent" problems because
employers (who are the principals) and workers (who are the agents of
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the employer) have somewhat divergent and adversarial interests that
can lead to low labor productivity unless workers' abilities can be pre
cisely measured and workers' productivity closely supervised. Main
stream labor economics has focused on high wage premiums as the
motivating force for ensuring that productivity will be maintained, but
it has not fully appreciated that wages are only a part of more complex
workplace systems that raise productivity through various types of
effort bargaining.
Employment-At-Will and the Secondary Labor Market
High-performance, efficiency wage systems contrast sharply with a
third, and very different, workplace system that I refer to as "employment-at-will." The employment-at-will system resembles a "spot"
market for labor, in which wages and employment are determined by
the invisible hand of competition. In the employment-at-will system,
jobs are dead end; employers provide little or no training and advance
ment opportunity; there are no effort bargains or incentive wage premi
ums above market levels; and employment is impermanent.
Collectively, these jobs belong to the secondary labor market of
marginal firms and marginal industries such as clothing and textiles.
During much of the postwar period, economists assumed that these
low-wage, low-performance industries would gradually be replaced by
Fordist and high-commitment industries, thereby further aiding growth
in productivity and earnings.

The Collapse of High-Performance Employment Systems
This assumption has been shattered by sharp declines in the fortunes
of high-performance manufacturing plants since the mid-1970s. Profits
fell during the 1970s and early 1980s by about one-third from the lev
els of the 1960s under the pressures of deregulation and loss of market
share to international competitors. These pressures rippled through the
labor market as over three-fourths of all large manufacturing compa
nies closed or significantly downsized a facility (Berenbeim 1986),
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causing as many as two million workers a year to be displaced from
their jobs.
Employment losses were most severe in import-sensitive industries
such as steel and apparel. Employment in basic steel has fallen by 58
percent since 1973, and other mature industries have experienced sub
stantial job cuts textile employment has fallen by 32 percent and
apparel by 29 percent, while the auto industry has lost 16 percent of its
jobs. As many as one in five of today's unemployed workers have now
permanently lost their jobs (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3).
While some workers have found replacement jobs quickly, displace
ment for most means being out of work for an average of nine months
to a year. Not only are replacement jobs harder to find, but they are also
likely to be less permanent and to pay less than the career jobs that they
replace (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3).
Reemployment has meant wage losses of 25 percent or more for a
quarter to a third of all displaced workers. The biggest losers have been
high-seniority workers who have held jobs in high-performance firms
(Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3). These jobs are also less secure because
newly hired workers have the least seniority and because the mix of
available jobs is becoming less stable. For example, involuntary parttime employment rose by almost three-fourths between 1973 and 1991
(Mishel and Bernstein 1993, table 4.10), and employment in the tem
porary help industry exploded during this period (Mishel and Bernstein
1993, tables 4.21 and 4.22; Christensen 1989). These impermanent
jobs do not offer the kinds of training opportunities or effort bargains
that are available to permanent workers in high-performance firms.
The real earnings of those who remain employed in manufacturing
have experienced a similar shock. Prior to the 1970s, real hourly earn
ings in manufacturing rose at an annual rate of about 1.5 percent.
Between 1973 and 1979, however, real hourly earnings in manufactur
ing rose at about half that rate and actually fell between 1980 and
1988. Overall, real earnings in manufacturing have fallen by over 9
percent since 1979.
Young workers have been hardest hit by these changes. Prior to the
1970s, young males could expect strong gains in real earnings during
their twenties as they moved from relatively short-term "youth" jobs to
higher-paying and more stable "career" jobs. The restructuring of man
ufacturing has changed this pattern, leaving a generation of young
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adults increasingly stranded in low-wage, dead-end, and often parttime service jobs. As a result, the real incomes of young male high
school graduates fell by 24 percent between 1973 and 1986, and by 37
percent for high school dropouts (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 2).
For those at mid-career, job attachment is becoming less secure as
the risk of displacement rises, and even older workers are finding that
their once secure career jobs are ending prematurely. Rather than hold
ing a career job until retirement, one in three male workers over fiftyfive are moving from career jobs to lower-paid "bridge" jobs. Onefourth of these bridge jobs involve a change of both occupation and
industry and half result in a drop in earnings of 25 percent or more
(Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 3; Ruhm 1992).
The degree and persistence of job and earnings losses is unprece
dented since the Great Depression of the 1930s; all workers are now at
risk of job loss at some point in their careers. While the effects of busi
ness restructuring have been most acute for minorities and those with
educational disadvantages, even college graduates have been affected.
Estimates are that one in five college graduates are now underutilized
because they are working in jobs that do not require college degrees
a rate that has almost doubled since 1970 (Hecker 1992).
To some economists, these developments are not a major source of
concern. They see such adjustments as evidence that labor in the U.S.
economy had become overpriced, overeducated, and inefficiently uti
lized by world standards. Trimming employment and cutting real
wages are the recommended prescriptions for such a situation, and
these steps should help to restore the economy to its long-term growth
path.
Such an assessment, however, ignores the way in which the nation's
workplace training and productivity capacity is also being eroded by
industrial restructuring. Much of the reduction in employment and
earnings in manufacturing is, in fact, symptomatic of the reconfigura
tion that is occurring in workplace training systems, and these changes
may adversely affect the long-term patterns of productivity and growth
in the American economy.
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Breaking Effort Bargains
Employment reductions in large enterprises have obviously dimin
ished the number of workers receiving training and premium pay in
high-performance workplaces. However, an even more significant con
sequence of restructuring is that companies are being forced to recon
sider the collective and individual effort bargains that have been one of
the lynchpins of productivity improvement in the postwar period.

Cutting Wages
In Fordist workplaces, the grand effort bargains are being changed
through wage rollbacks and concessions in other wage entitlements
such as cost-of-living allowances (Bell 1989). Shop floor effort bar
gains are also being broken as centralized bargaining in industries such
as steel and autos is being replaced by decentralized and fragmented
bargaining that allows for additional local wage reductions (Katz
1992). At the same time, effort bargains are also becoming more uncer
tain through the introduction of two-tier wage systems, lump-sum and
bonus payments, and profit-sharing schemes (Bell 1989).
There has been a similar reneging on effort bargains in high-com
mitment firms. Pay increases and career advancement have become
much less certain, and the implicit guarantees of lifetime employment
are being routinely broken by waves of layoffs, sometimes thinly dis
guised as early retirement programs. Even IBM the leading propo
nent of high-commitment effort bargains has been forced to abandon
its long tradition of virtual job guarantees and has begun to rely on lay
offs to trim its workforce.

Getting More Productivity
Both Fordist and high-commitment firms are also trying to increase
the productivity side of effort bargains. Quality circles and other forms
of employee involvement have been adopted to improve productivity,
solve quality problems, and more generally to motivate employees to
contribute more to business performance (Cole 1989; Kochan, Katz,
and McKersie 1986). Concerns with lagging productivity in steel in the
1970s, for example, led to the establishment of plant-level labor-man-
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agement committees to find ways to increase productivity. More
recently, shop floor labor-management committees have been used to
address similar problems in autos.
Inflexible work rules and job assignment practices are often identi
fied by management as a major source of labor inefficiency (Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie 1986). Such inflexibility is now being combated
by consolidating job classifications and by deploying workers more
widely within the enterprise. Flexibility in work assignments has also
been used to increase the skill and responsibility of production jobs by
blurring the dividing line between supervisory and production work.
Decentralization of personnel and labor relations decisions is also
seen as a move that will increase labor efficiency by making it easier to
change local effort bargains. For example, in a significant break with
past practice, individual auto plants and union locals have been
allowed to negotiate explicit labor cost reductions to forestall subcon
tracting and have sometimes bid for work that the auto companies had
intended to subcontract (Katz 1992).
The Threat From Employment-At-Will
As high-performance firms try to rewrite their effort bargains in
response to global competition, they also face unanticipated, head-tohead competition from a new breed of domestic employment-at-will
firms. Part of this shift to employment-at-will production is occurring
through increased subcontracting, but much of it is coming from large
and well-established firms that are switching from high-performance to
employment-at-will practices.
The new employment-at-will firms do not pay the wage premiums
of Fordist or high-commitment firms, preferring instead to keep wages
as low as market competition will allow. Jobs with these firms are of
indefinite duration and employment is quickly adjusted in response to
changing demand. Management retains unrestricted prerogatives over
work rules and the assignment of workers; no expectation of job secu
rity is offered; and no commitment from employees is expected.
Employment-at-will firms do relatively little human resources
development and do not depend on effort bargains to motivate labor
productivity. Instead, they rely on market incentives to motivate train
ing investments and effort. Ironically, relying on market forces for a
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supply of skills has been made easier by the pool of surplus skilled and
experienced labor released by downsizings and plant closings in the
high-performance sector.
High-performance firms fear that their current attempts to develop
more competitive effort bargains may fail, leaving them saddled with
high wage and employment costs that are not being offset by produc
tivity gains. In that event, they too are likely to switch to employmentat-will practices.

The Turnaround in Unit Labor Costs

Broad-based measures of productivity and labor costs suggest that
the competitive position of the American economy has been improving
during this period of restructuring of the workplace training system.
For example, productivity increases in manufacturing rebounded after
1980 as more aggressive productivity-improvement strategies came
into play, almost doubling the annual increases of 1.8 percent a year
during the period 1975-1980 when employment cost-cutting strategies
were first introduced.
Unit labor costs, a summary indicator that includes the effects of
both cost-cutting and productivity-improvement strategies, show a
similar pattern. Between 1973 and 1979, unit labor costs climbed at an
average annual rate of 6.1 percent before subsiding to an average of 1.1
percent a year during the decade of the 1980s. The decline in unit labor
costs is especially remarkable in a number of mature industries. In
nonelectrical machinery, unit labor costs in the 1980s fell at an annual
rate of 5.2 percent, and there were also declines in women's apparel of
4.3 percent per year and in autos of two-tenths of a percent a year.
What cannot be determined, however, is the extent to which these
improvements in cost competitiveness are the result of structural
changes in high-performance workplaces that have enhanced labor
productivity. The results could equally reflect cost-cutting reductions
in effort bargains, the effects of closures of inefficient plants as markets
declined, and a shift in the composition of production from high-wage,
high-performance firms to lower-wage, employment-at-will firms.
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Can Public Policy Help?
While most of the changes affecting labor productivity have been
the result of private actions taken by companies and unions, their con
sequences are a matter of deep public concern. For example, a recent
study by the Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce
(1990), a group that is reported to reflect the Clinton administration's
thinking on workforce issues, concluded that raising productivity and
restoring American living standards will depend on expanding highperformance employment. Three policy recommendations were identi
fied as central to accomplishing this goal: (1) establishing a common
threshold level of foundation skills for entry jobs; (2) creating a public
system of skill training that would combine schooling with work expe
rience; and (3) supporting increased workplace training and work reor
ganization through a 1 percent "play or pay" payroll tax.
In my view, however, such policies will not be sufficient to shift the
balance in favor of high-performance firms. Raising foundation skills
is a much overrated solution to the kinds of productivity problems fac
ing high-performance firms. The foundations of productivity that are
valued by such firms are not those of knowledge and skills, but involve
workforce qualities such as flexibility, adaptability, teamwork, and
problem-solving capacity. These are not the qualities that schools are
used to training for, nor do they lend themselves to the setting of
national standards for achievement.
Expanding public skill-training programs is also unlikely to foster
an increase in the high-performance sector. Fordist and high-commit
ment firms have little difficulty recruiting the basic skills they need,
and they often prefer to provide their own job training as part of effort
bargains with their employees.
Where skill-training programs can make a difference, however, is in
supplying trained labor to the employment-at-will sector. Employment-at-will firms want to hire workers who are job-ready, and they
deliberately place the burden of human capital formation on workers
and schools. As the employment-at-will sector expands, these training
needs will grow.
Unfortunately, we lack the kinds of public sector skill-building insti
tutions that can substitute for the lack of workplace training in the
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employment-at-will sector. With the exception of long-term residential
programs such as the Jobs Corps, most government skill-training pro
grams have yielded relatively little upgrading of skills, and the
improvement in earnings has been correspondingly low (Taggart 1981;
Bloom 1984; JTPA Advisory Committee 1989). Even the relatively
well-financed programs for displaced workers have only been mini
mally effective (Podgursky and Swaim 1989; Seitchik and Zornitsky
1989).
A much talked-about new approach to skill training is the German
model of apprenticeship training. The German "dual system," as it is
called, blends technical and vocational schooling with on-the-job expe
rience at a designated workplace. This system has been an effective
source of skill training for young high school graduates in Germany,
and there is a similar program for upgrading adult skills (Osterman
1991).
This German model, however, is unlikely to succeed in the United
States, even if coupled with strong partnerships between schools and
employers. An effective apprenticeship training program for the
employment-at-will sector needs to be able to link training to the high
est common denominator needs of specific groups of employers so that
workers can easily transfer from one firm to another as employment
shifts.
In contrast, school-based apprenticeships and other types of work
and education partnerships in the United States have more typically
gravitated towards the lowest common denominator training for entry
jobs. Programs that have had more ambitious goals have usually been
tailored to serve the needs of a single large employer. Rarely have
these programs had any mechanism for ensuring high-productivity
training for a pool of potential employers, and none have sought to
facilitate labor mobility among such employers.
A more suitable model is apprenticeship programs that are jointly
operated by unions and employer associations, such as those for craft
workers in the building trades. Because craft unions represent the
human capital interests of their members and have hiring commitments
from a pool of employers, they can operate apprenticeship programs
that meet the highest common denominator skill needs in their indus
try. Furthermore, because such programs involve groups of employers,
they are well-suited to operate in the unstable and shifting markets of
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the employment-at-will sector. In principle, these programs could also
meet the neglected training needs of small employers, who account for
about one in five jobs in manufacturing.
The carrot and stick of a modest payroll tax, however, is unlikely to
make much difference to the future of this type of apprenticeship pro
grams. The track record of similar subsidies for workplace training
suggests that such incentives are insufficient to leverage substantial
changes in employment practices, let alone overcome employer resis
tance in the employment-at-will sector to participation in training pro
grams that involve unions (Doeringer et al. 1991, ch. 1).
A more effective policy direction might be to encourage union orga
nization in the employment-at-will sector. Training funds could then be
used to subsidize both workplace training and school-based classroom
training conducted under union-management apprenticeship programs.
If desired, threshold competency standards for these programs could be
set by the employers and workers who will be using the training. While
such a proposal runs counter to much of the thrust of government pol
icy towards unions over the past decade or so, it may be timely to
rethink this entire policy area.
The idea that productivity growth can be achieved through partner
ships among business, government, and labor is relevant to the highperformance sector as well, particularly in Fordist firms that rely on
negotiations with unions to define productivity levels. Governments
can contribute in important ways to the climate in which effort bar
gains are negotiated by encouraging the substitution of high-perfor
mance labor relations in place of adversarial collective bargaining.
An example of this approach is found in the experience of
Jamestown, New York, where frequent strikes and outmoded union
work rules were accelerating the decline of the city's industrial base.
Through the mediation efforts of the city government, areawide labormanagement committees were established to improve the labor-rela
tions climate. These efforts in turn led to the creation of in-plant labormanagement committees, which are reported to have successfully
slowed the loss of manufacturing jobs during the 1970s by reducing
strikes, improving productivity, and changing the image of the city as a
"bad labor town" (Gittell 1992).
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Future Directions for Workplace Training and Productivity
The American workplace is at a critical juncture in terms of its con
tribution to labor productivity. Cost-cutting, restructuring, and produc
tivity improvements are restoring competitiveness in production to
many industries, but it is not clear what types of jobs and workplace
training systems will survive.
Companies and unions across the country are now debating which
workplace training system should guide productivity and wage deter
mination into the next century. Will it be some version of the Fordist
model that is evolving in autos and steel; will it be a high-commitment
model with high wages, intensive human resources development, and
some form of employment guarantee; will it involve a greater use of
craft and apprenticeship training arrangements; or will it be the lowwage, low-productivity employment-at-will model?
Each of these systems implies a different type of commitment to
human resources development and a different approach to generating
productivity growth. Each places a distinct imprint on the adjustment
process in terms of who is affected, how the costs of adjustment are
divided between employers and workers, and the rate at which plantlevel productivity will grow. Ultimately, these are choices between
high- and low-productivity strategies at the workplace, which, in the
aggregate, will translate into long-term choices between a high-growth
path and a low-growth path for productivity and income in the national
economy.
At present, high-performance models of all kinds are imperiled by
continued downsizing, broken effort bargains, and competition from
employment-at-will production. Despite widespread management and
union interest in improving labor productivity and successful instances
where workplace restructuring has raised labor efficiency (Katz,
Kochan, and Gobeille 1983; Katz 1985; Cooke 1989), a recent survey
of medium- and large-size companies found that only two in five were
using high-performance workplace practices, and in only a quarter of
these firms did high-performance practices apply to more than half of
the workforce (Osterman 1993).
It therefore remains to be seen whether the high-performance work
place can survive long enough to gain a majority share in the U.S.
labor market, or if the low-performance, employment-at-will model
will prevail.
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Workplace Training
in the United States
Is It Underproduced?
Ann P. B artel
Columbia University

Economists have long been interested in investigating the determi
nants and outcomes of investments in job training. Starting with the
pathbreaking work by Jacob Mincer (1962), researchers have gone on
to document how job training affects the careers of individuals through
its impact on wage growth, turnover behavior, and unemployment
experiences. Studies have also focused on the way in which job train
ing improves the productivity of business organizations (Bartel, forth
coming; Holzer et al. 1993) as well as the competitiveness of nations
(U.S. Congress 1990).
During the last few years, a perception has grown that American
workers do not receive sufficient on-the-job training. Many have
argued that government must take a more active role in the market for
training. Indeed, much of the campaigning in the last presidential elec
tion focused on this issue. In this paper, I attempt to answer the ques
tion posed in the title. The plan of attack is as follows. I first review the
data available from various sources on the amount of training that
American workers receive and then analyze and compare workplace
training in other countries to the American experience. The next sec
tion shows how data on rates of return to investments in job training
can be used to determine if underinvestment exists, followed by analy
sis of the likely causes of underinvestment and evaluation of the vari
ous proposals that have been suggested as cures for the
underinvestment problem. I then discuss my recent research on the
relationship between technological change and training and show the
implications of these research findings for the question posed in the
title of this paper.
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What Do We Know About Workplace Training
in the United States?
Our knowledge about the amount of workplace training in the
United States is only as good as the quality of the available data on
training. Two types of data sources can be consulted: surveys of indi
vidual workers and employer surveys. Training questions are included
in the following surveys of individuals: the Current Population Survey,
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal
Surveys of Mature Men, Young Men, Young Women, and Youth. The
latter survey, the NLSY, is unique in the comprehensiveness of the
training data reported. Data on a maximum of seven different training
programs taken at any time since the last interview are included.
Beginning with the 1988 survey, data on the following items are avail
able for each of the seven training programs: when the respondent
began and ended the training programs; what type of program it was,
e.g., apprenticeships, company training, technical/vocational training
off the job (such as business college, nurses programs, vocational and
technical institutes, barber or beauty school, a correspondence course)
and government training; and how many hours the respondent usually
devoted per week to this program.' In the other surveys of individuals
it is not possible to observe when the training actually took place or to
measure the duration of the training. 2 Hence, the NLSY is the best
employee-based source for measuring workplace training.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics from the NLSY. The
table shows that in 1990, approximately 13 percent of the individuals
in the sample received company training each year, and the duration of
this training was 250 hours. The individuals in this sample are young,
between the ages of 25 and 32 (in 1990), when most workplace train
ing takes place. A comparable survey of older individuals would pre
sumably find a much lower incidence of training. Table 1 also shows
that education level is an important determinant of receipt of training.
Only 7.4 percent of individuals with less than a high school education
received company training, compared to 24.6 percent of college gradu
ates. Individuals who work in large firms are more likely to receive
company training compared to those in small firms; 21 percent of indi
viduals employed by firms with at least 1,000 employees received

Table 1. Incidence and Duration of Company Training by Education and Size of Firm, 1990
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth Aged 14-21 in 1979
All education
Mean
hrs. if
%
trained trained
All firms
(N=4,3H)
Large firms
(N= 1,470)
Small firms
(N=2,841)

Education<12
Mean
hrs. if
%
trained trained

Educational 2
Mean
hrs. if
%
trained trained

Education,13-15
Mean
hrs. if
%
trained trained

Education 16+
Mean
hrs. if
%
trained trained

13.4

251.13

7.4

198.15

10.3

269.53

18.0

225.13

24.6

257.00

20.9

259.12

11.1

177.32

15.3

279.33

24.4

211.35

35.6

300.51

9.5

225.78

6.2

209.96

7.7

259.94

13.7

241.77

16.2

183.92

NOTE: Large firms are defined as firms with at least 1,000 employees
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training compared to 9.5 percent of individuals in smaller firms. The
picture painted by the data in table 1 is that company training is rela
tively uncommon; only 13 percent of individuals in the prime training
years receive it, and it is concentrated among the highly educated
working in large firms.
The second source of data, employer surveys, also paints a similar
picture of small amounts of training. Lakewood Publications, the pub
lishers of Training Magazine, reported that, based on a survey of 2,400
businesses, the aggregate expenditure on formal training was $45 bil
lion in calendar year 1989. Averaged across the employed workforce,
this implies an expenditure of $385 per worker. An alternative bench
mark is that this expenditure equals 1.8 percent of total compensation
in the United States.3
A major disadvantage of employer-based surveys is the low
response rates on questions relating to the cost of employee training.
Several years ago, Columbia Business School conducted a survey of
human resource management practices in American businesses
(Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1989). One part of the survey dealt
with employee training and development, and businesses were asked
whether they had a formal training program, and, if so, the annual cost
per employee. Only 40 percent of the businesses that had formal train
ing programs reported their annual cost. The probability of reporting
the cost data was unrelated to the size of the business, return-on-assets,
industry, capital/labor ratio, or the length of time the training program
had been in operation (Bartel 1991). The problem seems to be that
many businesses are not sure what costs should be included and/or
they are unable to readily locate a cost measure for their organization.
Aggregate cost data on employee training may, therefore, be an unreli
able measure of the existence of underinvestment.
Workers in the United States receive training from sources other
than formal company training programs, but the extent of participation
is low. In the NLSY, 4.2 percent of the individuals reported receiving
training in 1990 from one of the following sources: a business college,
a vocational or technical institute, a barber or beauty school, or a corre
spondence course. Apprenticeships in this sample of individuals were
relatively rare. In 1990, only 1 percent of the individuals in the NLSY
reported receiving training through an apprenticeship program. This
finding is not atypical of other data sources on apprenticeships in the
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United States. For example, the U.S. Congress (1990) reports that,
between 1970 and 1987, apprentices in federally registered programs
fell from 0.3 percent of the United States civilian workforce to only
0.16 percent.
Informal on-the-job training, on the other hand, appears to be quite
important for American workers. In the January 1991 Current Popula
tion Survey (U.S. Department of Labor 1992), 38 percent of the indi
viduals who reported receiving skill improvement training on their
current job indicated that the source of that training was informal onthe-job training. Formal company training was reported as the source
of skill improvement training for another 38 percent of the individuals.
The remaining 24 percent reported school or miscellaneous sources.
Hence, according to this survey, participation in informal on-the-job
training occurs with the same frequency as participation in formal
company training programs.
When training is measured by hours rather than by incidence, there
is some evidence that informal on-the-job training is more important
than formal company training programs. A 1989 Columbia Business
School survey of two hundred businesses found that, during their first
three months on the job, employees in these businesses spent three
times as many hours in informal training as they did in formal training
(Bartel 1991). Using data from the 1982 Employment Opportunity
Pilot Project, Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) also found that,
during the first three months of employment, time spent in informal
training exceeded time spent in formal training.

How Does the United States Compare to Other Countries?
One way of judging whether workplace training is adequately pro
vided in the United States is to compare the experience of a typical
American worker with that of a worker living in another country. In
this section, I describe the provision of training in Germany, France,
and Japan and show how training in these countries differs from the
United States.
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Germany
At age 16 or the completion of grade 10, German students select a
"career track." Approximately 60 percent of the students choose to end
their schooling at this point and enter an apprenticeship program. The
remaining 40 percent go on to universities or to careers in skilled
white-collar occupations that require attendance at vocational colleges.
There are 380 officially recognized occupations for which apprentice
positions exist (Dowling and Albrecht 1991). Eighty percent of all
German firms with at least twenty employees participate in apprentice
ship programs (U.S. Congress 1990).
The apprenticeship contract signed by the company and the appren
tice states that the company must train the worker in subject areas that
are determined by the regulations governing a particular occupation.
The federal government works with trade associations and unions to
define uniform national curricula and examinations. The contract sets
out the length of the initial trial period of the apprentice (during which
either party can opt out of the contract) and his or her wages. The
apprenticeship period usually lasts between two and three years and is
split equally between practical training in the firm and vocational edu
cation at a vocational school run by the government. At the end of the
apprenticeship period, the student must pass a final exam consisting of
theoretical and practical parts, which then certifies the student to pur
sue the occupation. Ninety percent of the apprentices are employed by
the firm that trained them.
In sum, apprenticeships are a formalized part of the German training
system. If apprenticeships were to serve as an indicator of the extent of
job training, we would conclude that the American worker is undertrained relative to the German worker. But, as we have already indi
cated, training is multidimensional, and it is impossible to conclude,
based on available data, that German workers do indeed receive more
training overall than American workers.4
France
Unlike the German system of training which relies on apprentice
ships, the French system has as its central component a mandated
training tax. Since July 1971, employers with ten or more employees
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have been obligated to spend a certain percentage of their wage bill on
continuing education and training of employees or pay a tax equal to
the difference between the obligated and actual training expenditures.
In 1971, this tax was 0.8 percent of the wage bill; as of January 1993, it
is 1.4 percent. Unlike the situation in the United States, participation in
formal company training is quite common in France. In 1990, 32 per
cent of all French employees received some formal company training
(Bishop 1993). The incidence of training among young employees is
likely to be higher than this number. Recall that in the United States,
only 13 percent of individuals between the ages of 25 and 32 received
formal company training in 1990. Although participation is much more
extensive in France, formal training is of much shorter duration. In
1990, the average time spent in training by a trainee was only 46
hours! (The comparable figure for the United States is 250 hours.)
There are some similarities between the American and French experi
ences. As in the United States, large French firms are more likely to
provide formal training. In 1990, 53 percent of the employees in firms
with at least 2,000 workers received training, compared to 8 percent of
the employees in firms with 10-19 employees (Bishop 1993). There is
also a positive relationship between skill level (education) and receipt
of training. Whereas 50 percent of managers and professionals in
French firms received formal company training in 1990, only 13 per
cent of unskilled operatives received it.
Hence, these data do not support the conclusion that French workers
receive more training than American workers. While incidence of
training is higher in France, duration is considerably smaller.
Japan
The Japanese approach to training differs substantially from the
German approach. In Japan, training is for a firm, not a trade. Large
firms provide extensive workplace training, and there is minimal gov
ernment involvement or assistance. The policy of providing continuous
training for employees is largely grounded in the Japanese system of
"lifetime employment" in large firms. A case study of American and
Japanese autoworkers showed that autoworkers in Japanese plants
receive three times as much training each year as workers in U.S.
plants (U.S. Congress 1990).
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While large firms in Japan provide extensive on-the-job training to
their employees, only one-third of the Japanese labor force is
employed by such firms. The remaining two-thirds work in small firms
where lifetime employment is not guaranteed and training is not exten
sive.

Rates of Return as Measures of Underinvestment
in Training
As demonstrated above, a comparison of the U.S. training system
with the systems used in other countries does not lead to an unambigu
ous conclusion that American workers are undertrained relative to their
foreign counterparts. Here I approach the underinvestment question in
a different way. In particular, I present data on the rates of return to job
training for different groups of workers and consider whether the
observed rates are too high. A rate of return above the rates on invest
ments of comparable risk levels would enable us to conclude that
underinvestment in job training does exist.
The rate of return that an employer earns on investment in employee
training can be calculated by utilizing data on the costs of the training
program and the returns that the employer receives. In order to calcu
late this accurately, the researcher would require information on the
direct costs of the training program (i.e., instructors' salaries, materi
als, books, etc.), the time spent by trainees in the programs and the
value of their lost productivity during the training period, and the
increase in productivity that occurs after the training is completed and
that can be attributed to participation in the training program. This is a
very stringent list of requirements and can only be fulfilled if the
researcher has access to a company that keeps good records and is will
ing to share the information.
I was fortunate to gain access to the personnel files and training
database of a large manufacturing company. The direct costs of train
ing were calculated from the company's records on the salaries of
trainers, materials, and other expenses such as room and board for resi
dential training programs. Indirect costs were calculated by multiply
ing the number of days spent in training by the daily salary earned by
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the employee prior to participation in the training program. The returns
that the company earned from the training program were calculated
from a fixed effects model which estimated the effect of time spent in
the training program on salary (Bartel 1992).5 If workers are assumed
to stay "forever" in this company, the rate of return equals the ratio of
the annual return to training divided by the sum of the direct and indi
rect costs of training. Table 2 shows that the calculated rate of return on
training for this company is 21 percent. Of course, it is unrealistic to
assume that workers stay forever at a company, and the rate of return
needs to be adjusted to reflect the expected tenure at the company.6 In
this company, expected tenure is about ten years, and the adjusted rate
of return equals 17 percent.
Table 2. Rates of Return on Investments in Job Training
Assuming "lifetime Assuming "average"
tenure3
employment"
(percent)
(percent)
Sample
National Longitudinal
16
32
Survey of Youth
Panel Study of Income
25
29
Dynamics1"
Large manufacturing
17
company0
21
a In this column, the rate of return is calculated by assuming that the payoff period for the
investment equals the observed average length of tenure in the particular sample,
b. Mincer (1991).
c. Bartel (1992).

Admittedly these rates of return only pertain to one company and
may not be generalizable to other companies in the United States. A
more general estimate of the rate of return to job training in the United
States can be calculated from national datasets on individuals. Unfortu
nately, with these datasets the cost of training may not be precisely
measured. Information on direct costs of training are, of necessity,
unavailable in datasets on individuals. The indirect costs of training
can be inferred from data on the average amount of time spent in train
ing by individuals who reported receiving training during the last year.
Table 2 shows that in the NLS Y sample, the calculated rate of return is
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32 percent if the individuals are assumed to stay with their employers
"forever," but that the rate of return falls to 16 percent when it is
adjusted for expected tenure. Since the individuals in this sample are
young, their expected tenure is only three years; this produces a large
drop in the adjusted rate of return. Mincer (1991) calculated the rates
of return on training for the individuals in the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, and I report those rates as well in table 2. The unadjusted
rate is 29 percent and the adjusted rate is 25 percent.
The adjusted rates in table 2 range from 16 percent to 25 percent.
These rates seem high when compared to other investments. For exam
ple, Bound and Johnson (1992) calculate that the private rate of return
on a year of schooling is currently about 8.5 percent in the United
States.7 Using this number as a benchmark would lead to a conclusion
that there is underinvestment in job training. It is possible, however,
that the estimated rates of return on training may be overestimates of
the true rates. This could occur if the true cost of training is underesti
mated or the returns on training are overestimated because of incom
plete controls for unobserved heterogeneity or overly optimistic
estimates of a worker's expected tenure.

What Can Account for Underinvestment in Training?
If we use the rates of return reported in the previous section as evi
dence that workplace training in the United States is underproduced,
we next need to consider why this underinvestment takes place. Armed
with this analysis, we can then proceed to make informed policy rec
ommendations to increase investment in training.
It has been argued (Bishop 1991) that American workers receive
less training than their German and Japanese counterparts because the
turnover rate is higher in the United States. The OECD (1984) reports
that, for employees with less than one year of tenure, the probability of
staying at the firm for at least twelve additional months is over 80 per
cent in the United Kingdom, 76 percent in Japan but only 41 percent in
the United States. In Germany, 95 percent of apprentices who complete
the three-month probationary period stay with their employer for the
full three-year apprenticeship period (Bishop 1991). The typical pat-
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tern of a young American worker is to engage in job shopping during
the early years in the labor market. High rates of turnover will reduce
the firm's incentive to invest in specific training. Bishop (1991) shows
that employers also pay part of the costs of general training, and the
expectation of high turnover will therefore also reduce the firm's
incentive to provide general training.
Another factor contributing to less training in the United States is
the difficulty that American employers have in assessing the quality of
an applicant's general skills. In Germany, standardized curricula and
national certification standards provide employers with reliable infor
mation on a job applicant's skills. In the United States, employers do
not give enough weight to an applicant's stock of general skills. The
result is that American workers have less incentive to invest in general
skills.
The constraint imposed by the minimum wage reduces the incentive
for firms to invest in training workers whose value of marginal product
is less than the legislated minimum wage. This happens because the
workers are unable to offer to pay for general training by accepting a
wage below the minimum wage. Leighton and Mincer (1981) provide
evidence that the minimum wage leads to less on-the-job training for
low-skilled young workers than would otherwise occur. While it is true
that employers are now able to pay a subminimum training wage to
employees under the age of 20 for the first six months of their employ
ment, this does not address the problem faced by unskilled workers
aged 20 and over.8
A fourth reason for underinvestment is that young workers are
unable to pay for the general skills that they need because they are
liquidity-constrained. Since firms have no incentive to pay for general
training (except, perhaps, because of the positive effect on their reputa
tions), young workers must subsidize their own training and often have
insufficient funds to do so.
Finally, it has been argued (U.S. Congress 1990) that American
workers may receive less training than German and Japanese workers
because they have poor basic skills. According to the Office of Tech
nology Assessment, American companies find that, in their operations
in Germany or Japan, workers have better reading and math skills than
Americans in the United States. The absence of good basic skills
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makes the American worker less trainable, thereby reducing the per
ceived return on the company's investment in training.

Policy Options to Increase Investment in Training
In this section I review and evaluate a number of policy recommen
dations that have been suggested to increase employee and employer
investments in on-the-job training. The first idea is that training should
be provided by the government. The obvious criticism of this proposal
is that the government will not have adequate information to know
what types of skills businesses need in their employees.
A second approach is to adopt the French system whereby a payrollbased national training tax is imposed on all employers. Under this
system, employers would either spend the mandated percentage
amount on training or pay a tax equal to the difference between the
obligated and actual training expenditures. While this approach is pref
erable to direct provision of training by the government because it
allows the firm to decide on the amount and type of training, it suffers
from a number of problems. First, there is no incentive for firms to
spend beyond the mandated level. Second, it favors large firms because
of economies of scale in the provision of formal training. Third, it
completely ignores informal training, and we have already seen that
informal training is a significant component of total training. Firms
that find it optimal to rely on informal training would be penalized
under this system. Fourth, there would be significant measurement
problems as firms and the government debate what types of activities
qualify as training.
A third approach is for the federal government to provide subsidies
to firms that engage in training. This is more appealing than the man
date approach because it does not require firms to spend a stipulated
amount; firms would enjoy more flexibility in making the optimal
choice. The federal government's Job Training Partnership Act created
a system to share the costs of training new employees with private
firms. Unfortunately, recent reports (Business Week 1992) have docu
mented misuse of JTPA funds. In particular, firms have been accused
of using JTPA funds to cover the costs of "training" workers who were
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already trained, as well as unreasonably extending the length of a
worker's training period.
A number of states have training subsidy programs, and the evi
dence regarding the impact of these programs is, unlike the JTPA, gen
erally positive. Creticos and Sheets (1990) studied the programs that
exist in New York, Illinois, California, and Missouri and found that in
twenty-four companies that received financial aid from the states, all of
the companies showed improvements in business performance from
the training. Holzer et al. (1993) have studied the training grant pro
gram operated in Michigan during 1988 and 1989, called the Michigan
Job Opportunity Bank-Upgrade Program. They found that firms that
received training grants significantly increased the amount of training
they provided their employees; in other words, the subsidies did not
simply provide windfalls to those firms already engaging in training.
But the experiences with JTPA indicate that a government subsidy pro
gram will require careful monitoring to avoid abuse.
Another idea that has been suggested is that the government should
subsidize the creation of employer training collectives (U.S. Congress
1990). The purpose of these collectives would be for firms in an indus
try to jointly provide the skills necessary for that industry. By sharing
the costs and risks of providing training, firms would have an incentive
to train more. The disadvantage of this approach is that firms in an
industry may be concerned about sharing proprietary information.
Also, free-riders outside the consortia could attempt to raid the newly
trained workers.
Finally, there are some government programs that can be introduced
to increase the incentive for the employee to invest in general training.
Like the German government, the U.S. government can work with
industry and trade groups to establish national certification standards
for various trades and occupations. This will enable employers to
assess the quality of the general skills an applicant possesses. In addi
tion, the federal government could consider providing low-cost loans
to individuals who wish to acquire general skills. Alternatively, a revi
sion of the current tax law that pertains to the deductibility of an
employee's own training expenses could be considered. At the present
time, if an employee pays for his or her own training, the expenses can
only be deducted if the sum of those expenses plus all other miscella-
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neous deductions exceeds 2 percent of an individual's adjusted gross
income.

The Role of Technological Change
The programs discussed in the previous section are attempts to
address perceived flaws in the U.S. market for training. Each of the
suggested programs strives to increase training by either circumvent
ing the market entirely, subsidizing the costs incurred by trainees or
trainers, or improving the quality of information in the labor market.
It is possible, however, that the future for the U.S. training market is
brighter than we currently think. The ratio of expenditures on com
pany-sponsored R&D to net sales has been increasing in the United
States in recent years (National Science Foundation 1989). Rates of
productivity growth in the 1980s are far ahead of the rates observed in
the late 1970s (U.S. Department of Labor 1992). All of this bodes well
for the training of American workers because, in a world in which
firms are updating or changing their production technologies, the
opportunities for learning expand. When firms are introducing new
technologies, they have an incentive to train their employees in order
to reap the productivity gains from the technological change. A formal
way of stating this argument is that the marginal cost of producing a
unit of human capital investment decreases with technological change
(Tan 1989).
Some people may take a more pessimistic view of the relationship
between technological change and training. The basis for the pessimis
tic view is that technological change increases the rate at which human
capital depreciates. Within the Ben-Porath (1967) framework, higher
rates of depreciation reduce the marginal return to investment and
thereby lead to less investment in on-the-job training in each time
period. The theoretical prediction about the impact of technological
change on the amount of on-the-job training is ambiguous.
In my paper with Nachum Sicherman (Bartel and Sicherman 1993),
I conducted an empirical analysis that resolves the theoretical ambigu
ity. We used the 1979-1990 National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor
Market Experience of Youth aged 14-21 in 1979 to analyze whether
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individuals who work in industries that are technologically progressive
receive more training, ceteris paribus. Since our study covers both the
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, we measure an indus
try's rate of technological change by its rate of productivity change as
calculated by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987). Ideally, one
would prefer to use R&D intensity as the measure of technological
change in the industry, but R&D data are only available for the manu
facturing sector. Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) have shown that for
the time period 1959-1976 there was a significant relationship between
an industry's intensity of private R&D expenditures and subsequent
growth in productivity. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) also found that
this relationship existed at the company level in the 1970s and 1980s.
In our study, we estimated an equation in which the dependent vari
able is the probability of receiving company training since the last sur
vey (i.e., during the last year) and the independent variables are (1) the
mean rate of technological change in the individual's industry during
the ten years prior to the date of the interview, and (2) a vector of con
trol variables that includes education, experience and its square, tenure
and its square, size of plant in which the individual works, marital sta
tus, race, union membership, and residence in an SMSA. We found
that, in industries with higher rates of technological change, employees
are significantly more likely to receive company training.
If rates of technological change continue to increase over the next
decade as they have during the last five years, these findings would
predict an increase in the amount of training that U.S. workers will
receive. This will not require tampering with the U.S. training market
by imposing targets for training, nor will it require an expenditure of
government funds to subsidize the cost of training. Rather, an increase
in employee training will be a simple by-product of increased rates of
technological change and expenditures on R&D.

Summary and Conclusions
I began this paper by posing the question of whether or not work
place training in the United States is underproduced. In order to answer
this question, it was necessary to carefully review the data available on
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the extent of workplace training in the United States. Since company
data are generally sparse, researchers must rely on surveys of individu
als that include questions on workplace training. These data show that
only 13 percent of individuals in the prime training years (ages 25-32)
received formal company training in the United States in 1990, and
that this training was concentrated among the highly educated working
in large firms. Apprenticeships are rare in the United States. Informal
on-the-job training appears to be at least as important as formal com
pany training.
The training experience of the American worker is very different
from that of workers in other countries. But, specific comparisons with
Germany, France, and Japan do not enable us to unambiguously con
clude that American workers, in general, receive less training than their
counterparts in those countries. An alternative approach to the underin
vestment question is to consider whether the observed rates of return
on investments in job training are too high. We found that rates are
indeed high when compared to rates of return to education in the
United States. Underinvestment in job training could be due to high
turnover, the absence of standardized curricula and national certifica
tion standards for occupations, minimum wage constraints, liquidity
constraints, and/or weak basic skills of American workers. Each of
these causes suggests a proposed solution, and we reviewed and cri
tiqued a number of these: (1) direct provision of training by the gov
ernment, (2) a payroll-based national training tax similar to the system
used in France, (3) government subsidies to firms that train their work
ers, (4) employer training collectives, and (5) low-cost loans and tax
breaks for individuals who pay for their own training.
While the high rates of return to training may be consistent with a
yes answer to the question posed in the title, I ended with an optimistic
forecast for the future of the training market. Research evidence has
shown that technological change increases the incentives for invest
ment in training. If the recent upward trends in R&D expenditures and
productivity growth rates in the U.S. continue, we can predict that
opportunities for training will increase. The attractiveness of this sce
nario is that the increase in training will not require government inter
ference with the training market.
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NOTES
1. Prior to 1988, detailed information on type of private sector training, as well as the weeks
and hours per week spent in training, were only recorded if the training spell lasted at least four
weeks
2. In the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young and Older Men and Young Women, the sur
vey asks, "What was the longest type of training you have had since the last interview 7" In the
Current Population Survey, the question is, "What training was needed to get the current or last
job and what training is needed to improve skills on the current job?"
3 In France, expenditures on formal company training equal 3 percent of total compensation.
4. In the report prepared by the U S Congress (1990), evidence is presented that workers in
German metalworking firms receive more training than comparable workers in British metalworking firms. No evidence is presented, however, that beyond the apprenticeship period, Ger
man workers receive more training than Amencan workers
5 The profitability of training is actually the increase in productivity less the increase in
wages. Barren, Black, and Loewenstem (1989) and Blakemore and Hoffman (1988) show that
productivity doubles compared to wages in the datasets that they analyze. This implies that the
wage increase attributable to training is a good proxy for the productivity increase produced by
training
6 Mincer (1991) shows that adjusted rate of return is calculated by the following formula
r = r'(l - (1/1+r)7 ) where T= expected tenure and r is the adjusted rate of return
7 This does not include the consumption returns to schooling If these were added in, the rate
of return on schooling would increase, and may approach the rate of return on training
8. In an analysis of the fast food industry, Katz and Krueger (1992) provide evidence that the
submimmum training wage is rarely used
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The Very-Long-Run Effect
of Human Capital
on Human Progress
Julian L. Simon
University of Maryland

This article is my first attempt to state a general theory of human
progress in connection with the concept of population numbers and
human capital. The theory is presented with only a sketchy formal
framework and with little supporting data; those elements must await a
longer presentation.
The question addressed here is: What is the rock bottom cause of so
many of the world's population now being long-lived and endowed
with much wealth and a high standard of living, with an even larger
proportion likely to enjoy these benefits in the coming decades,
whereas people did not have those advantages 10,000, 2,000, 1,000, or
even 200 years ago? The obvious answer almost a definition is that
current technology A 1993 is a sum of increments to knowledge dA in
the past. And these dA were produced by people and therefore must
have been influenced by human numbers. One may add that the cul
tural, political, economic, and social systems of the past were also a
factor, and perhaps a more important factor than numbers. I shall
argue, however, that those systems were themselves a function of
human numbers together with the economic levels of past societies;
this is one of the main points of the paper.
Why did the rapid progress of the past two centuries not begin cen
turies or millennia earlier, or not begin until sometime in the future?
Was there something extraordinary about the human numbers P or the
level of technology A in the year 1700 or so? Probably not. But we
must notice one crucial correlation: Both P and A as well as the income
Y all began to rise rapidly about that time. That rise represented an
unprecedented tripling or more within a century or two and was the
first such event in all the thousands of years of human history.
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The answer I offer is that the size of the human population, as mea
sured by both population density P/lnd and P together with the tech
nology these people produced, is the root cause of the speed of
progress. More operationally, if the world's population had not grown
at all since, say, 10,000 years ago, or if population had not grown as
fast as it did over the millennia, the material condition of humanity
could not have progressed to its present state. To put it differently, if
the rate of population growth had been different (and had resulted in
different total populations at various times) than actually was the case,
the extraordinary period of the past two hundred years of falling mor
tality and increasing income would have happened either much later or
much earlier. Furthermore, one cannot say this of any other variable
unless it would primarily alter human numbers as, for example, a cli
matic change would have affected food production, or the quantity of
energy easily available would have improved survival probabilities. If
there were not an effect on human numbers, such a change would have
affected the amount of leisure and perhaps the mode of getting a living,
for example, herding versus hunting, but would not have affected the
speed of economic progress.
Even bestowing a library of today's knowledge upon a small popu
lation in the past probably would not have led to rapid progress.
Indeed, we know from the experience of India and China and other
poor countries until recently that the existence of such knowledge can
coexist with continuing backwardness. This leads to the question of
whether that fact does not contradict the basic thesis of this paper. I
think it does not, because we already see the inexorable process of
rapid modernization in these countries, despite having economic-polit
ical-social systems not well designed for such progress, systems that
kept the modernization from happening earlier (as it happened earlier
in Japan). And in turn, the combination of numbers and the existence
of knowledge, together with the demand for the fruits that knowledge
brings about, are inducing huge changes in the economic systems so as
to accommodate more rapid progress, as the thesis in this paper sug
gests; this has been the case most vividly for 700 million rural Chinese
whose agriculture was essentially privatized starting in 1979. So, taken
altogether the evidence available as of 1993 concerning the poor
though well-populated countries is not inconsistent with the thesis
offered here.
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Two lines of evidence are adduced to support the basic proposition:
(1) correlations of population size P and density P/\nd with the rate of
knowledge production dA, and (2) evidence that other relevant vari
ables are a function of P and Y. I also present some scrappy evidence to
show that population is not only correlated with knowledge production
but also is a causal variable. And I present theory and data to disprove
the proposition that the "natural" availability of natural resources has
been a crucial force.
I will argue (in connection with the causal concept used here) that
there is no nonbiological variable "deeper" than human numbers that
one can point to as being responsible for the population growth that
occurred, as one can point to population growth as being responsible
for the growth in income and the evolution of institutions and patterns
of behavior that were necessary for the progress that occurred. That is,
I will argue that unlike all other nonbiological variables, population
growth is exogenous in the process.
Many laypersons would say (and I agree with them) that the propo
sition stated here is entirely obvious: If there were no people, there
would be no "human capital" to create the knowledge that leads to
progress, and hence there would be no progress. But this answer is not
at all obvious or agreed-to in the view of many scholars, when speak
ing of long-run as well as of short-run progress. So the work required
here is not the demolition of a strawman.
It is a crucial element of the model stated here that population
growth and density affect the structure of law and tradition and politi
cal institutions. If this were not so, structures that are incompatible
with an improvement in technology and the long-run standard of living
could have remained in place indefinitely, thereby preventing further
progress. It is therefore an important part of this essay and perhaps
its most important novelty to offer fine-structure evidence for this
process of population-induced social change.
The complex web of relationships of endemic and epidemic disease,
and knowledge of them, with population density and total numbers
also is an important part of the analysis.
The strategy of the article will be as follows. The next section pre
sents the theory offered here. I then review the skimpy time-series and
cross-sectional evidence on the relationship of population to the rate of
economic growth in the long run, and ask about the possibility that
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other variables could explain the observed long-run economic growth;
at best, these data make aprimafacie but not a compelling case for the
theory. Next I digress to explore one particular topic which has been at
the root of thinking about population economics for three thousand
years: the relationship of numbers of people to supplies of natural
resources. I follow that with a presentation of evidence on the relation
ship of population to structural factors that affect the rate of economic
progress; this section is the heart of the paper; if given the space that
the subject deserves, the section would take up most of the book which
this subject properly requires (and which may yet come forth if luck
holds).
Various sections draw heavily upon my earlier work on the subject
of population growth; this article may be thought of as part of an evo
lutionary process in knowledge development.

A Stylized Description of Human Progress
In order to set the scene before launching into more formal work,
here is a stylized description of the long-run history of the process of
human progress. The first hominids came into being without any body
of knowledge that they themselves created, but instinctive knowledge
of how to survive was programmed into their genes just as with every
other species. And the early people may have learned some additional
techniques by observing other animals that happened to live within
their ken, such as techniques of building shelters and gathering food.
Such imitations may have been the first sort of learning that is distinc
tively human in its cumulative adaptation to the world about us. (I have
recently read that there seems to be a similar process of imitation
among apes, but it is questionable whether the knowledge can be
handed down from one generation to the next.)
The hominids then increased their population, just as other new spe
cies (if successful) increase their populations by spreading across new
territory into niches that will sustain them. At some point whether
population had stabilized by that time or not is unknown new discov
eries were made. These discoveries might have included the knowl
edge of fire and of stone implements the latter occurring at least two
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million years ago, according to Leakey (1981, p. 78). Each discovery
improved the ability of our ancestors to survive and allowed numbers
to increase faster than before the discovery; even simple stone tools
must have had a large effect on the rate of population growth. (Fire and
stone tools are "invention-pull" rather than "population-push" technol
ogy, requiring no increase in labor and therefore being of immediate
utility rather than waiting for further population growth to make them
profitable.) But recent work with genetics suggests that about 65,000
years ago the population was only about 100,000 and declined to about
10,000 before expanding again ("Research News," Science, October 1,
1993).
Why did rapid economic progress not occur much earlier say
100,000 or a million years ago? Was it just an accident that rapid
progress ever began, and could that accident just as easily have taken
place many millennia earlier? I think not; I cannot imagine any single
event that could have come along and made a big difference at an ear
lier time. The early invention of nuclear power obviously is inconceiv
able, but even had a nuclear reactor and full instructions been dropped
on earth by Martians, it would have been less use than a meteorite. Uti
lization of nuclear power had to wait for the accumulation of the nexus
of human numbers and knowledge.
Only a biological or environmental difference that would have
altered the nutrition and/or the rate of fertility and of subsequent sur
vival either climate or the appearance of a remarkable new easy-toobtain food source (or the opposite) or a change in the digestive sys
tem, for example could have altered the speed of economic progress
through the millennia. If numbers had been greater earlier on, there
would have been more people to invent and develop new discoveries
such as new ways of herding and cropping. Larger numbers also would
have meant greater need for such improvements earlier on, which
would have speeded up their adoption after invention in those cases
where adoption is not immediately profitable (Boserupian populationpush inventions).
Other kinds of differences could not have changed the rate of
progress, I contend. The earliest hominids had elements of a social sys
tem in their genetic programs, just as do apes; for example, incest was
surely practiced only infrequently, as with other species of animals.
But while there must have been some variations in social system from
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one band of hominids to another, it would not have been possible for
them to live with a modern form of social system that is consistent with
modern rates of rapid progress, such as democracy, over an area as
large as hundreds or even tens of miles in each direction, even if some
one had invented it; such modern systems could not be used until pop
ulation and technology (and the standard of living) had increased many
times over.
Would history have been very different if numbers had stayed at the
level they were at the time of Athens' glory? I contend that we would
not have reached the technology and the standard of living we now
enjoy especially our unprecedented life expectancy, which began to
lengthen rapidly only 250 years ago if our numbers had remained at
the few hundreds of millions on earth at the peak of Rome and Greece.
This essay is an attempt to support with theory and data the thoughts
sketched out in the above paragraphs.

The Theoretical Framework
My thesis is that (1) higher density and (2) larger total populations,
in individual societies and on earth altogether, were necessary condi
tions for progress. The extent to which they were (and are) also suffi
cient conditions depended in the past upon the nature of the societies at
the time. Particular societies certainly have been capable of retrogres
sion in the face of population growth. The analysis suggests, though it
cannot constitute more than a speculation on the matter, that conditions
of twentieth century transportation and communications have rendered
such long-term retrogression less and less likely, however.
The appropriate form for the inquiry is to ask: What would be the
effect of a major change in some variable jc? For example, what effect
would there have been if the Anglo-Saxon legal system had somehow
been transmitted to North American natives in the year 1000? Would
this have had a major effect on their economic and demographic
growth? The theory points to variables that are the key conditions of
readiness for growth the nexus of population numbers together with
the stock of knowledge and the level of the standard of living.
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An alternative theory, which I believe to be less compelling than the
theory stated above, is that the invention of new knowledge by itself
would raise the standard of living. For example, if starting in, say, the
year 1000 societies had somehow decided to educate a much larger
number of people and then put them to work in knowledge-producing
pursuits, would that have raised the rate of progress of the living stan
dard? Surely there would have been some increase in progress, but
how much? The work of Boserup (1965), together with my analysis of
inventions into those that are and are not immediately adopted without
appropriate demand conditions (Simon 1977, chapter 8; 1978; and
1992, chapter 3), shows that some newly invented knowledge can
remain dormant for a long time if demographic conditions are not
appropriate for its adoption at the time.
A secondary and related thesis is that the income level of a society is
the other most important determinant of significant material and tech
nical variables such as health, knowledge, physical and social mobility,
and communications. I will not develop this thesis here.
Conceptual Frameworks and the Time Horizon
The appropriate conceptual framework for the analysis of the effects
of population depends upon the length of horizon and upon the level of
economic development (which has the aggregate in the long-run corre
late with the historical date). These are some of the relevant frame
works.
1. For the very short run in a subsistence society, the framework of
Malthus is appropriate; the coming of more mouths or a deterioration
of natural conditions leads to diminishing returns in agriculture and
causes there to be less to eat for the average person. For the very short
run in a developed economy, the appropriate framework is a system of
equations which may have hundreds of variables and thousands of con
nections, as seen in the spaghetti-like large-scale multisector models
used for forecasting by consultants to government and business. In
these short-run models for both subsistence and developed economies,
the stock of technology and the nature of institutions and sometimes
even the size of the labor force are considered fixed.
2. Somewhat longer-term models consider physical and human cap
ital to vary. The growth of technology usually is considered to occur at
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a constant rate. The structures of political institutions, law, work
behavior, and tradition are considered to be fixed. The income level
and the size of the labor force are important variables in such models.
3. An even longer-run model of a subsistence society allows for the
nonconstant endogenous introduction of new technology. The alterna
tive frameworks of the long-run Malthusian dynamics (quite different
from the short-run Malthusian model mentioned above) and of the
Boserup analysis for subsistence agriculture are complementary rather
than opposing, as we shall see below. For developed economies, the
recent crop of endogenous-growth models (including my own work on
endogenous knowledge in connection with population growth) make
technology endogenous, but do not include some of the variables
included in the shorter-run models. These endogenous-growth models
include only income, population, and knowledge as independent vari
ables, and consider the structures of law and tradition only peripher
ally, if at all. Population growth may or may not be endogenous in this
sort of model.
4. The longest-run model, the heart of this paper, contains popula
tion growth at the earliest date in the dynamic system as the sole exog
enous variable; the structures of law, tradition, and other institutions
are endogenous variables, along with the standard of living, technol
ogy, and subsequent population growth. From such a model one can
deduce the proposition that if biological or climatological elements had
caused the rate of population growth to be faster than it actually was,
humanity would have had greater numbers than actually existed at var
ious times in the past; and each state in its development, including the
present state of high material culture and low mortality, would there
fore have reached centuries or millennia earlier.
Population and Knowledge
The most difficult analytic issue concerns the relationship between
the causal roles of population and of knowledge. They are the only two
variables about which one can reasonably say: If the stock of this vari
able had been much lower than its actual stock in year t, the state of
humanity would have been vastly poorer in the year t + x than it actu
ally was. All other variables, such as the stocks of private physical cap-
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ital and prime farmland, are likely to be replaced rather quickly if there
is a sudden catastrophic loss; not so with population and knowledge.
The rock bottom causal element of long-run human progress is the
combination of population and knowledge. They are as much insepara
ble parts of the same process as are the brain and the sexual organs. It
makes as little sense to ask which is the "original" cause as about
chicken and egg. Even the earliest humankind could not have survived
and grown without such technology as cutting tools and fire; and in
turn, the knowledge of these techniques came from human beings.
Indeed, the interpenetration of population and technology is shown
by the fact that history consists of both the Boserupian "populationpush" and the Malthusian "invention-pull" combinations of an inven
tion and population growth, in which causation runs from one of these
two forces in one case and to it in the other. (In Simon 1977, chapter 8;
1978; and 1992, chapter 3, I provide geometric and arithmetic theory
for these two processes, together with extensive historical examples.)
The key point is that no other element was as essential as the combi
nation of knowledge and human numbers not institutions, law, physi
cal capital, natural resources, or any other element. Humankind could
live in a variety of settings of these variables and produce livable forms
of them when they are completely absent; not so with knowledge and
human numbers.

Evidence on the Long-Run Progress-Population Connection
This section reviews the available time-series and cross-sectional
evidence on the relationship of population to the rate of economic
growth in the long run. The purpose is to show that there is indeed a
connection to be investigated; these data make a prima facie case for
the theory, but it is only prima facie and not a compelling case; to
make a persuasive case requires the later sections of the paper. Then
there is discussion of the possibility that variables other than popula
tion could explain the observed long-run economic growth.
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Population Size and the Standard of Living
Time-series evidence.
The first set of time-series evidence is stylized figures of crucial
variables over the very long run. The purpose of the graphs is to show
how all these variables moved in much the same general way, with
population moving earlier than the others. The lack of any precise data
and the consequent absence of ups and downs in the series prevents
any explicit statistical exploration of causality.
For the longest period of the existence of human beings as a spe
cies from, say, 20,000 years ago until 6,000 or 7,000 years ago
population growth was very slow, and hence total population and pop
ulation density were low. This growth might be described by a straight
line if plotted on semilog paper, but such a plot would obscure the
point of the graph, which is that the rate of early growth was infinitesi
mal.
A slightly less broad view is shown in figure 1, whose logarithmic
scale reveals the rapid increases in population starting with the onset of
the agricultural, industrial, and postindustrial "revolutions."
Figure 1. Growth of the Human Population of the World Over the Last
One Million Years
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During most of the past millennia, economic progress undoubtedly
was slow or nonexistent (which is proven by jobbing backwards;
spreading total growth over such a long period of time implies a very
low average rate), though it is very difficult to find meaningful indica
tors. Perhaps the most meaningful measure of economic progress
through the ages, both because of its intrinsic importance and because
we have some reliable data, is life expectancy; it increased only slowly
from the minimum level at which the species could be sustained rather
than go extinct. The most striking aspect of the increase in life expect
ancy for world populations at various dates over the past 10,000 years
is the rapid recent increase in the richer countries since the eighteenth
century, and in the poorer countries in the second half of the twentieth
country; this is an absolutely unprecedented event, and the most
important development in the history of humankind from the stand
point of economics as well as noneconomic welfare.
Some evidence that one might consider as disconfirming the basic
proposition of this paper is found in the long-run early history. The
total number of human beings who ever lived before, say, 6000 years
ago was not small; a reasonable estimate is that of the 77 billion human
beings born from 600,000 BC to 1962 AD, 12 billion lived before 6000
BC (with 42 billion from 6000 BC to 1650 AD, and 23 billion from 1650
AD to 1962 AD), to be compared with the more than 5 billion who may
be alive now. 1 Of course many of the people born in earlier years died
at young ages. But even so, the number of years of human life lived on
earth in the long-ago past was not small relative to any recent period.
Are these numbers inconsistent with their total intellectual production
in light of the thesis of this paper? Later I shall argue that because the
production of knowledge depends upon the existing stock of knowl
edge as well as the population size and density, the slow growth of
knowledge in early millennia does not confute the basic thesis.
The tool-using and tool-making revolution kicked off the rapid rise
in population around 1,000,000 BC The aid of various implements gave
the food gatherer and hunter access to the widest range of environ
ments. But when the productivity gains from the use of primitive tools
had been largely exploited, the rate of population growth fell.
The next rapid jump in population started perhaps 10,000 years ago,
when people began to keep herds and cultivate the earth rather than
simply foraging for wild plants and game. Once again the rate of popu-
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lation growth abated after the initial productivity gains from the new
technology had been exploited, and population size settled down to a
near-plateau compared to the rapid growth experienced for a while.
The known methods of making a living constituted a constraint to fur
ther population growth once the world's population reached a certain
size.
These two previous episodes of sharp rise and subsequent fall in the
rate of population growth suggest that the present rapid growth
which began perhaps 300 or 350 years ago, in the 1600s may settle
down again when, or if, the gains from the new industrial and agricul
tural knowledge that followed the "industrial revolution" begin to peter
out. And population size may again reach a near-plateau and remain
there until another "revolution" due to another major change in tech
nology, society, or psychology. Of course the current knowledge revo
lution may continue without foreseeable end, and population growth
may or may not continue as long as the revolution does. Either way, in
this long-term view population size adjusts to productive conditions
rather than being an uncontrolled monster.
To return to the many humans who lived in early millennia but pro
duced little new knowledge: If progress were a function of the number
of human minds alone, the total medical progress during the long
period before, say, 6000 BCE should have been as great as in the last 50
years, during which life expectancy increased rapidly and hugely. But
it was not so. Nor was the absence of rapid population growth as a
stimulus a reasonable explanation; the presence of sickness and the
danger of death certainly have been in all times a sufficiently powerful
motivation for major efforts at innovation. So this immediately
requires that a theory be more complex than the total number of per
sons alive among whom the spark of invention and progress might
somehow arise spontaneously.
The most reasonable additional explanatory variables are these: (1)
Population density conduces to the production and transmission of new
ideas, according to the theory of Simon Kuznets and the study by
Kelley (1972) of Higgs's (1971) data on American inventiveness. (2)
Production of new knowledge is influenced by the stock of existing
knowledge; the more existing ideas that may be built upon, the greater
the propensity to create new ideas. (This is demonstrated for the case
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of patents in England over many centuries by Simon and Sullivan
1989.)
Evidence from the modern period demonstrating that economic
growth in the developed countries has been faster in more recent
decades than in more distant decades when population was smaller is
found in the work of Maddison, Fellner, and Meguire (the latter finding
that the U.S. data do not square with the other countries' data, though it
is logically necessary that growth now be faster than, say, 200 years
ago (see Simon, forthcoming, for a review of this evidence).
Cross-sectional evidence.
Cross-national comparison of the data for recent decades reveals
that higher population density is correlated with a higher rate of eco
nomic growth (Simon and Gobin 1980).
Population Growth and the Growth of Technology

The next evidence to be presented concerns the bivariate relation
ships between population and such other variables as knowledge and
productivity over the period for which at least some data exists to
check for causality.
A long-run measure of the stock of the most important kind of
knowledge agricultural technology is the number of persons that a
single agricultural worker can feed. The complementary variable is the
proportion of the labor force that works in agriculture; it was nearly the
entire labor force throughout human history. But in about 1600 the pro
portion began to fall in the richest countries, and it now has reached
less than 2 percent in some affluent countries; the decline has unmis
takably begun in the poor parts of the world, too. This also is the best
long-term measure of the standard of living and of productivity.
A closely related measure of agricultural technology as indicated by
agricultural productivity per person is the price in labor time of a given
quantity of food. This price has fallen in the U.S. since 1800 by a factor
of perhaps 20 (Simon 1992).
A measure of technology related to productivity per person is pro
ductivity per unit of land the amount of land employed to feed an
average person. The quantity of land needed to feed a person has
declined extraordinarily over the years, in best practice by an astonish-
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ing factor of perhaps 25 million, compared with hunting and fishing
and by almost as much in standard practice, indicating an extraordinary
increase in productivity.
Shifting now to technology in metals production: Analogous to the
decline in the price of food as measured by the amount of time required
to produce it is the decline in the prices of metals an enormous fall
with respect to the price of labor in rich countries and large even com
pared with the consumer price index over the past two centuries
(Simon 1981; forthcoming), continuing a trend observable for 4,000
years. The supply of copper may be viewed in this context as a final
good and a component measure of the standard of living; it may also be
seen later as an element in the progress of productivity. The line of cau
sation from population to price seems rather clear here; there is no
other reasonable explanation of the increase in supply except an
increase in demand and in the supply of minds to produce new ways to
increase the supply and invent new substitutes.
The speed and cost of transportation is another good whose technol
ogy has measurably improved. (Transport is a good in itself, as well as
affecting the supply of food.) In just the past two centuries, speed has
risen from the 3-mile-an-hour walking pace of a human or the some
what faster pace of a horse or ship to hundreds of miles per hour on
land and thousands of miles per hour in the air (not even counting
space travel).
Long-run data on the increase in the stock of knowledge as mea
sured by the number of scientific journals and patents in the past five
centuries, and in human capital as measured by numbers of literate per
sons and persons with given amounts of education (the absolute num
bers are more relevant than the proportions, though the proportion is
also of interest), are sufficiently well known as to not need further dis
cussion here.
Some writers have suggested Greece and Rome as counterexamples.
But their rates of discoveries of important new ideas were faster in
their peak periods of population than before or after those periods (see
Simon 1981).
Another long period whose data are relevant is the Dark Ages. Cur
rently most commentators, such as Pirenne, agree that after population
declined, the standard of living fell and progress ceased despite the
increase in agricultural land per agriculturalist and the consequent drop
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in the price of land; this might have been caused by the decline in total
population or the lack of growth or both. Much the same seems to have
been true in the years after the Black Death. In contrast, the rapid
increases in population starting around 1000 and 1500 were accompa
nied by buoyant economic progress.
Simon and Sullivan (1989) show that in England from 1500 to 1800
population and knowledge (as measured by patents) do not just grow
together secularly, but there is a causal relationship between them
when other variables are held constant.
Cross-sectional evidence.
A work tradition beginning with Rostas (1948) shows that when
pairs of countries are compared, growth in productivity is higher in
those industries in which production is relatively larger; in light of the
association between higher production and higher population ceteris
paribus, this suggests that higher population leads to higher increases
in productivity.
Another relevant cross-sectional study is that of Glover and Simon
(1975), which shows that road density is greater where population is
more dense. And roads are a crucial element in the transmission of
knowledge.

Natural Resources and Population
As North (1981) has written, natural resources have been a major
element in discussions of population growth since the first such
recorded discussions. The constraint of natural resources must there
fore be considered before one can appreciate a theory of human
progress in the past despite the perceived limits of natural resources
progress that is without known bounds in the future as natural resource
constraints lessen rather than tighten.
Astonishingly, the importance of land and other natural resources
diminishes with every passing decade. Such was the great discovery of
Schultz about land in 1951, and of Barnett and Morse (1963) about
agricultural and mined resources. Their forecasts based on the histori
cal record and theoretical analyses have been borne out perfectly by
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events since then, as food and all metals, indeed, all natural resources,
have continued to get cheaper rather than more expensive.
Natural resources are the most dramatic examples of the fundamen
tal process at work in the long course of economic progress: Increasing
population or rising income raises demand for a commodity, which
usually implies a higher price. The higher price represents opportu
nity for businesses to make a profit and for inventors and institutions
to realize their desires to make creative social contributions. Most pro
spective discoverers fail to find solutions to the problem, and they pay
the price themselves. One or more succeed in finding the needed solu
tions. And usually the outcome, most unexpected though very impor
tant, is that the solution leaves humanity better off than before the
problem arose. That is, we end up with cheaper resources than before
the problem of the rise in price first occurred.
The story of this process at work in the case of energy since about
the fifteenth century in England from wood to coal to oil to nuclear
power is told at length in my 1981 book, as is the story of copper
during the 4000 years since Hammurabi.
A formal model of this process using the example of farmland may
be found in Simon and Steinman (1991) or in Simon (1992, chapter 5).
We simulate the model with meaningful parameters and analyze how
the course of food prices and land availability will change over centu
ries. We also analyze the steady-state properties of the system to show
how it is consistent with long-run growth in the standard of living as
human numbers increase.

Very-Long-Run Processes
It should help substantiate the exogeneity of growth to provide evi
dence on the disaggregated sinews of the process; this is the task of the
present section. This section contains the new substantive material
conveyed by this article, material which provides the evidence for the
propositions that (1) the rate of progress is a function of human num
bers; and (2) in the very long run all social and economic dimensions
are indeed a function of population size and density and constitute
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endogenous intermediate variables rather than independent causal vari
ables.
The elements that this section will touch on include the develop
ment of markets, social and economic organization, law, disease, and
evolved cultural patterns. Here our time horizon is so long that the phe
nomena that change over such a long period usually are not even men
tioned in the context of population economics. These phenomena have
been studied little, and because the ground is new the amount of data is
small. Hopefully the paucity of data will not mislead the reader about
the importance of these phenomena.
The Development of Markets
The size of the market depends upon both the number of people and
the level of income. The number of persons multiplied by their average
level of income measures aggregate income, and is perhaps the basic
measure of the size of the market. (Of course the sizes of submarkets
will be affected by the distribution of the total income among persons,
but that can be left aside here.) There is a presumption, then, that more
people imply bigger markets.
Increased population density also leads to better-organized markets.
Hicks (1969) and North (1981) have shown the connection between
these variables throughout history at the local and regional level. As
noted earlier, this phenomenon was seen vividly after the depopulation
of the Black Death. Despite higher wages and increased land availabil
ity to cultivators, overall economic conditions apparently were less
favorable. There was general economic depression as a result of the
disappearance of markets that in turn was caused by lack of people and
products to support markets.
A look at mircoeconomic theory with population and market growth
in mind immediately suggests many avenues through which there is
improved competition when population is larger rather than smaller,
especially the effects of having more rather than fewer producers and
sellers. In general, a larger number of competitors leads to a more
responsive and more rapidly changing marketplace.
Cities, along with infrastructure, seem to have been a crucial pre
condition of the industrial revolution in England, Holland, and else
where. The existence of cities requires relatively dense populations in
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surrounding areas. Cities and markets are closely related phenomena.
Pirenne's magisterial analysis (1925/1969) depends heavily on popula
tion growth and size. Larger absolute numbers of people are the basis
for increased trade and consequent growth in cities, which in turn
strongly influenced the creation of an exchange economy in place of
the subsistence economy of the manor.
According to Pirenne, growth in population causing cities to grow
also reduced serfdom by offering serfs legal haven in the city, as
memorialized in the saying "Town air makes free."
Disease
The evolution of the disease environment is another of the crucial
evolutionary processes that population density and growth have influ
enced. Density of population affects the virulence of disease; some
times it makes disease spread faster, as in the case of epidemics, and
sometimes it suppresses it, as in the case of malaria. And there are fur
ther complications: Sometimes increased virulence leads later to
immunities that check the spread of diseases. McNeill (1977) describes
how the evolution of the disease environment has been greatly influ
enced in complex ways by population density and therefore by popula
tion growth.
For most of the great diseases, the growth of population in earlier
centuries represented a one-time "investment" of our species into
developing resistance to mass killers; once our ancestors had suffered
this experience, later generations could go about their lives with less
threats.
A different sequence: By causing the land to be cropped closely,
increasing population density reduces the virulence of malaria, the
greatest killer of all; an important example was South China, which
was only colonized after this process had made it habitable.
A body of knowledge about the prevention and cure of diseases also
has evolved, much of it in a prescientific trial-and-error process; an
older example is the practice of quarantine. More recently, health
knowledge has begun to evolve from systematic scientific work; an
example is smallpox vaccination. Such advances in medical practice
can be attributed to the combination of a scientific attitude and a
greater base of scientific medical knowledge, both of which were
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enhanced by the industrial revolution; these advances occurred in
countries that were experiencing the industrial revolution, and did not
occur in countries such as India and China that were outside the ambit
of the industrial revolution. This greater capacity to deal actively with
the disease environment may be seen as a consequence of population
growth.
Events during the industrial revolution are instructive in this regard.
The causes of the fall in the death rate are also somewhat unclear,
though in recent years scholars have made rapid progress in under
standing the phenomenon. Some part of the mortality drop may have
been unconnected with economic progress; the climate may have
improved and yielded better crops, the rat population may have sponta
neously altered its species composition in such fashion that the rigors
of plague diminished, and the disease environment may otherwise have
become less dangerous. Some part of the improvement may stem from
economic progress in only very indirect fashion, if at all, notably
through shorter periods of breastfeeding and hence less inhibition of
pregnancy. But economic progress was surely responsible for most of
the improved life expectancy.
Economic progress, which interactively is the result of population
growth, helped people live longer by providing better diets. McKeown
(McKeown and Brown 1955; McKeown 1985) has argued forcefully
that "the slow growth of the human population before the eighteenth
century was due mainly to lack of food, and the rapid increase from
that time resulted largely from improved nutrition" (1985, p. 29).
Fogel's (1989) work agrees. (The importance of nutrition is surpris
ingly difficult to establish conclusively, however.)
Economic progress also helped people live longer through develop
ment of the physical infrastructure of society, especially provision of
purer communal drinking water. Such improvements were not mainly
intended to improve health and reduce death, but they nevertheless did
so to an important degree. Building such infrastructure requires farm
ing to be sufficiently efficient so that society can afford to employ peo
ple on such community projects. Also required is that the population be
sufficiently large and dense that such projects are economical. The
same is true for roads and other communication systems that contrib
uted to the spread of health technology. (See earlier discussion of road
density and population density.)
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In some places greater population density must have had short-term
negative effects upon health by temporarily lowering the standard of
living the Malthusian "positive check." But in the longer run, the
overall result of population growth on the incidence of disease clearly
has been positive.
Social and Political Organization
Though it is difficult to pin down statistically, the effect of popula
tion size and density upon social and political organization and its role
in economic development is given ever greater importance by such
scholars as Jones (1981) and McNeill (1963).
Population density and size seem to be related to the mode of orga
nization and the size of the government sector. Stevenson (1968)
argues that increasing density leads to better-articulated organization
of society; this seems plausible, but the phenomenon is difficult to
quantify.
The relationship of population growth to the abolition of feudalism
and slavery is controversial and needs further investigation.
It is enlightening to keep in mind a question that is frequently asked:
If more people cause there to be more ideas and knowledge, more
growth of markets and cities, and hence higher productivity and
income, why did not the modernization revolution begin in India and
China? This requires more lengthy discussion than this introduction to
the subject permits; suffice it to say that it ties into discussion of what
Jones calls "the European miracle."
In Europe there seems to have been a nexus of interconnections
between loosening of feudal ties, growth of cities, personal economic
freedom, political freedom, openness of societies, competition among
European states, economic advance, popular government, and popula
tion growth. McNeill (1963), Jones (1981) and others have suggested
that over several centuries the relative looseness and changeableness of
social and economic life in Europe, compared to China and India,
helps account for the emergence of modern growth in the West rather
than in the East. Change implies economic disequilibria which, as
Schultz (1975) reminds us, imply exploitable opportunities leading to
augmented effort. (Such disequilibria also cause the production of new
knowledge, it would seem.)
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Evolved Cultural Patterns
The processes of evolutionary growth extend into technical knowl
edge, social institutions, language, law, morals, rituals, and practices,
all of which affect human productive capacities just as does the evolv
ing stock of land, tools, shelter, and other physical capital one of the
most interesting aspects of this subject. It is plausible that these aspects
of human life changed only under the pressure of necessity, as repre
sented by increased population, and then in turn the new conditions
influenced the growth of population. If humankind had not developed
patterns of behavior and association that increased rather than
decreased the amounts of resources available to us, we would not still
be here. If, as humankind's numbers increased (or even as numbers
remained nearly stationary), behavior had led to diminished supplies of
plants and animals, less flint for tools, and disappearing wood for fires
and construction, I would not be writing these pages, and you would
not be reading them. These processes cannot now be documented for
prehistory, of course, but we have begun to develop knowledge about
the operation of similar processes in recent decades and the present,
e.g., changes in institutions for agricultural research (Hayami and Ruttan 1987).
Evolved cultural patterns include voluntary exchange among indi
viduals, and the markets that function to provide resources in increas
ing quantities, as discussed above; institutions that pass on knowledge,
such as schools; libraries, legends and storytellers, all of which store
knowledge; and monasteries, laboratories, and research-and-development departments which produce knowledge.
Humankind has evolved into creators and problem solvers to an
extent that people's constructive behavior has outweighed their
destructive behavior, as evidenced by our increasing life expectancy
and richness of consumption. And in recent centuries and decades, this
positive net balance has been increasing rather than decreasing. This
view of the human as (on balance) a builder conflicts with the view of
the human as destroyer, which underlies the thought of many doomsay ers.
Paradoxically, rules and customs that lead to population growth
rather than to population stability or decline may be part of our inher
ited capacity to deal successfully with resource problems in the long
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run, though the added people may exacerbate the problems in the short
run. Such rules and customs probably lead to long-run success of a
society in two ways. First, as noted above, high fertility leads to
increased chances of a group's survival, other things being equal. For
example, though the Parsis of India have been, as individuals, very
successful economically, as a people they seem doomed to the failure
of disappearance in the long run due to their marriage and fertility pat
terns. Second, high fertility leads to resource problems, which then
lead to solutions to the problems that usually leave humanity better off
in the long run than if the problems had never arisen, in the process
discussed earlier. In a more direct chain of events, rules and customs
leading to high fertility yield an increased supply of human ingenuity,
which responds productively to the increased demand for goods.
Particularly slow to change are basic institutions of law and conven
tion. These institutions tend to evolve gradually rather than being
altered by political upheaval or legislation. Hayek (1989) argues that
property rights and the family are the two most important institutions
in determining the economic progress of a nation. He suggests that
they, as well as the rest of the rich tapestry of cultural patterns, develop
by a process of cultural selection wherein communities that grow in
numbers are more likely to have their institutions be dominant in the
wider world than are groups that do not increase in population. Much
of this evolutionary process has taken place over thousands of years.
But the effects were important for economic development; for exam
ple, the system of Anglo-Saxon common law and its protection for
property surely aided the course of the industrial revolution in
England. Therefore, these slow-moving effects of population increase
should not be forgotten in our survey of demographic consequences.
Linguistics may be able to cast some light on the rate of change of
language to population size. In this respect language may be an impor
tant model for change in other subtle elements in culture.
The effect of population density and size upon the refinement and
the changes in direction that occur in the law has been hinted at by pre
liminary studies in the United States relating the size of state to the
extent to which decisions are cited. This theme needs to be developed.
Most difficult of all to pin down is the effect of population growth
and the industrial revolution, and their proximate effects discussed ear
lier, upon individual psychology and small-group sociology. Adam
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Smith remarks that "the progressive state is in reality the cheerful and
the hearty state to all the different orders of the society. The stationary
is dull; the declining melancholy." And it was a commonplace during
the earlier part of the industrial revolution that industrial work disci
pline, including attention to the daily time schedule for work hours,
was both important and slow to develop. Many writers have discussed
the mentality of progress and the notion of systematic scientific
progress; both ideas were concomitants of the industrial revolution.
However accurate these observations about psychological and smallgroup effects may be, however, they do not stand on the same level of
demonstrated fact as do the phenomena discussed in the earlier parts of
this paper. Yet the brevity of this treatment should not be taken as sug
gesting that these factors may not be of great significance. (On the
other hand, perhaps human nature should be seen as having been
changed relatively little by the industrial revolution. The meaning of
"little" and "much" are quite subjective, of course.)

Summary and Conclusions
This paper outlines a theory of the role of "human capital" that fits
the very-long-run trends. It discusses some of the elements that affect
the speed of adjustment to population change, conditions which are
different at different times in history and vary from place to place.
1. The state of knowledge clearly is the dominant element that var
ies in the long run. It is affected by population growth and density, as
knowledge in turn affects population growth and density.
2. Interrelated with changes in knowledge and production technique
are changes in the structure of society. These structural changes also
are influenced by population variables, and vice versa. There is
increasing recognition of the importance of social and economic struc
ture in economic development in even the short run. And population
affects these forces in the long run.
3. The growth of markets, with their many associated phenomena,
has been a function of population size and density. More people mean
both more buyers and more sellers, and hence less monopoly and more
competition and competitive effort.
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4. Slowest-changing are the habits, rituals, language, law, morals,
and all manner of social institutions, including sexual and childraising
practices. All of these elements are subject to processes of evolutionary
change. They not only are affected by population variables, but in turn
influence population growth and differentially the likelihoods of
survival of different human groups. Also disease affects in both direc
tions. Here we have moved all the way to full biology-like evolution
ary thinking, which is at the other end of the methodological spectrum
from the sort of physics-like thinking that we apply in very-short-run
analysis when the relevant elements are known and fixed. But the evo
lutionary processes in question are social and cultural rather than bio
logical.
NOTE
1 A more recent estimate is 3.8 billion before 40,000 BCE, 39 billion from 40,000 BCE to the
start of the Common Era, and 22 6 billion from the year 1 up until the year 1750, plus another
10 4 billion from then until 1950, and 4 3 billion from then until 1987, for a total of perhaps 80.3
billion (Bourgeois-Pichat 1989, p 90). The fact that, although Bourgeois-Pichat did not make ref
erence to Desmond (1975), the two estimates are so close to each other lends confidence to them.
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